Christie v. President of United States , 532 F. App'x 88 ( 2013 )

GLD-341 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 13-2520
___________
BRIAN T. CHRISTIE,
Appellant
v.
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 2-13-cv-00596)
District Judge: Honorable Mark R. Hornak
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
July 18, 2013
Before: FUENTES, FISHER and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: July 29, 2013)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Brian Christie, pro se, appeals from the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal of his
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Appellee, the President of the United
States, moves for summary action pursuant to Local Appellate Rule 27.4. For the reasons
that follow, we will summarily affirm. See LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
Christie’s complaint alleged that President Barack Obama has committed, and
continues to commit, high treason against the United States in various ways. 1 The
District Court dismissed the complaint because Christie lacked standing, among other
reasons. The District Court also denied leave to amend as futile.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over
the District Court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Berg v. Obama,
586 F.3d 234, 238 (3d Cir. 2009). We take the factual allegations of Christie’s complaint
as true in assessing whether he has met his burden to establish standing. See id. (citations
omitted).
To have standing under Article III, a plaintiff must have an injury-in-fact which is
1) concrete and particularized to him, and 2) actual or imminent, as opposed to merely
potential. See id. at 239 (quotation omitted). An injury is not sufficiently particularized
if, assuming it exists, it would be “shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large
class of citizens.” Id. Merely asserting every citizen’s “interest in proper application of
the Constitution and laws” is insufficient to confer Article III standing to a plaintiff.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1992).
1
Christie’s complaint and a document attached to his notice of appeal (which could be
viewed as an attempt to amend his complaint) list a series of unrelated, current political
controversies without any indication of Christie’s personal involvement, other than his
status as a U.S. citizen.
2
All of Christie’s allegations suffer from this lack of identifying a particularized
injury. He asserted that President Obama took actions against, and refused to act for, the
best interests of the United States, and that Christie was thereby injured as a citizen of
this country. In a document attached to his notice of appeal, Christie urges this Court to
adjudicate his complaint because “Without our law and Constitution we have nothing!”
Unfortunately for Christie, it is the Constitution that precludes us from adjudicating his
case. “The law of Article III standing, which is built on separation-of-powers principles,
serves to prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the political
branches.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146 (2013). There is no
general, citizen standing to challenge government actions. 2 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-
74.
Because we agree with the District Court that Christie lacked standing, we need
not reach the alternative grounds for dismissal raised by the District Court. The District
Court dismissed Christie’s original complaint, but did not give him an opportunity to
amend because it held doing so would be futile. We agree with the District Court that
amendment would have been futile. Accordingly, it was not an abuse of discretion to
deny leave to amend Richard’s complaint. See In re New Jersey Title Ins. Litig., 683
F.3d 451, 462 (3d Cir. 2012) (holding it was not an abuse of discretion to deny leave to
amend where complaint was properly dismissed for lack of standing).
2
The District Court characterized Christie’s complaint as seeking a general taxpayer
standing. As the District Court correctly held, merely being a taxpayer is generally
insufficient to confer standing to challenge a government action. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at
574; Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 593 (2007).
3
For the reasons given, we grant the President’s motion for summary action, and
will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court.
4