Ispat/Inland, Inc. v. Director OWCP , 422 F. App'x 149 ( 2011 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 10-3022
___________
ISPAT/INLAND, INC.,
Petitioner
v.
DIRECTOR OWCP, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR;
HOWARD CURTIS
_______________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Benefits Review Board, United States Department of Labor
(BRB No. 09-0356 BLA)
______________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 11, 2011
Before: SCIRICA, AMBRO and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: April 6, 2011)
_________________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_________________
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge.
Ispat/Inland, Inc. appeals a final judgment of the Department of Labor’s Benefits
Review Board awarding benefits to Howard Curtis under the Black Lung Benefits Act,
30 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (―BLBA‖). According to Ispat/Inland, the coal mine operator
responsible for paying benefits, the administrative law judge wrongly presumed any
obstructive pulmonary disease in an individual with both a history of coal dust exposure
and a longstanding smoking habit will necessarily ―arise out of‖ coal mine employment
and therefore qualify as ―legal‖ pneumoconiosis under the statute and regulations.
Because neither the ALJ nor the Board employed such a presumption, we will affirm.1
I.
Congress enacted BLBA to compensate miners who are totally disabled by
pneumoconiosis, which the statute defines as ―a chronic dust disease of the lung and its
sequelae, including respiratory and pulmonary impairments, arising out of coal mine
employment.‖ 30 U.S.C. §§ 901(a), 902(b). Under the statute, pneumoconiosis may be
―clinical‖ or ―legal.‖ The former label refers to the category of diseases recognized by the
medical community as pneumoconiosis. 20 C.F.R. § 718.201(a)(1). The latter is defined
as ―any chronic lung disease or impairment . . . arising out of coal mine employment‖
including, without limitation, ―any chronic restrictive or obstructive pulmonary disease
arising out of coal mine employment.‖ 20 C.F.R. § 718.201(a)(2). An obstructive
pulmonary condition caused by coal-dust exposure satisfies the definition of legal
pneumoconiosis. See id.; LaBelle Processing Co. v. Swarrow, 72 F.3d 308, 315 (3d Cir.
1995).
To recover benefits under BLBA, a claimant must demonstrate (1) he suffers from
pneumoconiosis; (2) he is ―totally disabled‖; and (3) the pneumoconiosis is a substantial
1
The Board upheld the ALJ’s award and denied Ispat/Inland’s motion for
reconsideration. We have jurisdiction under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’
Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 921(c), which is incorporated by reference in BLBA, 30
2
contributing cause of his total disability. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 718.201–204. By definition,
legal pneumoconiosis refers to a class of pulmonary impairments arising out of coal mine
employment. See 30 U.S.C. § 902(b). A claimant, therefore, bears the burden of proof on
two distinct causation inquiries — disease causation and disability causation. See 20
C.F.R. § 725.103; Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. Dep’t of Labor, 292 F.3d 849, 861 (D.C. Cir.
2002) (―a claimant . . . bears the burden of demonstrating that he meets all of the relevant
conditions‖). First, to qualify under the statute as an individual afflicted by ―legal‖
pneumoconiosis, a claimant must prove his obstructive pulmonary condition arose out of
his coal mine employment. 20 C.F.R. § 718.201(a)(2). Subsequently, he must
demonstrate pneumoconiosis is a ―substantially contributing cause‖ of his totally
disabling pulmonary impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 718.204(c). Pneumoconiosis is a
―substantially contributing cause‖ of a miner’s disability if it (1) ―[h]as a material adverse
effect on the miner’s respiratory or pulmonary condition;‖ or (2) ―[m]aterially worsens a
totally disabling respiratory or pulmonary impairment which is caused by a disease or
exposure unrelated to coal mine employment.‖ 20 C.F.R. § 718.204(c).
BLBA and its implementing regulations employ a number of presumptions
―intended to ease a claimant’s burden by allowing an element of the required proof to be
presumed from the existence of other rationally-related facts.‖ Andersen v. Dir., OWCP,
455 F.3d 1102, 1104 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted). In the realm of disease
causation, ―[i]f a miner who is suffering or suffered from pneumoconiosis was employed
U.S.C. § 932(a).
3
for ten years or more in one or more coal mines there shall be a rebuttable presumption
that his pneumoconiosis arose out of such employment.‖ 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(1); 20
C.F.R. § 718.203(b).2 The regulations ―do[ ] not . . . create a presumption that all or even
more obstructive disease is caused by exposure to coal dust. . . . [E]ach miner bears the
burden of proving that his obstructive lung disease did in fact arise out of his coal mine
employment.‖ Nat’l Mining Ass’n, 292 F.3d at 862–63 (internal quotation omitted).
