Maynard v. Government of the Virgin Islands ( 2010 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 09-2273
_____________
KENRICK MAYNARD,
Appellant,
v.
GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
_____________
On Appeal from the District Court of the
Virgin Islands - Appellate Division
(D.C. No. 01-cr-325)
Chief Judge: Hon. Raymond L. Finch
District Judge: Hon. Curtis V. Gomez
Superior Court Judge: Hon. Patricia D. Steele
_______________
Argued May 5, 2010
Before: SMITH, CHAGARES and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed August 25, 2010)
_______________
Michael C. Quinn [ARGUED]
Dudley, Topper & Feuerzeig
1000 Frederiksberg Gade
P.O. Box 756
St. Thomas, VI 00804
Counsel for Appellant
Elliott Davis
Richard S. Davis [ARGUED]
Joel H. Feld
Department of Justice
34-38 Kronprindsens Gade, GERS Complex, 2 nd Fl.
Charlotte Amalie
St. Thomas, VI 00802
Counsel for Appellee
_______________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_______________
JORDAN, Circuit Judge.
Kenrick Maynard appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Division of the
District Court of the Virgin Islands of the United States, which affirmed the judgment of
the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands1 sentencing him to life imprisonment following
his conviction for first degree murder. Maynard contends that the government violated
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), when it failed to disclose the identities of
individuals who were potentially linked to the murder weapon and the drug treatment
history of a key prosecution witness. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
However, we note that the prosecutor involved in Maynard’s case exhibited a disturbing
disregard for his obligation to respond to the defendant’s production requests and that his
actions should prompt the Attorney General of the Virgin Islands to undertake remedial
action to prevent similar prosecutorial neglect in the future.
1
The Superior Court was known as the Territorial Court of the Virgin Islands at the
time of Maynard’s sentencing. For ease of reference, we identify the tribunal using its
current name.
2
I. Background
The criminal prosecution against Maynard arises from separate incidents in which
he allegedly assaulted Leslie Hyman and murdered Hyman’s father, Adolph Hyman, Sr.
For purposes of completeness, we will relate the facts from which all charges arise;
however, the Brady challenges raised on appeal pertain exclusively to the murder of
Adolph, Sr.2
A. The Assault and Murder Underlying Maynard’s Prosecution
On July 4, 1999, Leslie and his cousin, Kimba George, attended the festival of
Carnival3 on the island of St. John in the United States Virgin Islands. According to both
men’s trial testimony, Maynard approached them at the festival and punched George
twice before retreating into the crowd. Later, as Leslie and George were leaving the
festival, Maynard and his brother, Ricky Kanasha,4 again accosted them. Maynard
allegedly stabbed George’s hand with a six-inch blade, and George responded by wresting
the weapon from Maynard’s grasp, knocking him to the ground, and stabbing him four
2
Because several members of the Hyman family are involved in this case, we refer to
them using their first names.
3
Carnival, as celebrated in the Virgin Islands, is not the same as the Carnival festivities
that are held during the week preceding Lent in much of Catholic-influenced Latin
America. The Virgin Islands Carnival, which has no religious significance, is a “cultural
exposition of music, food, and festivities.” (Appellee’s Ans. Br. at 5.)
4
Ricky’s surname is unclear from the record. George testified that Ricky is known as
Ricky Kanasha, while Leslie identified him as Ricky Maynard. For purposes of
differentiating between the brothers, we refer to Kenrick as “Maynard” and Ricky as
“Kanasha.”
3
times with the same blade. As this was happening, Kanasha attempted to hit George with
a chair that was sitting nearby. Leslie rushed to George’s defense and stabbed Kanasha
with a four-inch switchblade. The struggle then subsided, and the four men went their
separate ways.
Three weeks later, on the night of July 26, 1999, Leslie was shot five times while
exiting a tavern on the island of St. Thomas. He survived, and, when the police
responded to the incident, Leslie informed them that he did not know who had assaulted
him. At trial two years later, however, Leslie testified that Maynard was responsible for
the shooting.
On July 28, 1999, two days after the tavern shooting, Leslie’s father, Adolph
Hyman, Sr., and his brother, Adolph Hyman, Jr., were walking along a road at night with
Maria Weeks, Adolph, Sr.’s common law wife. Adolph, Sr., Weeks, and Adolph, Jr. had
been stranded after their car stalled. As they walked, they observed an individual they
knew only as “Baylor” signal to someone whom they could not see, and they were
initially confused by the gesture. Soon after Baylor’s signal, however, they saw Maynard
approaching them rapidly on foot, brandishing a firearm that Adolph, Jr. described as “a
big gun.” (App. at 226.) All three turned and fled, and Adolph, Jr. soon pulled ahead of
Adolph, Sr. and Weeks. Adolph, Jr. testified that he looked back as he ran and saw
Maynard “right behind [Adolph, Sr.], shooting after him.” (Id. at 229.) The shots passed
4
through Adolph, Sr.’s upper body, causing his shirt to become blood-stained as he ran.
Adolph, Jr. then rounded a corner, which obscured the scene from his view.
Weeks corroborated Adolph, Jr.’s testimony. She explained that she was several
paces behind Adolph, Sr., that she tried unsuccessfully to jump over a wall along the side
of the road, and that Maynard passed her as she did so. She then mounted the wall and
watched as Maynard shot the fleeing Adolph, Sr. five times in the back, eventually
causing him to fall face-down on the pavement. She testified that Maynard stopped,
stood over Adolph, Sr.’s body, and fired seven more shots into his back. Adolph, Sr. died
as a result of the assault.
