David Wilson v. Joseph Biden, Jr. ( 2023 )


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  •                                                          NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 22-2797
    __________
    DAVID ALLEN WILSON,
    Appellant
    v.
    USA PRESIDENT JOSEPH ROBINETTE BIDEN, JR.; VICE PRESIDENT KAMALA
    DEVI HARRIS; JOHN ROBERTS, USA SUPREME COURT CHIEF JUSTICE;
    MICHAEL A SHIPP, USA DISTRICT COURT JUDGE; SHELIA OLIVER,
    NEW JERSEY LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR; MARC MCKITHEN,
    TRENTON MUNICIPAL COURT CHIEF; STEVE WILSON, TRENTON POLICE
    COMMISSIONER; KENNETH S. DOUGLAS TRENTON FIRE COMMISSIONER;
    VIC CARSTARPHEN, CAMDEN CITY MAYOR;
    GABRIEL RODRIGUEZ, CAMDEN COUNTY POLICE CHIEF:
    MICHAEL HARPER, CAMDEN CITY FIRE CHIEF;
    JUSTICE STUART RABNER, New Jersey Supreme Court Chief
    ____________________________________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of New Jersey
    (D.C. Civil Action No. 2:22-cv-01647)
    District Judge: Honorable Julien X. Neals
    ____________________________________
    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    February 16, 2023
    Before: HARDIMAN, PORTER, and FREEMAN, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed: April 5, 2023)
    ___________
    OPINION*
    ___________
    PER CURIAM
    David Wilson, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals an order of the
    United States District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissing his complaint for
    failure to state a claim. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the judgment of the
    District Court.
    Wilson filed a complaint in March 2022 against numerous federal, state, and local
    officials, seeking compensatory, punitive, and injunctive relief. Dkt. No. 1 at 7. He
    alleged that, since his birth, he has been subject to wiretapping in every home where he
    has lived and every job he has worked. Id. at 6. He also claimed physical injuries,
    including damage to his eyesight, nightmares, severe high blood pressure, and numerous
    foot infections planted by the U.S. Government. Id. at 6-7. He also submitted an
    application to proceed in forma pauperis.
    The District Court granted Wilson’s request to proceed in forma pauperis,
    screened his complaint pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)(B), and dismissed it without
    prejudice for failure to state a claim, concluding that Wilson’s allegations in support of
    his claims were unintelligible. Dkt. Nos. 20 at 3 & 21. The District Court also permitted
    *
    This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
    constitute binding precedent.
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    Wilson to file an amended complaint within 30 days. Dkt. Nos. 20 & 21. Rather than
    file an amended complaint, Wilson immediately appealed from that order. Dkt. No. 23.
    We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . See Batoff v. State Farm Ins. Co.,
    
    977 F.2d 848
    , 851 n.5 (3d Cir. 1992). Our standard of review is plenary. Dooley v.
    Wetzel, 
    957 F.3d 366
    , 373 (3d Cir. 2020).
    Wilson argues on appeal that the District Court erred by failing to issue
    summonses and subpoenas to the defendants and by ruling that Wilson failed to state a
    claim because it failed to properly apply constitutional law to his claims. C.A. Dkt. No.
    24 at 3-4. However, we agree with the District Court that Wilson failed to state a claim.
    First, as demonstrated by the District Court’s screening of Wilson’s complaint,
    when a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis, a court is required to dismiss the case at any
    time if it determines that the complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be
    granted. 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)(B)(ii). Accordingly, Wilson’s argument that the District
    Court was required to delay its screening of his complaint until summonses or subpoenas
    were issued fails.
    Second, we construe pro se filings liberally, see Erickson v. Pardus, 
    551 U.S. 89
    ,
    94 (2007) (per curiam), and “are more forgiving of pro se litigants for filing relatively
    unorganized or somewhat lengthy complaints,” Garrett v. Wexford Health, 
    938 F.3d 69
    ,
    92 (3d Cir. 2019). Nevertheless, we conclude that, as recognized by the District Court,
    Wilson failed to state a claim because he failed to make specific allegations against
    3
    specific defendants. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678 (2009) (explaining that a
    complaint will survive dismissal if the “plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
    court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
    alleged”). Wilson’s complaint, in which he generally alleged that he was subject to
    lifelong wiretapping and physical injuries by numerous unnamed and unrelated
    government officials, does not contain the required “sufficient factual matter, accepted as
    true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” 
    Id.
     (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.
    v. Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    , 570 (2007)); see also Denton v. Hernandez, 
    504 U.S. 25
    , 32-
    33 (1992) (explaining that a court may dismiss a complaint if its allegations are “fanciful,
    fantastic, [or] delusional” (citations omitted)).
    For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
    4