On appeal, Ispat/Inland contests the ALJ’s findings concerning legal
pneumoconiosis and disability causation. Ispat/Inland argues the ALJ, in according less
weight to the testimony of a physician who theorized that the contribution of coal dust
exposure to Curtis’ pulmonary impairment was ―clinically insignificant‖ in light of his
well-documented smoking history, effectively fashioned an irrebuttable presumption in
favor of entitlement to benefits under BLBA. That is, by crediting medical testimony
ascribing Curtis’ lung disease to both coal dust exposure and cigarette smoke over
testimony pinning the obstruction solely on cigarette smoke, the ALJ impermissibly
facilitated Curtis’ efforts to demonstrate disease causation. Ispat/Inland argues this
adjudicatory tack leads invariably to the awarding of benefits under BLBA despite the
theoretically disproportionate contributions of cigarette inhalation and coal dust exposure
2
The ALJ concluded Curtis was entitled to this presumption. The Tenth Circuit has
concluded this presumption applies strictly to claims of clinical pneumoconiosis and does
not extend to claims of legal pneumoconiosis. Andersen, 455 F.3d at 1105–06.
Nevertheless, because a finding of legal pneumoconiosis subsumes a finding of disease
causation, the Board reasoned the ALJ’s misguided application of the presumption was
harmless error. We concur.
4
to a miner’s pulmonary disorder. For the reasons outlined below, Ispat/Inland’s argument
fails.3
II.
In January 2009, the ALJ awarded Curtis’ claim for benefits based on a finding of
legal pneumoconiosis. The ALJ found Curtis worked thirteen years in coal mine
employment and had smoked ―between 50 and 60 [cigarette] pack years.‖ Based on his
assessment of eleven x-ray interpretations, the ALJ found the evidence insufficient to
establish the presence of clinical pneumoconiosis. See 20 C.F.R. § 718.202(a)(1) (―A
chest X-ray conducted and classified in accordance with § 718.102 may form the basis
for a finding of the existence of pneumoconiosis.‖). However, the ALJ also assessed
testimony proffered by five medical witnesses and concluded Curtis had satisfied his
burden of establishing legal pneumoconiosis. See 20 C.F.R. § 718.202(a)(4) (―A
determination of the existence of pneumoconiosis may also be made if a physician,
exercising sound medical judgment, notwithstanding a negative X-ray, finds that the
3
We review a Board decision to determine whether an error of law has been made and
whether the Board has adhered to its own standard of review. Lombardy v. Dir., OWCP,
355 F.3d 211, 213 (3d Cir. 2004). We review questions of law de novo, and we note the
Board is bound by an ALJ’s findings of fact ―if they are supported by substantial
evidence in the record considered as a whole.‖ Id. ―Appellate review thus necessarily
entails an independent review of the record and a decision as to whether the
administrative law judge’s findings were supported by substantial evidence.‖
Consolidation Coal Co. v. Kramer, 305 F.3d 203, 207 (3d Cir. 2002). ―If substantial
evidence exists, we must affirm the ALJ’s interpretation of the evidence even if we might
have interpreted the evidence differently in the first instance.‖ Balsavage v. Dir., OWCP,
295 F.3d 390, 395 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation omitted).
5
miner suffers or suffered from pneumoconiosis as defined in § 718.201. . . . Such a
finding shall be supported by a reasoned medical opinion.‖).
The parties stipulated that Curtis suffers from a totally disabling chronic
obstructive pulmonary disease. Thus, as to both disease and disability causation, the
unifying question on appeal is whether Curtis demonstrated his condition was caused, in
some material part, by his occupational exposure to coal mine dust. On this issue, the
testimony of three physicians is germane.4 Dr. Donald L. Rasmussen, a medical witness
whose report was submitted by Curtis, conceded cigarette smoke was likely a more
determinative factor in Curtis’ obstruction than was coal mine dust but concluded the
dust exposure was ―significant‖ and had ―contribute[d] in a material way to his disabling
lung disease.‖ Dr. John E. Parker, another medical witness whose report was submitted
by Curtis, cited a wealth of research attesting to the causal link between coal dust and
obstructive lung disease and similarly fixed blame for Curtis’ obstruction on both coal
dust and tobacco smoke. To the contrary, Dr. Gregory J. Fino, Ispat/Inland’s medical
witness, placed sole responsibility for the pulmonary condition on cigarette smoke and
opined that coal dust exposure was ―of no clinical significance‖ in Curtis’ case. He also
concluded that, even if Curtis suffered from pneumoconiosis, his disability was caused
uniquely by cigarette smoke.
