Hennessy v. Federal Deposit Insurance , 58 F.3d 908 ( 1995 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    1995 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    6-29-1995
    Hennessy v FDIC
    Precedential or Non-Precedential:
    Docket 94-1857
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    Recommended Citation
    "Hennessy v FDIC" (1995). 1995 Decisions. Paper 178.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1995/178
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    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    No. 94-1857
    JOHN T. HENNESSY; MICHAEL B. HIGH;
    WILLIAM A. BRACKEN; LARRY GIBSON;
    MARTHA C. HITCHCOCK; LAURENCE A. LISS;
    KEN MANCINI; GEORGE S. RAPP;
    ROBERTA GRIFFIN TORIAN; FRANK J. SORIERO
    v.
    FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION,
    AS RECEIVER FOR MERITOR SAVINGS BANK
    (D.C. Civil No. 93-cv-05589)
    THOMAS CALLAHAN
    v.
    FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION,
    AS RECEIVER FOR MERITOR SAVINGS BANK
    (D.C. Civil No. 94-cv-01949)
    John T. Hennessy, Roberta Griffin Torian,
    Michael B. High, William Bracken, Laurence Liss,
    Marty Hitchcock, George S. Rapp, Kenneth R. Mancini,
    Lawrence J. Gibson, Frank J. Soriero and Thomas Callahan,
    Appellants
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. No. 93-cv-05589)
    No. 94-1933
    DAVID A. CAMPBELL, JR.; ROBERT F. HANNA;
    LESLIE VOTH; HELEN T. DEMARCO, individually, and
    ROBERT F. HANNA; HELEN T. DEMARCO, on behalf of
    themselves and all others similarly situated,
    (SEPARATION PLAN CLASS), and
    DAVID A. CAMPBELL, JR.,
    on behalf of himself and all others similarly
    situated, (RETIREE HEALTH CLASS), and
    DAVID A. CAMPBELL, JR.; ROBERT F. HANNA,
    on behalf of themselves and all others
    similarly situated, (LIFE INSURANCE CLASS)
    v.
    FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION
    AS RECEIVER FOR MERITOR SAVINGS BANK
    David A. Campbell, Jr., Robert F. Hanna,
    Helen T. DeMarco and Leslie Voth,
    Appellants
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. No. 93-cv-03969)
    No. 94-1934
    JOSEPH A. ADOLF, LAURENCE J. ARNOLD,
    CHRISTIAN F. AURIG, GEORGE W. BARBER,
    LINDA C. BARCH, RICHARD F. BATE, OWEN J. BEHEN,
    LAUREN BETHEA, ELIZABETH L. BLANKENHORN,
    ANNE MARIE BOBACK, SUSAN M. BROWN,
    JOHN J. BUCZEK, GEORGE S. BUNTING, MARY ANN C. BURCH,
    EDITH BURKEITT, THOMAS P. CALLAHAN,
    DAVID A. CAMPBELL, JR., KARLA J. CARNEY,
    JOHN M. CASAMENTO, JR., WILLIAM J. CATHCART,
    LISA CAVALLI, NANCY L. CEFFARATTI, JOSEPH D. CELLUCCI,
    ESTHER CERBO, CAROLE A. CIRCUCCI, ANTHONY R. COOGAN,
    LARRY A. COOK, SAMUEL J. COOK, WALLACE P. COONEY,
    PAUL L. COPPOLA, LORENE C. COQUILLETTE,
    BETTY R. CORLEY, HARRIET S. CORLEY, JOAN T. CORSON,
    DAVID E. COVERDALE, MARY C. CRAIGE, LOIUS T. CULLEN,
    JOHN F. CULP, EDWARD D. CUSTER, MICHAEL CZINCILA,
    JOAN E. DEBES, IRENE V. DELIZZIO, GAIL L. DELVISCIO,
    HAROLD L. DEMPSEY, HAROLD C. DENGEL,
    DEBRA ANNE DENIGHT, BEATRICE L. DESHER,
    JOSEPH H. DEVORE, JR., ANNA S. DIFELICE,
    MARIO DIFELICE, MARY ANN DIGREGORIO,
    LEONID A. DOBRININ, SARAH S. DOODY, JOSEPH M. DUFFY,
    LEONARD T. EBERT, JOHN A. FATULA, CHARLES J. FERRIE,
    GEORGE W. FETTERS, JR., LORE L. FISHER, JOHN P. FOGARTY,
    CYNTHIA M. FORD, DORIS GAGLIARDI, BARBARA A. GIBSON,
    FRANCES J. GILLEN, WILLIAM R. GOETTLE,
    CHARLES W. GRAY, III, EUGENE A. HEIWIG,
    WILLIAM H. HILLIARD, WILLIAM H.H. HSU,
    STANLEY E. HUNT, CHARLES C. JONES,
    THOMAS C. KEISER, KATHLEEN F. KELLY, LYNN M. KELLY,
    ETHEL S. KEOWEN, JOHN ANDREW KINNERMAN,
    PHILIP W. KLINGER, C. ANDREW KREPPS, JR.,
    JOHN DAVID LAMBERT, MICHAEL G. LEWIS,
    PATRICIA LEUTHY, SALVATORE LIZZIO, ALDO S. LOMBARDI,
    ELISABETH W. LORD, KATHLEEN LYNCH, E. DAVID MACNALLY,
    WILLIAM C. MACNEILL, JR., FRANK JOSEPH MARULLO,
    EDWARD M. MASON, JR., THOMAS G. MARVEL,
    RUTH A. MCALLISTER, JOSEPH F. MCCOLE,
    CHRISTINE D. MCCORMICK, PHILIP J. MCCORMICK,
    JANET B. MCCOURT, DAVID C. MELNICOFF, FREDA I. MILLAR,
    ANTHONY M. MINGARINO, JOSEPH J. MOFFA,
    LINDA LEE MONTANA, BARBARA L. MORGAN,
    MARION D. MORGAN, LEONARD V. MORRIS,
    DAVID D. MORRISON, MARY T. MURPHY, ANTHONY J. NOCELLA,
    WILLIAM A. NORRIS, III, MARTHA K. NYLUND,
    MARY E. ORR, JOHN T. OSMIAN, CHARLES E. PADGETT,
    PATRICIA PAWLING, HOWARD F. PEARCE,
    CATHERINE P. PICCONE, PETER P. PRYZBYLKOWSKI,
    DARLENE E. PURUGGANAN, ELIZABETH L. RAFETTO,
    EDWARD W. RAPP, LUBA K. REILLY, LOUISE M. REITANO,
    ANTOINETTE D. RENDINO, MS. JAMIE RINDOCK,
    JEAN DAVIS ROBINSON, RICHARD ROGERS, DIANE S. ROHR,
    HERBERT A. ROTH, ANTHONY J. SANTILLI, JR.,
    KATHLEEN M. SAWCHYNSKY, RUTH C. SCHMIDT,
    MICHAEL F. SCUTTI, MARTIN SELGRATH, JOHN W. SEMPLE,
    JOSEPH F. SLANE, ROBERT A. SMALLEY, ELIZABETH K. SONNEBORN,
    FRED B. STAAS, WALTER R. STAPLES, ROBERT C. STEINMAN,
    ARTHUR W. STETTLER, JEAN J. STUBBS, ANTHONY TABASCO,
    ROBERT B. TAYLOR, ANNITA L. TEDESCO, KENNETH C. THOMAS,
    PATRICIA E. THOMPSON, DIANNE T. TINDALL,
    JAMES M. TOOLAN, MORRIS VARANO, STANLEY J. VERBEEK,
    DONNA VOLZ, LESLIE C. VOTH, THERESA M. WEBB,
    CYNTHIA WEST, ROBERT B. WHITELAW, ALTON T. WINNER, JR.,
    ANNE M. WISE, VERDELLA WRIGHT, ANTHONY J. ZONGARO AND
    LINA G. ZANONI,
    Appellants
    v.
    FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION,
    AS RECEIVER FOR MERITOR SAVINGS BANK
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. No. 94-cv-01499)
    Argued May 16, 1995
    Before:   COWEN, LEWIS and GARTH, Circuit Judges
    (Filed   June 29, l995 )
    Alice W. Ballard (argued)
    Samuel & Ballard
    225 South 15th Street
    Suite 1700
    Philadelphia, PA 19102
    COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS
    in No. 94-1857
    Harry C. Barbin (argued)
    Barbin, Lauffer & O'Connell
    608 Huntingdon Pike
    Rockledge, PA 19046
    COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS
    in No. 94-1933
    Harry C. Barbin (argued)
    William M. O'Connell
    Barbin, Lauffer & O'Connell
    608 Huntingdon Pike
    Rockledge, PA 19046
    COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS
    in No. 94-1934
    Jaclyn C. Taner (argued)
    Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
    550 17th Street, N.W.
    Washington, DC 20429
    COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE
    Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
    as Receiver for Meritor Savings Bank
    OPINION
    COWEN, Circuit Judge:
    Plaintiffs in these related cases, former employees and
    managers of Meritor Savings Bank, appeal from three orders of the
    district court that granted summary judgment in favor of the
    defendant, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), on
    their claims to recover severance pay, medical benefits, and life
    insurance benefits pursuant to the terms of their employee
    welfare benefit plans.   The issues raised in these appeals are
    whether the district court erred in determining that: (1) the
    FDIC's takeover and sale of Meritor was not a reorganization for
    purposes of the plaintiffs' separation pay plan; (2) the
    discharge of Meritor employees did not constitute "job
    elimination" or "lack of work" triggering severance payments; (3)
    the plaintiffs had no vested right to severance pay; (4) the FDIC
    properly exercised its repudiation powers; (5) the plaintiffs did
    not incur "actual direct compensatory damages" as provided in 
    12 U.S.C. § 1821
    (e)(3); (6) the FDIC properly terminated life and
    health insurance benefits pursuant to the termination provisions
    in these employee welfare benefit plans; (7) the FDIC was not
    liable for a statutory penalty under 
    29 U.S.C. § 1132
    (c)(1) as a
    result of its failure to respond in a timely manner to
    plaintiffs' request for plan documents; and (8) the certification
    of three plaintiff classes was inappropriate.    Because we
    conclude that the district court did not err in granting summary
    judgment to the FDIC on plaintiffs' claims for separation pay,
    health insurance benefits, and life insurance benefits, we will
    affirm the orders of the district court.   Further, because we
    conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
    finding that the FDIC is not liable for the statutory penalty
    prescribed by 
    29 U.S.C. § 1132
    (c), we will affirm the order of
    the district court pertaining to this issue.    Finally, because of
    our conclusion on the merits, that the district court did not err
    in granting summary judgment for the FDIC, we need not reach the
    class certification issues.
    I.   FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    On December 11, 1992, the Secretary of Banking of the
    Commonwealth of Pennsylvania issued an order declaring Meritor
    Savings Bank ("Meritor") insolvent and directing that the bank be
    closed.   On the same day, the FDIC was appointed as receiver for
    the insolvent bank.    As receiver, the FDIC executed a Purchase
    and Assumption Agreement with Mellon Bank ("Mellon") transferring
    a portion of Meritor's assets and liabilities to Mellon.      The
    FDIC retained the liabilities not assumed by Mellon, along with
    the unpurchased Meritor assets, which the FDIC proceeded to
    liquidate for the benefit of Meritor's approved creditors.
    The record demonstrates that until the Secretary of Banking
    declared the bank insolvent, Meritor maintained a separation pay
    plan ("SPP"), a retiree health insurance plan (the Meritor
    Medical Plan 65 Special Option or "65 Special"), and a retiree
    life insurance plan (the Meritor Group Life Insurance Plan or
    "MGLIP").1   Under the SPP, eligible employees were entitled to
    severance pay based on their years of service and salary, up to a
    maximum benefit of twenty-six weeks.        Benefits were payable for
    involuntary termination due to "lack of work, job elimination,
    reorganization or reduction-in-force."          Campbell App. at 139a.
    No benefits would be paid if separation resulted from sale or
    disposition of a portion of Meritor's assets and the employee was
    employed by the successor entity.        
    Id.
    The SPP was "unfunded," meaning all benefits were paid from
    the general assets of Meritor.       
    Id.
     at 141a.      Meritor retained
    sole authority to determine whether a separation entitled an
    employee to benefits.       
    Id.
       Moreover, Meritor expressly reserved
    the right to modify or discontinue the SPP in whole or in part at
    any time.    
    Id.
     at 137a.
    Under the 65 Special, Meritor provided group health
    insurance coverage for its retirees.           
    Id.
     at 406a.   The 65
    Special was a self-insured plan that qualified as an employee
    welfare benefit plan under the Employee Retirement Income
    Security Act of 1974, as amended, 
    29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461
    1
    . The parties stipulated to the material facts in these cases.
    Statement of Undisputed Facts, Hennessy App. at 187-95; Joint
    Statement of Undisputed and Disputed Facts Regarding Motions for
    Summary Judgment, Campbell App. at 403a-70a; Joint Statement and
    Joint Supplemental Statement of Disputed and Undisputed Facts,
    Adolph App. at 367a-437a.
    ("ERISA").    The MGLIP, also an employee welfare benefit plan
    under ERISA, provided retirees with death benefit coverage equal
    to the lesser of $50,000 or 25% of the amount of death benefit
    coverage for which they were insured immediately prior to
    retirement.    
    Id.
     at 405a-06a.
    Meritor explicitly reserved the right to terminate the 65
    Special and the MGLIP at any time. The health plan provided:
    Meritor intends the plan to be permanent, but since future
    conditions affecting your employer cannot be anticipated or
    foreseen, Meritor reserves the right to amend, modify or
    terminate the plan at any time, which may result in the
    termination or modification of your coverage. Expenses
    incurred prior to the plan termination will be paid as
    provided under the terms of the plan prior to its
    termination.
    
