Cong Cun v. Atty Gen USA ( 2011 )


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  •                                                                 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 11-1262
    ___________
    CONG A. CUN,
    AKA Sang,
    Petitioner
    v.
    ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
    Respondent
    ____________________________________
    On Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    (Agency No. A046-091-191)
    Immigration Judge: Honorable Andrew Arthur
    ____________________________________
    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    July 22, 2011
    Before: SCIRICA, SMITH and VANASKIE Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed: August 1, 2011 )
    ___________
    OPINION
    ___________
    PER CURIAM
    Petitioner Cong A. Cun, proceeding pro se, seeks review of a final order of
    removal. For the reasons that follow, we will deny his petition for review.
    I.
    Cong A. Cun, a native and citizen of Vietnam, became a lawful permanent
    resident of the United States in May 1997. In July 2009, Cun was convicted in federal
    district court of one count of conspiracy to distribute marijuana (
    21 U.S.C. § 846
    ) and
    two counts of aiding and abetting the distribution of marijuana (
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (a)(1),
    (b)(1)(D) and 
    18 U.S.C. § 2
    ), and was sentenced to forty-one months of incarceration.
    He was then charged with removability under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1227
    (a)(2)(A)(iii) (convicted of
    an aggravated felony as defined by § 1101(a)(43)(B) and (U)). Cun appeared before the
    Immigration Judge (“IJ”) in January 2010 and conceded removal; he waived appeal from
    that decision.
    In October 2010, Cun filed a motion to reopen to apply for cancellation of removal
    pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a). The IJ denied the motion after determining that Cun
    was statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal because he has been convicted of an
    aggravated felony. The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) agreed, and dismissed
    his appeal. Cun filed a timely notice of appeal.
    II.
    We have jurisdiction under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (a) to review the denial of a motion to
    reopen. We review such denials for abuse of discretion. Liu v. Att’y Gen., 
    555 F.3d 145
    ,
    148 (3d Cir. 2009). Under this standard, we may reverse the BIA’s decision only if it is
    “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.” Guo v. Ashcroft, 
    386 F.3d 556
    , 562 (3d Cir.
    2004).
    2
    III.
    In order for a lawful permanent resident to be eligible for cancellation of removal,
    he must have maintained that status for a minimum of five years, resided in the United
    States for seven continuous years, and not been convicted of an aggravated felony. 8
    U.S.C. § 1229b(a). Cun argues that the BIA did not apply the categorical approach set
    forth in Taylor v. United States, 
    495 U.S. 575
     (1990), to determine whether his
    conviction qualified as an aggravated felony. The claim is without merit. In denying his
    request for a motion to reopen to apply for cancellation, the IJ applied Singh v. Ashcroft,
    
    383 F.3d 144
    , 147-48 (3d Cir. 2004), in which this Court determined that Taylor’s
    categorical approach applies in assessing whether an alien’s conviction is an aggravated
    felony. The BIA agreed with the IJ’s findings. Accordingly, Cun fails to demonstrate
    any error.
    Cun next claims that the BIA improperly relied on a sentencing factor, 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (b), to establish his removability. The government argues persuasively that we lack
    jurisdiction to review the determination that Cun is removable because he waived his
    appeal from the IJ’s original removal order, and he did not exhaust his administrative
    remedies. See 
    8 U.S.C. § 1252
    (d)(1); Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 
    414 F.3d 442
    , 447 (3d
    Cir. 2005). In any event, as described below, any potential error is harmless, as Cun’s
    conviction under § 841(a) constitutes an aggravated felony.
    Finally, Cun claims that the BIA improperly relied on his admission that he was
    convicted of an aggravated felony, or on his “admission to the facts in 
    21 U.S.C. §
                                            3
    841(b),” in concluding that he had been convicted of an aggravated felony. This claim is
    without merit. Cun conceded before the IJ that he had been convicted of the crimes as
    alleged. Under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1101
    (a)(43)(B), “illicit trafficking in a controlled substance . .
    ., including a drug trafficking crime (as defined in section 924(c) of Title 18)” is an
    aggravated felony. Cun’s conviction pursuant to 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1) clearly qualifies.
    See 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (c) (defining “drug trafficking crime” to include “any felony
    punishable under the Controlled Substances Act (
    21 U.S.C. § 801
     et seq.)”).
    IV.
    For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.
    4