Police responded to the scene, where they recovered sixteen shell casings and a
bullet, which were catalogued and retained in the police department’s evidence locker. A
warrant was issued for Maynard’s arrest, but he was not immediately apprehended. The
record contains no indication of what, if any, investigation occurred from the time of the
murder until early 2000.
Within days after the fatal shooting of Adolph, Sr., Maynard fled to Atlanta,
Georgia, where he assumed the name of Samuel Blyden. According to Maynard, he
moved after the July 4 stabbing incident at the Carnival festival on St. John. He claimed
that he never saw his attackers and did not know their identities. He also claimed to
believe that fleeing under a false identity was necessary to protect his safety.
5
B. Discovery of the Murder Weapon
On January 1, 2000, Virgin Islands police officers heard shots being fired in the
Hospital Ground area of St. Thomas. They investigated the gunfire and apprehended six
individuals (hereinafter “the January 1 arrestees”) who were about to flee the scene. They
also discovered several spent shell casings nearby. The individuals had no weapons in
their possession, but police seized two high-caliber firearms, an AK-47 and an MP-45,
which were hidden near the scene of the arrest.5 No one had been injured by the shots,
and the record contains no indication of whether any of the six arrestees were actually
connected to the firearms. The arrestees were initially charged with firearms-related
offenses, but those charges were later dropped because the government could not link any
of them to either the AK-47 or the MP-45.
For reasons not discussed in the record, the Virgin Islands police suspected that the
AK-47 may have been used in the murder of Adolph, Sr., and they submitted the gun
seized on January 1 and the casings collected at the time of the murder to a firearms
examiner at the Federal Bureau of Investigation. According to the examiner’s trial
testimony, at least ten of the casings collected at the scene of Adolph, Sr.’s murder were
fired using the AK-47.
5
A firearms examiner for the Federal Bureau of Investigation testified that one of the
firearms was technically a Mac-90, which is a civilian version of the better known AK-
47. However, the parties described the gun as an AK-47 at trial and in briefing submitted
to our court. We adopt the parties’ convention of referring to the weapon as an AK-47,
even though that description appears to be technically incorrect.
6
C. Prosecution of Maynard
The discovery of the AK-47 prompted police to devote renewed attention to the
warrant for Maynard’s arrest, which remained outstanding. Through means not described
in the record, police discovered that Maynard had fled to Atlanta, and they filed a request
for extradition with Georgia state authorities, who apprehended him. Maynard
voluntarily agreed to be extradited to the Virgin Islands, where he was charged with
assault in connection with the shooting of Leslie and with first degree murder in
connection with the death of Adolph, Sr.
1. Pretrial Proceedings
During the final pretrial conference on September 10, 2001, Maynard’s attorney
requested disclosure of two pieces of information. First, Maynard requested disclosure of
the names of the January 1 arrestees. As part of the government’s pretrial disclosures, the
prosecution had given Maynard several documents that identified the arrestees using
arrest numbers rather than their names. The prosecutor, Assistant Attorney General
Lofton Holder, represented that the arrestees’ names were in a document listing property
seized during the arrest. The prosecutor further stated that the document with the names
had already been provided to the defense. He said that the government “ha[d] no further
information” and that defense counsel was “asking for blood out of a rock.” (Id. at 106.)
Maynard contends – and the government does not now dispute – that the arrestees’
identities did not, in fact, appear in that document.
7
Second, Maynard was aware from personal knowledge that Weeks had a history of
using crack cocaine, and defense counsel requested any records in the government’s
possession regarding Weeks’s drug use or treatment. The prosecutor responded that he
had “no knowledge” of any such information. (Id. at 108.) Defense counsel asked the
government to check for records about Weeks with the Mental Health and Substance
Abuse Clinic, a division of the Virgin Islands Department of Health. Two days later, the
prosecutor responded that he had contacted the clinic but that, without a court order,
clinic personnel would not discuss whether records existed for Weeks. Neither party
requested any such court order, and the prosecutor did not take any other steps to obtain
the records.
2. Trial
Trial commenced in the Superior Court on September 24, 2001. Maynard renewed
both of his disclosure requests in advance of opening statements to the jury. With respect
to the identities of the January 1 arrestees, the prosecutor said, “I have provided counsel
with all of the documents in my possession with reference to the recovery of t[he]
weapon,” and he went on to assert that none of those documents contained the identity of
the arrestees.6 (Id. at 128.) He also reiterated that he had contacted the Substance Abuse
Clinic but could not obtain Weeks’s treatment records without a court order. Trial then
began.
6
That assertion was manifestly inconsistent with the prosecutor’s statement before trial
that the names had already been provided to the defense in an inventory document.
8
Following the lunch recess that same day, the government called as a witness
Officer Miguel Perez, who had investigated the January 1, 2000 shooting incident
involving the AK-47 and the MP-45. During Perez’s testimony, the government sought
to admit a document that was part of the chain of custody for the AK-47 and that
contained the names of the six January 1 arrestees. Maynard objected to the report on the
basis that the government had not disclosed the arrestees’ names despite several pretrial
requests. When the Court asked the government to explain the sudden discovery of the
names, the prosecutor stated that the chain-of-custody records in Maynard’s case file did
not contain those names and that the document that did have the names came from a file
in a separate case.7 The prosecutor indicated that he considered the January 1 arrests to
be “unrelated” to Maynard’s case and that he believed he had produced all relevant
documents associated with the charges against Maynard. (Id. at 281.) He further
explained that he had first learned of the document at issue from an unidentified
individual in the prosecutor’s office during the lunch recess.