    Id.
     at 165a (emphasis omitted).    The life insurance
    plan provided:
    Meritor reserves the right to terminate the group life
    insurance policy for its employees and retirees at any time,
    if Meritor determines that such termination is in its best
    interests. If Meritor terminates its group life insurance
    policy, employees and retirees who die after the effective
    date of the termination . . . will not have any life
    insurance.
    
    Id.
     at 152a.
    On the day the Secretary declared Meritor insolvent, a
    meeting was held to discuss the status of Meritor's employees.
    At that meeting, Jack Goodner, the FDIC's closing manager, made a
    brief presentation.    When he finished his remarks, an employee
    asked him whether severance benefits would be paid.     Goodner
    thought not, but was not sure.    After looking towards two other
    FDIC officials for guidance, Goodner responded "no."     At the
    close of business on December 11, 1992, the former Meritor
    employees became employees of Keytech Resources, Inc., a firm
    established to provide staffing for the former Meritor offices
    purchased by Mellon.   Mellon paid severance benefits to the
    employees who were subsequently laid off based on their years of
    service to Meritor, up to a maximum of four weeks salary.
    On the Monday following the events of Friday, December 11,
    1992, the former branches of Meritor opened for business as usual
    under the name of Mellon-PSFS without interruption of business to
    regular customers.   The FDIC subsequently repudiated the SPP
    pursuant to its powers under 
    12 U.S.C. § 1821
    (e).   The FDIC did
    not repudiate either the 65 Special or the MGLIP plans.   Instead,
    the FDIC sent letters to the former employees and retirees of
    Meritor notifying them that their health and life insurance plans
    were terminated effective December 31, 1992 pursuant to the terms
    of each plan.2   Those letters advised the employees about the
    availability of FDIC-sponsored continuing medical coverage, and
    also provided specific instructions for filing claims for
    benefits under the FDIC's statutory claims process, alerting the
    employees and retirees to a March 19, 1993 bar date for filing
    claims against the assets of the receivership.
    A. The Hennessy Plaintiffs
    2
    . Consistent with the above facts, when we use the term
    "repudiation," we are referring to the statutory power of a
    receiver under 
    12 U.S.C. § 1821
    (e) to refuse to recognize a
    contract. "Termination," by contrast, refers to the
    discontinuing of a plan pursuant to the plan's own terms.
    The Hennessy plaintiffs are former managers of Meritor.
    They filed suit in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania alleging
    the right to recover severance pay pursuant to the terms of the
    SPP.    In support of their claim, they rely on the above-stated
    facts and the fact that, prior to the FDIC's takeover of Meritor,
    each of them received a letter from Meritor's Chairman, Roger
    Hillas, stating:
    Meritor senior management is acutely aware that [it] is
    essential to retain motivated employees such as you in key
    positions.
    As evidence of this awareness, Meritor is extending the
    severance benefit provided to you under the Separation Pay
    Program to a total of 52 weeks pay. This enhanced benefit
    will be payable under the same terms and conditions as
    provided for in the Separation Pay Program if you are
    separated from employment by Meritor anytime on or before
    December 31, 1992.
    Letter from Hillas to John Hennessy (October 3, 1990); Hennessy
    App. at 68.    The Hennessy plaintiffs argued before the district
    court that their severance rights under the SPP were activated
    when "they were terminated as part of a reorganization."
    Hennessy v. FDIC, 
    858 F. Supp. 483
    , 487 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
    The district court rejected the Hennessy plaintiffs'
    argument.    The court explained that the FDIC sold Meritor to
    Mellon and was in the process of liquidating the rest of
    Meritor's assets.    
    Id.
       The court reasoned that because the FDIC
    was involved with the termination of Meritor, rather than the
    continuation of its business, there was no reorganization.     
    Id.
    In the alternative, the Hennessy plaintiffs argued before
    the district court that given the FDIC's repudiation of the SPP,
    the plaintiffs should be able to recover severance pay pursuant
    to 
    12 U.S.C. § 1821
    (e)(3) which provides for compensation for
    actual direct compensatory damages attributable to a repudiation.
    
    Id. at 488-89
    .    The district court disagreed.    Relying on the
    decision of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Howell
    v. FDIC, 
    986 F.2d 569
     (1st Cir. 1993), the district court
    determined that severance payments are not actual direct
    compensatory damages under § 1821(e)(3).      Id. at 489.
    Accordingly, the district court granted summary judgment in favor
    of the FDIC.     Id. at 485.   This appeal followed.
    B. The Campbell Plaintiffs
    The Campbell plaintiffs include: (1) David Campbell, Jr., an
    employee who retired from Meritor effective December 1, 1987; (2)
    Robert Hanna, Helen DeMarco, and Leslie Voth, employees who were
    employed by Meritor on December 11, 1992; and (3) potential
    plaintiff classes comprised of the above named plaintiffs and
    those similarly situated.      The Campbell plaintiffs filed claims
    for benefits with the FDIC.      The FDIC, however, rejected these
    claims.
    Subsequent to the FDIC's denial of their claims, the
    Campbell plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District
    Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.        In their
    complaint, plaintiffs Hanna and DeMarco sought severance payment
    pursuant to the SPP.     Plaintiff Campbell sought a declaration
    that he and other similarly situated persons are entitled to
    health insurance coverage under the 65 Special.        Campbell also
    sought reimbursement with interest for health insurance premiums
    paid since December 11, 1992.      In addition to these claims,
    plaintiffs Campbell and Hanna sought a declaration that they and
    other similarly situated persons are entitled to life insurance
    under the MGLIP.      They also sought reimbursement with interest
    for life insurance premiums paid since December 11, 1992.
    Finally, plaintiffs Campbell, Hanna, Voth and DeMarco sought a
    monetary penalty under ERISA for the FDIC's failure to provide in
    a timely manner information requested by their counsel.3
    The district court denied Hanna and DeMarco's claims for
    severance pay under the SPP for the reasons set forth in its
    decision in Hennessy.      Campbell v. FDIC, No. CIV.A.93-3969, 
    1994 WL 475067
    , at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 1994).      In addition, the
    court found that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the claims
    brought by Campbell or Voth because these claims were filed
    prematurely.4   
    Id.
        Nevertheless, the court concluded that even
    if it had jurisdiction to hear Campbell's claims for health and
    life insurance benefits, these claims would fail because the FDIC
    terminated both the 65 Special and the MGLIP pursuant to its
    3
    . Plaintiffs' counsel sent an ERISA document request to the
    FDIC on March 16, 1993. The FDIC did not respond to the ERISA
    document request until September 21, 1993, 189 days after the
    initial request.
    4
    . The court concluded that Campbell's and Voth's claims were
    premature because these plaintiffs did not wait the requisite 180
    days after filing their claims with the FDIC before filing their
    actions in district court. Campbell, 
    1994 WL 475067
    , at *4. The
    court noted, however, that Campbell and Voth were added as
    individual plaintiffs in the Adolph case by the filing of the
    First Amended Complaint in that case and thus these plaintiffs
    asserted a timely filing in Adolph. 
    Id.
     at *7 n.7.
    contractual rights.   
    Id.
         Finally, the district court granted
    summary judgment in favor of the FDIC on the plaintiffs' claims
    for a statutory penalty because it concluded that: (1) the
    statutory penalty should not apply to the FDIC, an agency of the
    federal government; or (2) even if the statutory requirement does
    apply to the FDIC, the court would exercise its discretion under
    