4
The ALJ accorded little weight to the opinions of Drs. Celko and Altmeyer. Because
Ispat/Inland has not contested these evaluations, we will devote the bulk of our analysis
to the three medical opinions most heavily relied upon by the ALJ.
6
The ALJ found the testimony of Drs. Rasmussen and Parker more persuasive than
the opinion forwarded by Dr. Fino. Specifically, he found Dr. Fino ―failed to explain how
the literature related to [Curtis’] case‖ and could not offer a convincing explanation for
how he had managed to distinguish the effects of cigarette smoke from the effects of coal
dust in this instance. The Board affirmed, holding the ALJ had acted within his discretion
in discounting Dr. Fino’s opinion and in concomitantly crediting the pneumoconiosis
diagnoses offered by Drs. Rasmussen and Parker.
We too conclude the ALJ acted properly in scrutinizing and weighing the
competing medical testimony. Under the BLBA’s adjudicatory scheme, the ALJ
―evaluate[s] the reasoning and credibility‖ of medical opinions, Kertesz v. Crescent Hills
Coal Co., 788 F.2d 158, 163 (3d Cir. 1986), and ―has discretion to accord varying weight
to physician testimony,‖ Consolidation Coal Co. v. Kramer, 305 F.3d 203, 207 n.7 (3d
Cir. 2002). At no point did the ALJ or the Board afford Curtis the benefit of a
presumption that his obstruction or his total disability arose out of coal dust exposure.
Instead, the ALJ assessed the medical evidence regarding the etiology of Curtis’
condition and found the diagnoses offered by Drs. Rasmussen and Parker comparatively
credible. The ALJ found their opinions — which factored into the equation Curtis’
smoking and employment histories — squarely supported by adequate data and sound
analysis. Neither witness blindly assumed Curtis suffered from legal pneumoconiosis
simply by virtue of his affliction with a chronic pulmonary condition, and the ALJ did not
make this inferential leap on the issue of disease causation without first rigorously
7
evaluating the competing testimony. The burden remained on Curtis to demonstrate
disease causation, and the ALJ properly determined he had satisfied this burden by
presenting medical testimony that weighed in his favor. See 20 C.F.R. § 718.202(a)(4).
―Whether a medical opinion is reasoned . . . is a decision that rests ultimately with
the ALJ . . . . The ALJ needs only to be persuaded, on the basis of all available evidence,
that pneumoconiosis is a contributing cause of the miner’s disability.‖ Freeman United
Coal Mining Co. v. Summers, 272 F.3d 473, 483 (7th Cir. 2001). Here, the ALJ found Dr.
Fino’s opinion deficient in several respects. Critically, both the ALJ and the Board found
Dr. Fino failed to articulate a viable explanation for why the selections from the relevant
medical literature upon which he relied were directly applicable to Curtis. Quite clearly,
the ALJ did not discredit Dr. Fino’s testimony simply because it posited cigarette smoke
as the sole underlying cause of Curtis’ condition. Indeed, far from overlooking the
potentially confounding influence of cigarette smoke in Black Lung cases in which x-ray
evidence does not demonstrate the existence of clinical pneumoconiosis, the ALJ
prefaced his decision by acknowledging a claimant’s cigarette smoking history ―is of
particular importance because the pulmonary manifestations of smoking are often similar
to [those] of coal workers’ pneumoconiosis.‖
Based on the available evidence, the ALJ reasonably concluded coal dust exposure
was a significant contributing cause of Curtis’ chronic obstructive pulmonary disease,
and that Curtis’ condition therefore comports with the statutory definition of legal
pneumoconiosis. See 30 U.S.C. §902(b); 20 C.F.R. § 718.201(a)(2). The ALJ acted
8
within his discretion in crediting the testimony of Drs. Rasmussen and Parker over the
testimony of Dr. Fino and in determining Curtis had satisfied each element of entitlement
to benefits based on this medical testimony.5
III.
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review and affirm the
order of the Benefits Review Board.
5
The Board declined to review the ALJ’s finding of disability causation under 20 C.F.R.
§ 718.204(c) because Ispat/Inland had neglected to challenge the issue on appeal. In
affirming the ALJ’s award of benefits, our reasoning applies with equal force to both
disease and disability causation.
9