Maynard moved to dismiss, arguing that the government’s late production of the
document violated its disclosure obligations under Brady because the arrestees were
potentially connected to the weapon used to kill Adolph, Sr. Maynard speculated that,
had he known their names prior to trial, he could have interviewed the arrestees and might
7
The record does not identify whether the document appeared in a file associated with
the January 1 arrests, or with another unidentified case. For our purposes, we note only
that, whatever the purpose of the file, it was clearly related to the seizure of the AK-47
and contained documents associated with the arrestees’ being taken into custody.
9
have been able to link one of them to the weapon or to the murder. The prosecutor
opposed the motion to dismiss on the basis that the names of the arrestees were not
relevant and that, even if the arrestees possessed exculpatory information, Maynard had
suffered no prejudice because defense counsel still “ha[d] ample opportunity to
[investigate them during trial because w]e’re still on the Government’s case.” (Id. at
292.) The Court expressed indignation with that suggestion and asked: “When should he
do that? ... [Y]ou want me to break now and send [defense counsel] off?” (Id.) The
prosecutor responded by saying, “[i]f [defense counsel] wants to investigate [the
arrestees], I think he should get started now.” (Id.). The Court chastised the prosecutor
for the belated production but denied Maynard’s motion and indicated that it would
reconsider the issue at the close of the government’s case.
The government’s direct examination of Perez continued, during which the officer
described the circumstances leading to the January 1 arrests. On cross examination,
Maynard’s counsel elicited the names of the six arrestees and moved the newly produced
report into evidence. At the close of the government’s case, Maynard renewed his motion
to dismiss. The Court denied the motion on the basis that he could have investigated the
individuals after the first day of trial and that he was able to encourage jurors to infer that
one of the arrestees was linked to the firearm. During closing argument, Maynard’s
counsel urged the jury to draw such an inference, thereby discrediting the government’s
theory that Maynard was responsible for the murder of Adolph, Sr.:
10
But we know, do we not, that somebody else other than Kenrick Maynard
possessed that gun, because on January 1st, 2000, there was a shooting ... .
***
[The police] arrested ... Jose Hodge, Antonio Benjamin, Sherman Louis,
Kareem George, Naja Adams and Kwasi Adams[] for possession of that
same firearm, the gun that was used to kill Adolph Hyman.
***
And you can use that against the government, because it shows that
somebody else, other than Kenrick Maynard, possessed that firearm that
shot Adolph Hyman, ... Sr.
(Id. at 546-47.)
The issue regarding Weeks’s drug treatment also came up during trial. The
morning the trial began, the prosecutor reiterated that a court order was required to obtain
Weeks’s drug treatment records. Defense counsel then served a subpoena on the
Department of Health demanding production of those records. The Department
responded to the subpoena the next day, but, because the trial lasted only a day and a half,
the records did not arrive at the courthouse until the Court had already closed the
evidentiary record and submitted the case to the jury. The records of Weeks’s treatment,
which dated from 1996, revealed that she had an eleven-year history of addiction to crack
cocaine and that therapists had characterized her as a “pathological liar who alters the
truth to fit her needs and fantasies” in order to obtain crack cocaine or to conceal her drug
use. (Id. at 636.) Maynard requested that the Court reopen the evidence and allow him to
submit the records to the jury, but the Court refused.
11
D. Post-Trial Proceedings
The jury returned a verdict finding Maynard guilty of the murder of Adolph
Hyman, Sr., but acquitting him of the assault on Leslie Hyman. Thereafter, Maynard
made an oral motion for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the government’s failure to
disclose the arrestees’ identities and the information concerning Weeks’s drug treatment
violated Brady. The Court ordered briefing on the motion and indicated that it would
hear oral argument approximately one month later, at the time of Maynard’s sentencing
hearing. The record contains no indication that Maynard made any effort prior to
sentencing to locate the January 1 arrestees or to show what, if any, information they
possessed about the firearm.
At sentencing, the Superior Court denied the motion on the ground that the
government had not suppressed the names of the January 1 arrestees because it had
disclosed them before the completion of trial, and that those identities were available to
the defense prior to trial because Maynard could have discovered their names by
contacting the law enforcement personnel who handled the arrests. Similarly, the Court
concluded that the records of Weeks’s drug treatment were not suppressed by the
government because the defense could have obtained them by serving a subpoena before
trial. Alternatively, the Court found that those records were not material to Maynard’s
case because they were over five years old and shed no light on whether Weeks was under
the influence of crack cocaine at the time of her testimony.
12
Maynard filed a timely appeal to the Appellate Division of the District Court. The
Appellate Division affirmed for the same reasons cited by the Superior Court in denying
Maynard’s motion for judgment of acquittal. Maynard then filed the present appeal.
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
The Superior Court had jurisdiction over Maynard’s criminal case pursuant to
48 U.S.C. § 1611(b) and V.I. C ODE A NN., tit. 4, § 76(b). The Appellate Division had
jurisdiction to hear appeals from the final judgment of the Superior Court under 48 U.S.C.
§ 1613a(a). 8 Our appellate jurisdiction arises under 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(c).
Alleged Brady violations often involve mixed questions of fact and law. In such
cases, we review a trial court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions
de novo. Gov’t of the V.I. v. Fahie, 419 F.3d 249, 252 (3d Cir. 2005). However, where,
as in this case, the facts from which the alleged violation arises are not in dispute, we
conduct our review exclusively under a plenary standard. Wilson v. Beard, 589 F.3d 651,
657 (3d Cir. 2009).