    29 U.S.C. § 1132
    (c) and award no penalty in this case.        
    Id. at *7
    .
    With respect to the potential class claims, the district
    court denied plaintiffs' motion to certify a separation pay plan
    class, a retiree health class, and a life insurance class.
    Campbell v. FDIC, No. 93-3969 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 1994) (order
    denying class certification).      The court determined that the
    plaintiffs could not satisfy all four of the threshold
    requirements of Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
    Procedure for certifying a plaintiff class.         
    Id. at 5, 7, 8
    .    In
    addition, the district court found that class certification under
    Rule 23(b)(1) or Rule 23(b)(2) would be inappropriate.        
    Id. at 9
    .
    This appeal followed.
    C.    The Adolph Plaintiffs
    The Adolph plaintiffs are a group of 161 former Meritor
    employees and retirees.5     In their complaint, also filed in the
    United States District Court for the Eastern District of
    5
    . On July 22, 1994 the district court entered an order granting
    the plaintiffs' unopposed motion to amend the complaint in this
    matter to add David Campbell and Leslie Voth as plaintiffs.
    Pennsylvania, the employee plaintiffs challenged the repudiation
    of the SPP by the FDIC.    The retiree plaintiffs challenged the
    termination of their medical benefits under the 65 Special.       In
    addition, both the employee and retiree plaintiffs challenged the
    termination of the MGLIP.    The FDIC and the Adolph plaintiffs
    filed motions for summary judgment on July 26, 1994.    The
    district court granted summary judgment for the FDIC for the
    reasons detailed in Hennessy and Campbell.     Adolph v. FDIC, No.
    94-1499 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 1994) (order granting summary
    judgment).   This appeal followed.
    II. JURISDICTION
    These cases commenced under the Financial Institutions
    Reform, Recovery and Relief Act of 1989 ("FIRREA") and ERISA.
    The district court's jurisdiction was predicated upon 
    28 U.S.C. § 1331
    .   We have jurisdiction over the instant appeals pursuant to
    
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    .    We exercise plenary review over a grant of
    summary judgment.    Because the material facts in this matter are
    not in dispute, we review only for errors of law.    As to the
    Campbell plaintiffs' argument that an ERISA penalty should be
    assessed pursuant to 
    29 U.S.C. § 1132
    (c)(1), our review is for
    abuse of discretion.
    III. SEVERANCE PAY
    A. Was there a Reorganization?
    The Hennessy plaintiffs' first contention is that Meritor
    was "reorganized," triggering a right to severance payments under
    the terms of the SPP.   According to these plaintiffs, Mellon Bank
    acquired Meritor as a going concern following the FDIC's takeover
    of Meritor.   The Hennessy plaintiffs point out that Meritor's
    offices opened for business as usual on the next business day
    after the takeover under the trademark "Mellon-PSFS."   They
    assert that because Meritor continued as a going concern without
    interruption of business, they have a right to severance payments
    under the terms of the SPP.
    We are unpersuaded by this argument.    The written terms of
    the SPP provide that:
    If the Employee is involuntarily terminated for
    organizational reasons associated with lack of work, job
    elimination, reorganization, or reduction in force . . .
    he/she will be eligible to receive bi-weekly separation
    payments and benefit continuation as outlined in Section IV
    of the Plan Document.
    Meritor Separation Pay Program (effective November 1, 1989);
    Campbell App. at 129a (emphasis added).   The district court
    determined that both the facts and the law in this case did not
    support the conclusion that the Hennessy plaintiffs were
    terminated as part of a reorganization.   Hennessy, 858 F. Supp.
    at 487.   It reasoned that the FDIC's takeover and sale of a
    bank's assets constituted a termination of the bank's business,
    not a continuation of this business.   Id.   We agree with the
    determination of the district court.
    A receiver, unlike a conservator, does not have as its
    purpose the preservation of an institution as a going concern.
    Resolution Trust Corp. v. CedarMinn Bldg. Ltd. Partnership, 
    956 F.2d 1446
    , 1454 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,        U.S.   , 
    113 S. Ct. 94
     (1992).   Receivers have the power to liquidate and wind up
    the affairs of an institution.   
    Id.
     (citing FDIC v. Grella, 
    553 F.2d 258
    , 261 (2d Cir. 1977)).   As the Court of Appeals for the
    Eighth Circuit has recognized, this distinction was emphasized in
    the Conference Report accompanying FIRREA, which stated:
    The title . . . distinguishes between the powers of a
    conservator and receiver, making clear that a conservator
    operates or disposes of an institution as a going concern
    while a receiver has the power to liquidate and wind up the
    affairs of an institution.
    
    Id.
     (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 209, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 398
    (1989)).
    The Secretary of Banking for the Commonwealth of
    Pennsylvania closed Meritor Savings Bank.   The FDIC was appointed
    receiver and it sold some of Meritor's assets to Mellon.    As part
    of this transaction, Mellon agreed to assume some of Meritor's
    liabilities.   The FDIC proceeded to liquidate the remaining
    assets of Meritor for the benefit of Meritor's creditors.     These
    actions are commensurate with the winding up of a failed bank's
    affairs and the proper function of a receiver.    To suggest that
    these actions constituted a reorganization of Meritor is to turn
    a blind eye to the dispositive facts.   We therefore cannot
    conclude that the district court erred in its determination that
    Meritor did not undergo a reorganization that would trigger
    plaintiffs' rights to severance pay.
    B. "Job Elimination" or "Lack of Work"
    Rather than arguing that Meritor was reorganized, the Adolph
    and Campbell plaintiffs suggest that under the terms of the SPP,
    "job elimination" or "lack of work" triggered the receiver's
    obligation to pay severance benefits.    According to these
    plaintiffs, the district court failed to adequately consider this
    argument when it simply relied on its discussion in Hennessy to
    grant summary judgment in favor of the FDIC in the Campbell and
    Adolph cases.6   The Adolph and Campbell plaintiffs assert that
    because the FDIC, as receiver, stands in the shoes of Meritor, it
    must provide separation benefits pursuant to the written terms of
    the SPP.
    This argument also misses the mark.   As stated above, the
    written terms of the SPP provide:
    IF the Employee is involuntarily terminated for
    organizational reasons associated with lack of work, job
    elimination, reorganization, or reduction in force . . .
    he/she will be eligible to receive bi-weekly separation
    payments and benefit continuation as outlined in Section IV
    of the Plan Document.
    Meritor Separation Pay Program (effective November 1, 1989);
    Campbell App. 129a (emphasis added).    Job elimination, however,
    is defined by the plan to be if "as a result of a reorganization,
    changing business needs, or the sale, closure or relocation of an
    office, a specific position is determined to be unnecessary to
    the company for an indefinite period of time."    
    Id.
     at 128a.    The
    Secretary of Banking's shutdown of Meritor and the appointment of
    6
    . The district court's discussion in Hennessy did not
    specifically address this argument.
    the FDIC as receiver was not "reorganization, changing business
    needs, or the sale, closure or relocation of an office."      It was
    the shutdown of the entire bank.     Further, no specific position
    was "determined to be unnecessary to the company for an
    indefinite period of time."     Rather, Meritor ceased to exist, and
    the employment of all employees (not specific positions) was
    terminated permanently.     We therefore cannot conclude that "job
    elimination" triggered a right to severance pay.
    Similarly, we cannot conclude that a "lack of work," as
    defined by the plan, triggered the right to severance benefits.
    Lack of work is defined by the plan to be if "as a result of a
    decrease in volume of work to be done, a position is temporarily
    not needed."     
    Id.
     at 128a (emphasis added).   The facts of this
    case do not support the view that a position was "temporarily not
    needed."     The Secretary of Banking closed the entire bank and
    declared Meritor insolvent.     We therefore fail to see how the
    Campbell and Adolph plaintiffs have demonstrated a "lack of work"
    as the plan defines that phrase.     Accordingly, we are unpersuaded
    that the district court erred in failing to find this argument a
    sufficient basis upon which to ground a claim for severance
    benefits.7
    7
    . The Hennessy plaintiffs did not rely on "job elimination" or
    "lack of work" as a basis for recovery in their briefs before
    this Court. At oral argument, however, counsel for the Hennessy
    plaintiffs stated that she believed that "job elimination" or
    "lack of work" would be an alternative grounds of recovery for
    her clients. Further, she stated that the plan document
    containing the definitions of "job elimination" and "lack of
    work" received by the Campbell and Adolph plaintiffs was not
    received by the Hennessy plaintiffs.
    C. Did plaintiffs' right to severance pay vest?
    Using slightly different approaches, the Hennessy
    plaintiffs, and the Campbell and Adolph plaintiffs, next argue
    that their rights to severance pay were "fixed and unconditional"
    when the receiver was appointed.   Based on certain language in
    the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit's opinion in Kennedy
    v. Boston-Continental National Bank, 
    84 F.2d 592
     (1st Cir. 1936),
    the Hennessy plaintiffs argue that their rights to severance
    benefits vested on the day that Meritor closed its doors and went
    into receivership.   The Campbell and Adolph plaintiffs, by
    contrast, assert that the Meritor employees had fixed,
    enforceable contract rights to severance pay throughout the term
    of their employment as the result of their total compensation
    package.   According to the Campbell and Adolph plaintiffs, the
    only contingent aspect of their right to severance pay was the
    amount of the benefits to be paid, an amount that was tied to
    each employee's salary and years of service.   These plaintiffs
    cite Citizens State Bank of Lometa v. FDIC., 
    946 F.2d 408
    , 415
    (5th Cir. 1991), and that case's analysis of a standby letter of
    credit, to support their argument.
    (..continued)
    While the Hennessy plaintiffs' argument along these lines
    raises certain questions about which plan documents are
    applicable to them, we need not decide these questions because of
    our determination, see infra part III.D., that the FDIC
    repudiated the SPP.
    We find these arguments unconvincing.    The rights and
    liabilities of a bank and the bank's debtors and creditors are
    fixed as of the date of the declaration of a bank's insolvency.
    American Nat'l Bank of Jacksonville v. FDIC, 
    710 F.2d 1528
    , 1540
    (11th Cir. 1983) (citing First Empire Bank v. FDIC, 
    572 F.2d 1361
    , 1367-68 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    439 U.S. 919
    , 
    99 S. Ct. 293
     (1978); FDIC v. Grella, 
    553 F.2d 258
    , 262 (2d Cir. 1977);
    Kennedy, 
    84 F.2d at 597
    ).    To establish a claim against an
    insolvent bank in receivership, the liability of the bank must
    have accrued and become unconditionally fixed on or before the
    time it is declared insolvent.    Kennedy, 
    84 F.2d at 597
    (citations omitted).   As the Court of Appeals for the First
    Circuit has stated:
    The amount of a claim may be later established, but it
    must be the amount due and owing at the time of the
    declaration of insolvency . . . . If nothing is due at
    the time of insolvency, the claim should not be allowed
    . . . .
    Id.; see also Dababneh v. FDIC, 
    971 F.2d 428
    , 434 (10th Cir.
    1992) (courts analyze "provability" of claims and creditors
    possess "provable" claims only if claims are "in existence before
    insolvency") (quoting FDIC v. Liberty Nat'l Bank, 
    806 F.2d 961
    ,
    965 (10th Cir. 1986)).
    The language that the Hennessy plaintiffs cite in Kennedy is
    not to the contrary.     To support their argument, the Hennessy
    plaintiffs point to language in Kennedy that states:
    Had the lease contained a covenant that insolvency shall be
    breach of the lease and thereupon, without any further
    action by the lessor, the lease shall terminate and the
    lessor shall be entitled forthwith to damages measured as
    provided in the covenant of the lease for liquidated
    damages, then, on the declaration of insolvency, no doubt a
    claim would arise and be matured by the agreement for
    liquidated damages . . . so that the claim would be provable
    in bankruptcy.
    Kennedy, 
    84 F.2d at 597
     (citations omitted).    Aside from the fact
    that the Hennessy plaintiffs' position ignores the holding of
    Kennedy -- that the claim for failure to rent in that case was
    too contingent and uncertain to support liability -- these
    plaintiffs have made no showing that insolvency itself triggered
    their rights under the SPP.    The terms of the SPP do not provide
    that a declaration of insolvency triggers payment of severance
    benefits.    Accordingly, their right to severance benefits was
    still contingent at the time of the appointment of the receiver.
    The Campbell and Adolph plaintiffs' right to severance pay
    was likewise contingent, and their reliance on Citizens State
    Bank of Lometa is unavailing.    In Lometa, the Court of Appeals
    for the Fifth Circuit held that claims that "originated" from
    standby letters of credit issued before the bank became insolvent
    passed the "provability test" even though the triggering event
    obligating the bank to pay did not occur until after the bank
    became insolvent.    Lometa, 
    946 F.2d at 415
    .   The court in Lometa,
    however, explained that standby letters of credit are not
    contingent liabilities; they are loans.    
    Id. at 414
    .   Therefore,
    such letters are not directly comparable to a severance pay plan
    under which no vested benefits accrue until a contingency is
    fulfilled.    Accordingly, we remain unconvinced that the
    plaintiffs had a vested right to benefits prior to, or at the
    time of, the appointment of the receiver.
    D. Repudiation
    Having determined that there was no event that triggered the
    payment of severance benefits, it would ordinarily be unnecessary
    to dispose of the other issues raised by the parties regarding
    their entitlement to severance pay, i.e., repudiation and whether
    the failure to pay severance benefits constituted actual direct
    compensatory damages under FIRREA.   However, the parties have
    forcefully argued their positions regarding the various
    "triggering" provisions, and have at least implied that they are
    susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.    We would
    normally commit the task of construing ambiguous contract terms
    to the fact finder after extrinsic evidence has been adduced.    We
    do not do so here because even if we were to assume a triggering
    event had occurred, we would nonetheless affirm the district
    court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the FDIC because
    the FDIC repudiated the SPP pursuant to its statutory authority
    under 
    12 U.S.C. § 1821
    .   See PACC v. Rizzo, 
    502 F.2d 306
    , 308 n.1
    (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 
    419 U.S. 1108
    , 
    95 S. Ct. 780
     (1975)
    (we can affirm the district court on any ground).
    The Hennessy, Campbell, and Adolph plaintiffs all allege
    that following the FDIC's appointment as receiver, the FDIC did
    not properly repudiate the SPP pursuant to the statutory
    requirements found at 
    12 U.S.C. § 1821
    (e)(1).   According to the
    plaintiffs, 
    12 U.S.C. § 1821
    (e)(1) requires the FDIC to make
    formal findings that the terms of the SPP were "burdensome" and
    that repudiation is necessary in order to "promote the orderly
    administration of the institution's affairs."   The plaintiffs
    argue that the FDIC made no such formal findings in this case and
    therefore any repudiation of the SPP was ineffective.   Further,
    the Hennessy plaintiffs argue that the FDIC improperly relied on
    an undisclosed policy of denying all claims for severance
    benefits in repudiating the SPP.8
    8
    . In addition to this procedural argument, the Hennessy
    plaintiffs suggest that the FDIC's repudiation power is limited
    to executory contracts. These plaintiffs cite LaMagna v. FDIC,
    
    828 F. Supp. 1
     (D.D.C. 1993) in support of their position.
    In LaMagna, the district court determined that an employment
    agreement which provided for severance pay was nonexecutory once
    the employee had rendered his services by working for one year.
    