8
On January 29, 2007, the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands assumed the District
Court’s appellate jurisdiction. See Hypolite v. People, 51 V.I. 97, 101 (V.I. 2009) (“The
Supreme Court officially assumed appellate jurisdiction over appeals from the Superior
Court on January 29, 2007.”). However, because Maynard appealed from the Superior
Court before the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands had assumed jurisdiction, his appeal
remained with the Appellate Division of the District Court. See 48 U.S.C. § 1613a(d)
(“The establishment of the [Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands] shall not result in the
loss of jurisdiction of the district court over any appeal then pending in it. The rulings of
the district court on such appeals may be reviewed in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit and in the [United States] Supreme Court notwithstanding the
establishment of the [Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands].”).
13
III. Discussion
Brady requires the government to disclose exculpatory evidence with sufficient
notice to enable the defendant to use the evidence effectively at trial. See United States v.
Starusko, 729 F.2d 256, 262 (3d Cir. 1984) (“No denial of due process occurs if Brady
material is disclosed in time for its effective use at trial.” (quoting United States v. Higgs,
713 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1983))). To prove a Brady violation, the defendant must show
that “(1) the government withheld evidence, either willfully or inadvertently; (2) the
evidence was favorable, either because it was exculpatory or of impeachment value; and
(3) the withheld evidence was material.” Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 252 (3d
Cir. 2004). “Evidence is ‘material’ where there is a reasonable probability that, had the
evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been
different. A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence
in the outcome.” Simmons v. Beard, 590 F.3d 223, 234 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting United
States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985)); see also United States v. Pelullo (Pelullo I),
105 F.3d 117, 123 (3d Cir. 1997) (requiring the defendant to show that the alleged Brady
violation “resulted in a verdict unworthy of confidence”). However, “the government is
not obliged under Brady to furnish a defendant with information which he already has or,
with any reasonable diligence, he can obtain himself.” United States v. Pelullo (Pelullo
II), 399 F.3d 197, 202 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Starusko, 729 F.2d at 262). A defendant
who proves a Brady violation is entitled to a new trial. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S.
14419, 435 (1995) (stating that, when analyzing a Brady claim, “once a reviewing court ...
has found constitutional error, there is no need for further harmless-error review”).
Maynard contends that the government violated Brady by failing to disclose the
identity of the January 1 arrestees and the records of Weeks’s drug treatment. We discuss
each of those pieces of evidence in turn.
A. Identity of the January 1 Arrestees
Maynard’s first Brady challenge is somewhat unusual in that he contends that the
government suppressed the names of the January 1 arrestees even though he received
those names during trial, entered them into evidence, and urged the jury to draw an
inference that one of them was connected to the murder weapon. Thus, Maynard cannot –
and does not – argue that the arrestees’ names were exculpatory solely because they
showed that someone other than himself could have possessed the AK-47. Instead,
Maynard argues that the government’s failure to disclose the arrestees’ identities violated
Brady because, had he received their names in advance of trial, he could have
investigated the individuals and potentially shown that one of them actually possessed the
weapon, and perhaps he could even have linked one of them to the murder of Adolph, Sr.
However, defense counsel never spoke with any of the arrestees after learning their
names, even though one month had elapsed between the end of Maynard’s trial and the
Court’s formal ruling on his Brady challenge, nor did he request an extension of time to
conduct such an investigation. We are therefore left to guess whether he could have
15
successfully contacted them and what, if any, information such an investigation might
have revealed. Accordingly, and as more fully detailed below, Maynard’s Brady claim
involving the identities of the January 1 arrestees fails.
1. Suppression by the Government
The first element of a Brady claim requires the defendant to show that the
government suppressed evidence. Lambert, 387 F.3d at 252. The government’s Brady
obligations attach to all exculpatory evidence in the government’s actual or constructive
possession. A prosecutor has constructive possession of evidence if, “although [he] has
no actual knowledge [of the evidence], [he] should nevertheless have known that the
material at issue was in existence.” Pelullo II, 399 F.3d at 218 n.23 (quoting United
States v. Joseph, 996 F.2d 36, 39 (3d Cir. 1993)). Thus, under Brady, the government
must “take the minimal steps necessary to acquire ... information” of which the
prosecution should be aware, even if it lacks knowledge of the material at the time the
defendant requests disclosure. United States v. Risha, 445 F.3d 298, 307 (3d Cir. 2006)
(quoting Joseph, 996 F.2d at 40). The prosecutor’s good faith or bad faith in failing to
disclose the information is irrelevant. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 52, 57 (1988).
Maynard contends that the prosecutor’s failure to produce the January 1 arrestees’
identities before trial constitutes government suppression of exculpatory evidence, and,
contrary to the holdings of the District Court and the Superior Court, the record in this
case shows that he is correct. The January 1 arrests were handled by the same police
16
department that investigated the murder of Adolph, Sr., and both matters were referred for
prosecution to the Office of the Attorney General of the Virgin Islands. The prosecutor in
Maynard’s case knew that police had apprehended the January 1 arrestees near where they
discovered the AK-47, but the prosecutor failed to perform even the most rudimentary
search for their names. Despite repeated requests by defense counsel, the prosecutor
never reviewed the files associated with the January 1 arrests, nor did he inquire whether
anyone in his office knew the names of the arrestees. Indeed, he was so little concerned
with meeting a clearly relevant disclosure request from the defense that he changed
stories without, it seems, any care at all, saying first that the defense had been given the
names, then that the prosecution itself was without the names, and finally that the
prosecution had the names but that they were never thought to be relevant to Maynard’s
case. Under these circumstances, we have little difficulty concluding that the
prosecutor’s neglect effectively suppressed the identities of the January 1 arrestees. See
Wilson, 589 F.3d at 659 (stating that Brady requires disclosure of exculpatory
“information in the possession of the prosecutor’s office, the police, and others acting on
behalf of the prosecution”).
The government advances two unpersuasive arguments against a holding that the
names were suppressed. First, it argues that the arrestees’ identities were located in a
separate case file of which the prosecutor had no knowledge. That argument has no merit
because the arrest files were in the possession of the Attorney General’s office, and
17
documentation in Maynard’s file referred to the six arrestees by arrest number. The
prosecutor therefore knew that the names were in the government’s possession and knew
further where to locate the names, even if he had not yet gone to the trouble to do so. See
United States v. Perdomo, 929 F.2d 967, 970-71 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that a prosecutor
had constructive knowledge of information held by another arm of the government
accessible to the prosecutor).
Second, the government argues that there was no suppression because the
prosecutor disclosed the arrestees’ names during trial, thereby giving Maynard an
opportunity to present their identities to the jury and argue that one of them was tied to
the weapon. That argument wrongly presumes that the government is free to dictate the
purpose to which the withheld information could be put. Maynard claims that he wanted
the names not merely to argue an inference but to be able to investigate a more concrete
connection between the January 1 arrestees and the murder of Adolph, Sr. The January 1
arrests meant that six people other than Maynard were possibly linked to the murder
weapon, and Maynard hoped that, through his own investigation, he might be able to tie
one of them to the weapon or to the murder. That is a legitimate purpose which the
prosecutor was not free to frustrate by his cavalier refusal to respond to the defense
request for the names of the January 1 arrestees. Cf. United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39,
43 (3d Cir. 1983) (“Determining that the requested information falls under Brady,
however, does not resolve the more difficult question of when that information must be
18
disclosed to appellees. Because Brady rests on the requirements of due process, our focus
must be on when disclosure is necessary to insure appellees a fair trial.”). The
government must disclose Brady material sufficiently in advance of trial to enable the
defendant to use the evidence in a meaningful fashion, and, in this case, the late hour of
the government’s disclosure prevented Maynard from using the evidence for any
investigatory purpose. Cf. United States v. Lee, 573 F.3d 155, 164-65 (3d Cir. 2009)
(concluding that the government’s failure to disclose exculpatory evidence prior to trial
under Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure prejudiced the defendant
because he “was deprived of any opportunity to prepare meaningfully for trial”).
Accordingly, we conclude that the prosecutor suppressed evidence and that Maynard has
successfully established the first element of a Brady violation.
2. Favorableness and Materiality
The second and third elements of a Brady violation require the defendant to prove
that the suppressed evidence was favorable to his defense and material to his case.
Lambert, 387 F.3d at 252. To be favorable to the defendant, the evidence must either
exculpate the accused or impeach a witness for the prosecution. Wilson, 589 F.3d at 659.
To determine materiality, we evaluate the excluded evidence to assess whether there is a
reasonable probability that the outcome would have differed had the jury known of the
evidence. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 683. “[T]he Constitution is not violated every time the
government fails or chooses not to disclose evidence that might prove helpful to the
19
defense.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436-37. Rather, we must determine whether the non-
disclosure is so significant that it “undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.” Id.
at 434 (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678).
a. Guiding Principles of Law
We have identified three overriding legal principles that guide our Brady analysis.
First, Brady is not a discovery rule, and it is neither designed nor intended to enable the
defendant to present the most effective case possible. See Wilson, 589 F.3d at 659 (“The
purpose of Brady is not to require the prosecution to disclose all possibly favorable
evidence to the defense ... .”). Instead, Brady establishes a constitutional floor for
prosecutorial conduct, requiring the government to provide the defendant, at a minimum,
with exculpatory information for the purpose of ensuring that the defendant receives a fair
trial. Starusko, 729 F.2d at 262. It therefore focuses on safeguarding the defendant’s due
process rights and regulates prosecutorial conduct only to the extent necessary to protect
that right. Id. (characterizing Brady as a “minimum prosecutorial obligation.” (citation
omitted)). Thus, non-disclosure alone is not sufficient to form the basis of a successful
Brady challenge. See United States v. Brown, 595 F.3d 498, 509 (3d Cir. 2010) (stating
that courts evaluate the merits of an alleged Brady violation “irrespective of the good
faith or bad faith of the prosecution” (quoting Brady, 373 U.S. at 87)). Even suppression
resulting from a prosecutor’s bad faith or ineptitude does not provide a basis for relief
unless the defendant makes an additional showing that the undisclosed evidence is
20
material, i.e., that there is a reasonable probability it will change the outcome of his trial
on remand. See Cone v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 1769, 1783 (2009) (“[E]vidence is ‘material’ ...
when there is a reasonable possibility that, had the evidence been disclosed, the result of
the proceeding would have been different.”); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 110
(1976) (“Nor do we believe the constitutional obligation is measured by the moral
culpability, or the willfulness, of the prosecutor.”).
Second, a successful Brady challenge requires the defendant to show that the
suppressed evidence is either itself admissible or would have directly led to evidence that
would be admissible at a new trial or sentencing. See Ellsworth v. Warden, 333 F.3d 1, 5
(1st Cir. 2003) (“[W]e think it plain that evidence itself inadmissible could be so
promising a lead to strong exculpatory evidence that there could be no justification for
withholding it.”); Wright v. Hopper, 169 F.3d 695, 703 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Inadmissible
evidence may be material if the evidence would have led to admissible evidence.”).