    Id. at 2-3
    . The court concluded that such nonexecutory contracts
    may not be repudiated by the FDIC pursuant to FIRREA. 
    Id.
    We are unpersuaded by the district court's reasoning in
    LaMagna. The district court's conclusory holding that § 1821(e)
    does not permit the receiver to repudiate a "nonexecutory"
    contract lacks support in both the statutory language and the
    case law. As many courts have noted, the statute explicitly
    provides that a conservator or receiver "may disaffirm any
    contract or lease," not just executory contracts. E.g.,
    Employees' Retirement System of Alabama v. Resolution Trust
    Corp., 
    840 F. Supp. 972
    , 984 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (quoting §
    1821(e)(1)(A)) (emphasis in original). This provision is in
    sharp contrast to the Bankruptcy Code which specifically refers
    only to the trustee's power to reject executory contracts. See
    Morton v. Arlington Heights Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 
    836 F. Supp. 477
    , 481-82 (N.D. Ill. 1993); Employees' Retirement System of
    Alabama, 
    840 F. Supp. at 984
     (noting marked contrast with the
    Bankruptcy Code which gives a trustee in bankruptcy the power to
    "assume or reject any executory contract." (quoting 
    11 U.S.C. § 365
    (a))). Because Congress provided no such limitation here, we
    are unable to conclude that the FDIC's power of repudiation is
    limited only to executory contracts.
    The provisions governing a receiver's authority to repudiate
    contracts can be found at 
    12 U.S.C. § 1821
    (e).   Section 1821(e)
    states, in pertinent part:
    (1) Authority to repudiate contracts
    In addition to any other rights a conservator or
    receiver may have, the conservator or receiver for any
    insured depository institution may disaffirm or repudiate
    any contract or lease--
    (A) to which the institution is a party;
    (B) the performance of which the conservator or
    receiver, in the conservator's or receiver's
    discretion, determines to be burdensome; and
    (C) the disaffirmance or repudiation of which the
    conservator or receiver determines, in the
    conservator's or receiver's discretion, will promote
    the orderly administration of the institution's
    affairs.
    
    12 U.S.C. § 1821
    (e)(1) (Supp. V 1993).   Section 1821(e) does not
    set forth a specific procedure for a receiver to follow in
    repudiating a contract.   Indeed, section 1821(e) leaves the
    decision as to whether repudiation is "burdensome" and "necessary
    to promote the orderly administration of the institution" to the
    receiver's discretion so long as repudiation is accomplished
    within "a reasonable period" following the receiver's
    appointment.   
    12 U.S.C. § 1821
    (e)(2).
    Courts have refused to read into this statutory language any
    requirement for formal findings in support of a decision to
    repudiate.   In addressing this precise issue in a case involving
    a receiver's obligation to pay rent, the Court of Appeals for the
    Second Circuit recently stated:
    First, there is no requirement that the conservator or
    receiver make a formal finding that a lease or contract is
    burdensome. Second, it can hardly be said that it was not
    reasonable for the [receiver] to find that it would be
    burdensome for it to assume a $7 million obligation to pay
    rent on premises for which it no longer had use, at a time
    when the real estate market was declining. Third, whether
    the lease is burdensome is to be decided at the discretion
    of the conservator or receiver. 
    12 U.S.C. § 1821
    (e)(1)(B).
    1185 Avenue of the Americas Assocs. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 
    22 F.3d 494
    , 498 (2d Cir. 1994).   The court went on to uphold the
    district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of a receiver
    that claimed that it had repudiated a lease.   Id.; see also
    Morton, 
    836 F. Supp. at 485
     ("The statute does not require that
    the receiver give reasons for repudiating a contract . . . . ");
    Jenkins-Petre Partnership One v. Resolution Trust Corp., No.
    Civ.A.91-A-637, 
    1991 WL 160317
    , at *5 (D. Col. Aug. 13, 1991)
    ("The FIRREA statute does not provide that the [receiver] explain
    its actions or that a court may review the basis for that
    decision.").
    We see no reason to depart from this line of cases.    The
    claimants have failed to demonstrate that the SPP, which provided
    no benefit to the receivership, but which called for millions of
    dollars in payments, should not be considered "burdensome."       In
    addition, we conclude that there is no basis in the statute or in
    the case law for requiring the FDIC, which has discretion in
    making the decision concerning whether to repudiate, to produce
    written findings.
    Nor do we find merit in the Hennessy plaintiffs' argument
    that the FDIC's repudiation is invalid because it was carried out
    pursuant to an undisclosed policy.   We fail to comprehend how a
    consistent denial of the same type of claim constitutes an abuse
    of the FDIC's discretion.   If anything, such a longstanding
    policy demonstrates a conscious decision to promote uniform
    treatment of similar claims.   Accordingly, we cannot conclude
    that the district court erred in determining that the FDIC's
    repudiation was not procedurally defective.
    E. Actual Direct Compensatory Damages
    The three sets of plaintiffs next argue that even if the
    FDIC did properly repudiate the SPP, they are entitled to
    severance benefits as actual direct compensatory damages under 
    12 U.S.C. § 1821
    (e)(3).    The plaintiffs assert that severance pay in
    the context of at will employment represents additional
    compensation for entering into such a relationship and is
    therefore a compensable loss if not paid.   The plaintiffs rely on
    the decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
    Circuit in Office and Professional Employees Int'l Union, Local 2
    v. FDIC, as Receiver of Nat'l Bank of Washington ("NBW"), 
    27 F.3d 598
     (D.C. Cir. 1994), to support their position.
    While the question is close, we remain unconvinced by the
    plaintiffs' argument.   FIRREA provides, in pertinent part, that:
    the liability of the conservator or receiver for the
    disaffirmance or repudiation of any contract pursuant to
    paragraph (1) shall be--
    (i) limited to actual direct compensatory damages; and
    (ii) determined as of--
    (I) the date of the appointment of the conservator
    or receiver; . . . .
    
    12 U.S.C. § 1821
    (e)(3)(A) (Supp. V 1993).    The statute states,
    however, that the term "actual direct compensatory damages" does
    not include:
    (i) punitive or exemplary damages;
    (ii) damages for lost profits or opportunity; or
    (iii) damages for pain and suffering.
    