Successful Brady challenges often seem to rest upon discrete pieces of admissible
evidence that the government effectively withheld. See, Pelullo I, 105 F.3d at 122-24(granting a new trial in a corporate fraud case because a law enforcement officer’s notes
corroborated the defendant’s theory that allegedly fraudulent money transfers had been
performed for the legitimate purpose of repaying corporate debt); Perdomo, 929 F.2d at
970-74 (concluding that government had suppressed a witness’s criminal history and
remanding for further fact-finding regarding the materiality of that information).
21
Particularly pertinent here, the Supreme Court has suggested that a defendant may
predicate a Brady claim upon prosecutorial suppression that causes the defendant to
“abandon lines of independent investigation, defenses, or trial strategies that [he]
otherwise would have pursued,” Bagley, 473 U.S. at 683, provided that the defendant
shows that he would have discovered admissible evidence which calls the outcome of the
trial into question. Id. at 684.
Third, a defendant’s ability to establish a Brady violation by arguing that
suppressed evidence would have led to additional exculpatory materials requires more
than speculation. See United States v. Aleman, 548 F.3d 1158, 1164 (8th Cir. 2008)
(rejecting a Brady claim based on the government’s failure to disclose a witness’s
statement that alluded to other individuals who the defendant could have investigated
because the defendant offered nothing more than speculation about what those witnesses
would have said); United States v. Ramos, 27 F.3d 65, 71 (3d Cir. 1994) (“We think it
unwise to infer the existence of Brady material based upon speculation alone.”). The
defendant must instead produce some evidence to show that his investigation would have
borne fruit. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 109-10 (“The mere possibility that an item of
undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have affected the
outcome of the trial, does not establish ‘materiality’ in the constitutional sense.”); Ramos,
27 F.3d at 71 (requiring a defendant to raise a “colorable claim” showing the existence of
22
material and exculpatory evidence before granting relief under Brady (quoting United
States v. Griffin, 659 F.2d 932, 939 (9th Cir. 1981))).
The Supreme Court’s decision in Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1 (1995),
illustrates the type of speculation that cannot support a right to relief under Brady. In
Bartholomew, a habeas case brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the defendant was charged
with killing a victim during the course of a robbery. The government administered a
polygraph test to a critical prosecution witness in which the examiner asked whether the
witness had assisted the defendant in preparing for the robbery. Bartholomew, 516 U.S.
at 4. The witness responded that he had not done so, and “the examiner concluded that
the responses ... indicated deception” by the witness. Id. The government withheld the
results of the polygraph test. The defendant later sought a writ of habeas corpus on the
ground that, had he known of the polygraph results, he likely would have sought to
depose the witness prior to trial. Id. at 4-5. The district court denied relief, but the court
of appeals reversed because it believed that the defendant “might well have succeeded in
obtaining an admission that [the witness] was lying about his participation in the crime,” 9
which could have been used to impeach the witness or exculpate the defendant. Id. at 5.
The Supreme Court, however, found that no Brady violation had occurred. The Court
held that, “[o]ther than expressing a belief that in a deposition [the witness] might have
confessed to ... involvement” in the robbery, the theory of the court of appeals about what
9
The polygraph test results were not themselves admissible because state evidentiary
laws prohibited their introduction at trial. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. at 5.
23
the witness might have said was “based on mere speculation.” Id. at 6. The defendant
had failed to produce any evidence to support the possibility that the witness would have
provided exculpatory testimony, id., and it appeared that the challenge was based entirely
on information that the defendant hoped to find, not on a showing that such evidence was
available and accessible to him.
Bartholomew thus demonstrates that a defendant may not rest a Brady claim on the
mere hope that he will discover exculpatory information. Id. (stating that the court of
appeals’s “judgment [wa]s based on mere speculation, in violation of the standards we
have established” under Brady). Instead, he must make a concrete showing that he has a
fair probability of discovering such evidence. See Aleman, 548 F.3d at 1164 (concluding
that conjecture about what witnesses might have said cannot support a Brady claim).
We too have rejected conjecture as a basis for a Brady challenge. We have refused
relief to a defendant who speculated that preliminary investigation notes destroyed by law
enforcement officers might have contained unspecified Brady materials. Ramos, 27 F.3d
at 71. We have also found Brady claims to be insufficient when based on the
government’s failure to disclose evidence that, due to the location and condition of
discovery, could only be linked to the case through conjecture, Lambert, 387 F.3d at 264(concluding that no Brady violation occurred when police were searching for a pair of
sneakers discarded in a river but found a partly decayed sneaker on the riverbank because
the sneaker appeared to be too old to be connected to the case, and therefore any link to
24
the crime was purely speculative), or when based on unsupported guesswork regarding
information that the government might have had in its files, United States v. Am. Radiator
& Standard Sanitary Corp., 433 F.2d 174, 202 (3d Cir. 1970).
Together, these three guiding principles – (1) that the government’s failure to
disclose does not by itself support a Brady claim, (2) that the defendant must point to
materials that are admissible or that would have led to admissible evidence, and (3) that
the defendant may not rest his claim on pure conjecture – reveal that, at its core, Brady
requires a showing of prejudice. See Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 691 (2004)
(describing Brady’s materiality element as equivalent to a showing of prejudice). The
defendant must identify evidence raising a reasonable probability that, were we to remand
for a new trial or sentencing, the new proceeding would have a different outcome than the
one that occurred in the first instance.
b. Maynard’s Speculation about Exculpatory, Material Evidence
Applying those principles to this appeal, we conclude that Maynard has not moved
his Brady challenge beyond the realm of conjecture. Maynard rests heavily upon the
prosecutor’s misconduct to substantiate his claim to relief, and he notes that the
prosecutor’s failure to discover and disclose the arrestees’ identities reflects a refusal to
take seriously the obligations imposed by Brady. Maynard repeatedly requested the
arrestees’ identities, and the prosecutor represented that the government lacked such
25
information, even though there had been no effort to review the files associated with the
January 1 arrests.
To be sure, the manner in which the prosecutor approached his responsibilities in
Maynard’s case deserves, at a minimum, the most unequivocal rebuke, and both the
Superior Court and the Appellate Division appropriately took him to task for his lack of
professionalism. Since he appears to be a repeat offender,10 the Superior Court in
particular expressed an understandable inclination to punish him, but that does not mean
10
The prosecutor’s failure to disclose the information prompted the Superior Court to
say:
[Y]ou can’t walk into court at the last minute and produce information that
you should have produced, that the defendant asked specifically for on four
different occasions, in front of me, at least, and you get up and say you
didn’t have it.
Your problem is that you cavalierly deal with these cases as if it
doesn’t matter. You don’t have it or produce it, and that’s it. You don’t
seem like you think that you have to investigate.
Any other officer in your department, whatever they have, you have.
And I’m getting tired of you, in particular, of these last minute, producing
things.
And this is a situation where the defendant has asked you over and
over and over, and you get up and say, “Judge, we gave all we have. That’s
it.”
And then in the middle of the trial you’re going to produce a
document that has the names of people that this defendant could have
investigated, who might have some connection to the very gun that was
used ... , and the Court is just supposed to close its eyes to it and proceed.
(App. at 293-94.) Like the Superior Court, the Appellate Division indicated that it did not
condone the prosecutor’s “lackadaisical and cavalier approach to discovery,” (id. at 40),
and that it had “serious doubts that the prosecutor ... complied with” his discovery
obligations. (Id. at 41.)
26
that a Brady claim is well-founded. Maynard is free to file an ethical grievance against
the prosecutor with the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands or with the Virgin Islands
Bar Association. See V.I. S. C T. R. 203(f) (establishing procedures for disciplinary
complaints against attorneys); V.I. S. C T. R. 205 (creating the Virgin Islands Bar
Association and giving it authority to regulate the practice of law). He may also petition
for habeas relief, though we of course make no comment on whether such a petition
would have merit. In addition, the circumstances of this case should, we think, prompt
the Attorney General of the Virgin Islands to take remedial action to ensure that this
prosecutor in particular understands and acts upon the scope of his disclosure obligations,
including the obligations that flow from Brady.
Regardless of what ought to be done in disciplining the prosecutor, however, it still
remains that Brady is not violated every time the government withholds information from
a defendant. United States v. Veksler, 62 F.3d 544, 550 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[N]ot every
failure to disclose evidence favorable to the defense requires a reversal of a conviction.”).
Brady requires vacatur of the conviction only if the withheld evidence undermines
confidence in the integrity of the verdict. See Dist. Atty’s Office for the Third Judicial
Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2335 (2009) (“[T]he [government] violates due process
when it suppresses ‘evidence favorable to an accused’ that is ‘material either to guilt or to
punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.’” (quoting
Brady, 373 U.S. at 87)). We must therefore consider whether Maynard suffered prejudice
27
as a result of the prosecutor’s neglect. In other words, we must determine whether
Maynard has identified exculpatory evidence sufficient to raise a reasonable probability
that his trial or sentence would have been different had the evidence been presented in
court. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682. Our review shows that he has not.
Insofar as the names of the January 1 arrestees were themselves exculpatory,
Maynard presented them to the jury and urged jurors to conclude that one of the arrestees
was linked to the weapon or to the murder. During closing arguments, Maynard’s
counsel suggested that the names “show[ed] that somebody else, other than Kenrick
Maynard, possessed the firearm that shot Adolph Hyman, ... Sr.” (App. at 546-47.) Thus,
Maynard had and took the opportunity to link other individuals to the murder weapon
using the identities of the January 1 arrestees.
As to whether the government’s suppression of the arrestees’ names deprived
Maynard of evidence that he could have collected before trial to link one of the arrestees
to the AK-47 or to the murder, the decision is less clear, but ultimately we conclude that
Maynard has failed to show that the names would have directly led to the discovery of
such evidence. He has not shown that he could have located the January 1 arrestees,
much less that they possessed information that would have altered the outcome of his
trial. The arrests occurred over six months after Adolph, Sr.’s death, and no evidence of
record suggests that any of the arrestees ever possessed the murder weapon at any time.
28
Indeed, the arrestees were released from custody because the government could not link
them to the gun in any way.
Like the defendant in Wood, Maynard has predicated his Brady arguments not on
an evidentiary showing that he could have obtained exculpatory information from the
arrestees but on a mere hope that he would have done so. His challenge rests entirely
upon the assumption that he could have located the arrestees, that one of them knew about
and would have been willing to speak with him about the weapons, and that the
conversation would have given him information that shed new light on who used the AK-
47 six months earlier, when Adolph, Sr. was killed. We should not make such speculative
leaps without some evidentiary footing, and Maynard has given us nothing of the kind.