    12 U.S.C. § 1821
    (e)(3)(B) (Supp. V 1993) (emphasis added).      The
    courts are split over the proper interpretation of these
    provisions.    The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has
    determined that the phrase "actual direct compensatory damages,"
    does not include severance payments stipulated in advance.
    Howell v. FDIC, 
    986 F.2d 569
    , 573 (1st Cir. 1993).    According to
    that court, such payments are "at best an estimate of likely harm
    made at a time when only prediction is possible" and are
    analogous to "liquidated damages."   
    Id.
        That court reasoned that
    because those employees entitled to severance pay "may, or may
    not, have suffered injury," depending on the employment options
    they had in the past and the options available now, and because
    "[c]onceivably," such employees could have suffered "no damage at
    all," severance payments of this type do not fit within the
    language of the statute.   Id.; see also Resolution Trust Corp. v.
    Management, Inc., 
    25 F.3d 627
    , 632 (8th Cir. 1994) ("Neither
    severance fees nor future lost profits are compensable under
    FIRREA."); Westport Bank & Trust Co. v. Geraghty, 
    865 F. Supp. 83
    , 86 (D. Conn. 1994) ("Courts have found that damages resulting
    from the repudiation of a severance package are not ``actual
    direct compensatory damages' within the meaning of § 1821 because
    they are analogous to liquidated damages."); Aguilar v. FDIC, No.
    92-4286 (RR), slip op. at 15-16 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 1993) (noting
    that courts have been unwilling to permit plaintiffs to recover
    amounts more akin to liquidated than compensatory damages);
    Lanigan v. Resolution Trust Corp., No. 91-7216, slip op. at 5-7
    (N.D. Ill. March 30, 1993) (relying on the reasoning in Howell).
    As the plaintiffs point out, however, the Court of Appeals
    for the District of Columbia Circuit has taken a different view.
    In NBW, a case involving a collective bargaining agreement
    between the National Bank of Washington and its employees, the
    court of appeals determined that in the context of an at will
    employment relationship, severance payments are "properly
    characterized as consideration for entering into (or continuing
    under) the employment contract and therefore are compensable as
    actual damages under FIRREA."   NBW, 
    27 F.3d at 604
    .    Rejecting
    the "liquidated damages" analogy used by the Court of Appeals for
    the First Circuit, the court determined that the FDIC was liable
    for severance payments.   
    Id. at 604-05
    .
    In addition to being confronted with division amongst the
    courts, we must contend with competing policy considerations.       On
    the one hand, we have the concern raised in Howell that in
    drafting FIRREA, "Congress, faced with mountainous bank
    failures," was "determined to pare back damage claims founded on
    repudiated contracts."    Howell, 
    986 F.2d at 572
    .   On the other
    hand, we must address the point raised in NBW that the question
    is not whether Congress meant to scale back damage claims, but
    "which damage claims, however few, are preserved."     NBW, 
    27 F.3d at 604
    .     Moreover, we are cognizant of the fact that disallowance
    of promised severance pay may chill a troubled bank's ability to
    effectively retain able employees.     See Howell, 
    986 F.2d at 573
    .
    We share the view of the Court of Appeals for the First
    Circuit that these payments are analogous to "liquidated
    damages."     We therefore agree with the position of the district
    court in this case that these damages are not compensable as
    "actual direct compensatory damages" under 
    12 U.S.C. § 1821.9
    Accordingly, we will affirm the order of the district court
    granting summary judgment to the FDIC on the issue of separation
    pay.
    IV. TERMINATION OF HEALTH AND LIFE INSURANCE BENEFITS
    The Campbell and Adolph plaintiffs next allege that the
    district court erred in granting summary judgment against them on
    their claims for health and life insurance benefits pursuant to
    the 65 Special and the MGLIP.10    According to these plaintiffs,
    9
    . In reaching this decision, we are not unmindful of the
    Hennessy plaintiffs' argument that under the terms of this
    severance pay plan, benefits are actually accelerated if the
    discharged employee finds other employment. Hennessy App. at 106
    ("If you are otherwise qualified for separation payments and then
    become employed during the benefit payment period . . . [y]ou
    will then receive a single-sum cash payment equal to the
    remaining separation pay to which you would have been entitled
    had you remained unemployed."). Nevertheless, we believe that
    the function of these provisions is to articulate the timing of
    the payment of benefits rather than to relate the purpose behind
    the SPP.
    10
    .   The Hennessy plaintiffs take no part in this argument.
    the district court erred in determining that the provisions of §
    402(b)(3) of ERISA, 
    29 U.S.C. § 1102
    (b)(3), requiring that every
    employee benefit plan provide a "procedure for amending such
    plan," apply only to plan amendments and not to plan
    terminations.    These plaintiffs argue that because the FDIC did
    not follow the proper "procedure" in terminating their life and
    health insurance benefits, the FDIC should be responsible for
    these benefits until such time as the FDIC complies with ERISA.
    They suggest that a remand is appropriate to decide this
    question.
    Relying on our previous decision in Schoonejongen v.
    Curtiss-Wright Corp., 
    18 F.3d 1034
     (3d Cir. 1994), the district
    court held that when a party seeks to terminate an ERISA plan,
    there is no requirement that the ERISA plan have a termination
    procedure.   Campbell, 
    1994 WL 475067
    , at *5.   Subsequent to the
    district court's opinion in this matter, however, the Supreme
    Court reversed our panel's decision in Schoonejongen.    Curtiss-
    Wright Corp v. Schoonejongen,       U.S.   , 
    115 S. Ct. 1223
    (1995).    Following that reversal, we decided the case of Ackerman
    v. Warnaco, Inc., No. 94-3527, 
    1995 WL 289682
     (3d Cir. May 15,
    1995).    In that case, we explicitly held that § 402(b)(3) of
    ERISA applies to plan terminations as well as plan amendments.
    Ackerman, 
    1995 WL 289682
    , at *3.    Accordingly, we conclude that
    the district court erred in holding to the contrary.
    Nevertheless, we cannot agree that a remand is appropriate
    or that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for
    the FDIC.    Section 402(b)(3) of ERISA requires that every
    employee benefit plan shall "provide a procedure for amending
    such plan, and for identifying the persons who have authority to
    amend the plan."    
    29 U.S.C. § 1102
    (b)(3) (1988).   The summary
    plan booklet for the 65 Special states that:
    Meritor intends the plan to be permanent, but since future
    conditions affecting your employment cannot be anticipated
    or foreseen, Meritor reserves the right to amend, modify or
    terminate the plan at any time, which may result in the
    termination or modification of your coverage.
    Campbell App. at 165a.    Similarly, the summary plan booklet for
    the MGLIP states:
    Meritor reserves the right to terminate the group life
    insurance policy for its employees and retirees at any time,
    if Meritor determines that such termination is in its best
    interests. If Meritor terminates its group life insurance
    policy, employees and retirees who die after the effective
    date of the termination (other than those who are totally
    disabled and insured under the provision of "Continuation of
    Life Insurance During Disability") will not have any life
    insurance.
    Campbell App. at 152a.    While section 402(b)(3) of ERISA requires
    that every employee benefit plan have a procedure for amending or
    terminating the plan, the Supreme Court has determined that
    language such as that stated above reserving the right of "the
    Company" to modify or amend a plan satisfies the requirements of
    section 402(b)(3).    Curtiss-Wright,     U.S. at    , 
    115 S. Ct. at 1228-29
     ("Curtiss-Wright is correct, we think, that this
    states an amendment procedure and one that, like the
    identification procedure, is more substantial than might first
    appear.").   The Court explained that "the literal terms of §
    402(b)(3) are ultimately indifferent to the level of detail in an
    amendment procedure, or in an identification procedure for that
    matter."    Id. at     , 
    115 S. Ct. at 1229
    .   Further, the Court
    explained that "principles of corporate law provide a ready-made
    set of rules for determining, in whatever context, who has
    authority to make decisions on behalf of the company."     
    Id.
    Because the 65 Special and the MGLIP reserve to Meritor (the
    Company) the right to terminate these plans, we find no violation
    of the terms of section 402(b)(3).
    The question therefore becomes what "procedure" the FDIC
    must follow when it is appointed receiver for Meritor and it
    terminates an employee welfare benefit plan pursuant to such a
    reservation clause.    Certainly, under such circumstances, it
    would make little sense to require the FDIC to follow Meritor's
    procedure for terminating these plans (i.e., calling a meeting of
    the Board of Directors of Meritor or taking other corporate
    action).     While the appropriate analog within the FDIC to
    Meritor's Board of Directors is not immediately apparent, it is
    clear that an official receiver has great discretion in taking
    action that would previously have been handled through the normal
    methods of corporate governance.     Thus, the receiver alone may
    act in ways that might otherwise require Board action.     The
    record reflects, and the plaintiffs concede, that on December 11,
    1992, "the FDIC" sent the Campbell and Adolph plaintiffs mailings
    notifying them of the termination of the 65 Special and the
    MGLIP.     Joint Statement of Undisputed And Disputed Facts
    Regarding Motions for Summary Judgment, Campbell App. at 416a-
    17a; Joint Statement of Undisputed and Disputed Facts Regarding
    Motions for Summary Judgment, Adolph App. at 368a (incorporating
    statement of undisputed facts in Campbell case by reference).
    Since the plaintiffs acknowledged that they received notice of
    the plan terminations from "the FDIC," we decline to require
    further investigation into the methods by which the FDIC makes
    its decisions.   Accordingly, we will uphold the district court's
    grant of summary judgment for the FDIC on plaintiffs' claims for
    health and life insurance benefits.
    V. STATUTORY PENALTY UNDER 
    29 U.S.C. § 1132
    (c)(1)
    The Campbell plaintiffs next allege that the district court
    erred in determining that the FDIC was not liable for the penalty
    found at 
    29 U.S.C. § 1132
    (c)(1) for failure to respond in a
    timely manner to a request for plan documents.   According to
    these plaintiffs, their counsel sent an ERISA document request to
    the FDIC as administrator of the Meritor Pension Plan and the
    Meritor Savings Bank Savings Plan on March 16, 1993.   The FDIC
    did not respond until September 21, 1993, 189 days after the
    initial request.   Because ERISA provides that the plan
    administrator must mail requested material within 30 days of such
    a request, the Campbell plaintiffs assert that they are entitled
    to the requisite statutory penalty of up to $100.00 a day for
    each day the plan administrator failed to comply.
    We cannot agree.   ERISA provides that an administrator who
    fails or refuses to mail requested documents within 30 days after
    such request:
    may in the court's discretion be personally liable to such
    participant or beneficiary in the amount of up to $100 a day
    from the date of such failure or refusal, and the court may
    in its discretion order such other relief as it deems
    proper.
    