Maynard had the opportunity to seek out the January 1 arrestees pending the
Superior Court’s disposition of his Brady motion following trial. However, even though
he had their names and time to look for them, he never undertook the investigation that he
had so zealously claimed was essential to his defense. If he thought he lacked the amount
of time necessary for an investigation, he could have requested a continuance, but he did
not do so. In short, he had the chance to move his Brady challenge beyond the realm of
conjecture but neglected to do so. See Pelullo II, 399 F.3d at 209 (imposing burden of
establishing a Brady challenge upon the defendant).
One final point convinces us that denying relief on the Brady claim pertaining to
the January 1 arrestees is appropriate, namely, the weight of evidence against Maynard.
29
See Bartholomew, 516 U.S. at 8 (considering the strength of the government’s case when
evaluating materiality under Brady). Both Adolph, Jr. and Weeks testified that they were
acquainted with Maynard prior to the shooting of Adolph, Sr. Both testified that they saw
him firing the weapon that killed Adolph, Sr., and they described in detail their
opportunity to witness the murder. They both positively identified Maynard at trial.
Neither of them expressed uncertainty about his culpability at any point during pretrial
investigation or questioning at trial. Jurors also heard testimony that the six arrestees
were apprehended at the time the AK-47 was discovered, and Maynard encouraged them
to draw an inference that one of these six individuals was linked to the weapon or was
responsible for the murder. Jurors nevertheless found Adolph, Jr. and Weeks’s account
of the murder to be credible. We will not second-guess that finding of credibility. United
States v. Ozcelik, 527 F.3d 88, 94 (3d Cir. 2008) (“We must ‘defer to the jury’s
assessment of witness credibility’ and recognize that ‘the government’s proof need not
exclude every possible hypothesis of innocence.’” (quoting United States v. Bala, 236
F.3d 87, 93-94 (2d Cir. 2000))).
Furthermore, Maynard fled the Virgin Islands immediately after the shooting of
Adolph, Sr., supposedly to escape the individuals who had attacked him on July 4, 1999,
but whom he could not identify. He never indicated why the attack threatened him so
severely that he moved 1,500 miles away, nor has he explained why he changed his
identity. He asked jurors to believe that he upended his entire life based on a single
30
incident perpetrated by individuals he did not know and for reasons he did not
understand. The jury rejected that explanation and, on this record, we are in no position
to disagree. See United States v. Green, 25 F.3d 206, 210 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[E]vidence of
a defendant’s flight after a crime has been committed is admissible to prove his
consciousness of guilt.”).
In sum, Maynard’s conjecture about what an investigation of the January 1
arrestees might have shown is insufficient to demonstrate that an investigation would
have led to evidence that was exculpatory and material to his defense. Accordingly, the
Appellate Division was correct to affirm the Superior Court’s denial of Maynard’s Brady
claim with respect to the arrestees’ identities.11
B. Medical Records of Weeks’s Drug Use
Maynard alleges that the government violated Brady by failing to obtain and
produce evidence of Weeks’s drug use in the possession of the Department of Health.
Assuming that Weeks’s treatment records qualified as Brady materials, they nevertheless
11
One might argue that the denial of Maynard’s Brady challenge will create an
incentive for prosecutors to withhold the names of key witnesses or other individuals who
possess evidence pertinent to a case. That concern is, we hope, unfounded. The Supreme
Court has noted that “because the significance of an item of evidence can seldom be
predicted accurately until the entire record is complete, the prudent prosecutor will
resolve doubtful questions in favor of disclosure.” Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108. A sensible
prosecutor has no incentive to withhold the names of potential witnesses because, in
doing so, the prosecutor creates a risk that the defendant will later establish that those
witnesses possessed material and exculpatory information. Although that risk did not
materialize in this case, rejecting Maynard’s Brady challenge does not mean that another
defendant in a similar position would be unable to advance a meritorious Brady
challenge.
31
fail to support a claim to relief because Maynard could have discovered them through the
exercise of reasonable diligence. Pelullo II, 399 F.3d at 202 (“[T]he government is not
obliged under Brady to furnish a defendant with information which he already has or,
with any reasonable diligence, he can obtain himself.” (quoting Starusko, 729 F.2d at
262)). After the prosecutor allegedly tried and failed in his attempt to obtain those
records from the Department of Health, defense counsel subpoenaed them on the first day
of trial. The Department promptly brought the records to the courthouse the following
day, but it was too late for defense counsel to put them in evidence.
These circumstances, though unfortunate, demonstrate that Maynard could have
obtained the records prior to trial. Defense counsel was aware two weeks before trial that
a court order would be necessary to acquire the records, but he did not subpoena them
until after trial commenced. See United States v. McKenzie, 768 F.2d 602, 608 (5th Cir.
1985) (concluding no Brady violation because the defendant could have subpoenaed a
videotape allegedly withheld by the government from the witness who had custody of it);
see also Perdomo, 929 F.2d at 973 (“Brady does not oblige the government to provide
defendants with evidence that they could obtain from other sources ... .”). Because
Maynard’s counsel could have obtained the records prior to trial through the exercise of
reasonable diligence, those records cannot serve as the basis for relief under Brady.
Accordingly, Maynard is not entitled to a new trial based on the government’s failure to
obtain and produce records of Weeks’s drug treatment.
32
IV. Conclusion
Though we do not entirely agree with the reasoning provided by the Appellate
Division, the Court was correct in its conclusion that neither the suppression of the
January 1 arrestees’ identities nor the government’s failure to obtain and produce
Weeks’s drug treatment records provides a basis for relief under Brady. Thus, the Court
properly affirmed the Superior Court’s denial of Maynard’s post-trial motion. We will
therefore affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division of the District Court.
33