    29 U.S.C. § 1132
    (c)(1)(B) (Supp. V 1993) (emphasis added).        The
    district court in this case made two alternative findings.
    First, it determined that while by its terms ERISA's requirements
    and penalties apply to all administrators, "the requirement
    should not apply to the FDIC since it is an agency of the federal
    government."   Campbell, 
    1994 WL 475067
    , at *7.    Second, it
    determined that even if the statutory penalty for failure to
    provide requested information in a timely manner is applicable to
    the FDIC, "the court shall exercise its discretion under 
    29 U.S.C. § 1132
    (c)(1) and award no penalty in this case."     
    Id.
         The
    court explained that any penalty applied "would be an
    unjustifiable windfall to the plaintiffs and would hinder the
    FDIC in achieving its public mission -- the orderly wrapping up
    of Meritor's affairs."   
    Id.
    As the district court noted, the issue of whether the
    penalty provision of § 1132(c)(1) applies to the FDIC when it
    acts as receiver for a failed financial institution is one of
    first impression.   Id. at *6.    We agree that nothing on the face
    of § 1132(c) exempts the FDIC from the requirement of furnishing
    requested documents in a timely manner.     We therefore see no
    reason to adopt a rule categorically excluding the FDIC from this
    important ERISA obligation.      The reasoning of the district court,
    that the requirement should not apply to the FDIC since it is an
    agency of the federal government, is unconvincing.   Employees'
    need for access to significant information about plan coverage
    does not diminish because the entity currently in charge of the
    plan is an agency of the federal government.11
    Concerning the district court's alternative holding,
    however, we have previously determined that whether a district
    court awards a plaintiff monetary damages under 
    29 U.S.C. § 1132
    (c)(1) is a matter of discretion.    Gillis v. Hoechst Celanese
    Corp., 
    4 F.3d 1137
    , 1148 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied,        U.S.
    , 
    114 S. Ct. 1369
     (1994).    Since the district court did determine
    that any penalty in this case would be an "unjustifiable
    windfall" and "would hinder" the FDIC in "the orderly wrapping up
    of Meritor's affairs," we cannot conclude that the district court
    abused its discretion in declining to award a statutory penalty.
    Accordingly, we will affirm the order of the district court
    denying the Campbell plaintiffs a § 1132(c)(1) penalty award.
    VI.     CLASS ACTION ISSUES
    The Campbell plaintiffs also raise a number of issues
    concerning the district court's decision to deny certification of
    three plaintiff classes.    The district court determined that the
    plaintiffs failed to establish the threshold requirements under
    11
    . The FDIC suggests that 
    12 U.S.C. § 1825
    (b)(3), a FIRREA
    provision, creates an exemption from the ERISA penalty
    requirement. That provision states that the FDIC, when acting as
    receiver, "shall not be liable for any amounts in the nature of
    penalties or fines." 
    12 U.S.C. § 1825
    (b)(3). Read as a whole,
    however, § 1825 appears to concern exemptions from taxes. We
    therefore find this argument unconvincing.
    Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.    Campbell,
    No. 93-3969, at 5, 7, 9 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 1994) (order denying
    class certification).   In addition, the district court found that
    class certification under Rule 23(b)(1) or Rule 23(b)(2) would be
    inappropriate.   Id. at 9.   Because of our decision on the merits
    of the Campbell plaintiffs' claims, that these claims cannot
    survive summary judgment, we need not address the propriety of
    the district court's decision to deny class certification.    We
    therefore take no position with respect to these issues.
    VII. CONCLUSION
    The district court did not err in granting summary judgment
    to the FDIC on the plaintiffs' claims for separation pay, health
    insurance benefits, and life insurance benefits.   We will
    therefore affirm the orders of the district court.    Further,
    because the district court did not abuse its discretion in
    declining to find the FDIC liable for the statutory penalty
    prescribed by 
    29 U.S.C. § 1132
    (c)(1), we will affirm the order of
    the district court pertaining to this issue.   Finally, because of
    our conclusion on the merits of the Campbell plaintiffs' claims,
    that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment
    for the FDIC, we do not reach the class certification issues.
    Each party to bear its own costs.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 94-1857, 94-1933 and 94-1934

Citation Numbers: 58 F.3d 908

Judges: Cowen, Lewis, Garth

Filed Date: 6/29/1995

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024

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