Williams v. United States District Court ( 2011 )

DLD-063 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 11-4028
___________
CAZZIE L. WILLIAMS,
Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEWARK, NEW
JERSEY; FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
TREASURY
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil No. 2-11-cv-00884)
District Judge: Honorable William J. Martini
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P.
10.6 and for Request for a Certificate of Appealability Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)
December 8, 2011
Before: AMBRO, JORDAN AND VANASKIE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: December 20, 2011)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Pro se appellant Cazzie Williams appeals the District Court’s order dismissing his
complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291and exercise plenary review over the District Court’s order. See Allah v. Seiverling, 229
F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). For the reasons set forth below, we will summarily affirm
the District Court’s judgment. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
In 2003, Williams pleaded guilty in the District Court to four counts of bank
robbery, and the Court sentenced him to 156 months’ imprisonment and ordered him to
pay $105,797.85 in restitution. Williams filed a notice of appeal, but then withdrew his
appeal before briefing.
Williams has since sought to attack his conviction through collateral proceedings.
He first filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255; his central claim was that his plea
agreement was defective and that his criminal judgment was consequently void. The
District Court rejected this argument on the merits. See Williams v. United States, Civ.
A. No. 08-1242, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62725 (D.N.J. July 22, 2009). Williams
subsequently filed a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 advancing a similar challenge
to his plea agreement; the District Court concluded that Williams’s claims could be
pursued only in a § 2255 motion, and thus dismissed the § 2241 petition. See Williams v.
Zickefoose, Civ. A. No. 10-2953, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 139069 (D.N.J. Dec. 29, 2010).
At issue in this appeal is Williams’s most-recent effort to vacate his criminal
judgment. He has again argued that he was convicted based on a flawed plea agreement.
Therefore, he contends, his incarceration and the restitution award are unlawful.
However, he has framed this proceeding as a civil action arising exclusively under the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692p. He seeks his
release from prison and $390 billion in damages.
2
The District Court dismissed Williams’s complaint, concluding that “[r]egardless
of how Williams characterizes his pleading here, there is no doubt that he is actually
challenging the validity of his conviction.” Op. at 13. Williams then filed a timely notice
of appeal.
This case requires little discussion. Absent a waiver, sovereign immunity shields
the United States and its agencies — including all defendants named here — from suit.
See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994). Consent to suit “must be unequivocally
expressed” in statutory text, and cannot simply be implied. White-Squire v. U.S. Postal
Serv., 592 F.3d 453, 456 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Congress did
not waive the sovereign immunity of the United States in the FDCPA. See Wagstaff v.
U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 509 F.3d 661, 664 (5th Cir. 2007). 1 Therefore, the District Court
properly dismissed the complaint.
We also deny Williams’s request to recover his docketing fees. Williams filed a
complaint and an application to proceed in forma pauperis; 28 U.S.C. § 1915 makes clear
that filing fees shall be assessed, and makes no provision for a refund of such fees. See
§ 1915(b)(1); cf. Porter v. Dep’t of Treasury, 564 F.3d 176, 179 (3d Cir. 2009).
1
There are other problems with Williams’s theory. Most fundamentally, none of the
defendants is a “debt collector” as defined in the FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(C).
Moreover, to the extent that Williams’s claim for prospective injunctive relief is not
barred by sovereign immunity, cf. Foehl v. United States, 238 F.3d 474, 477-78 (3d Cir.
2001), the relief Williams seeks — his immediate release from prison — may be obtained
only through habeas corpus proceedings. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500
(1973).
3
Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. 2 See 3d
Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
2
While the District Court occasionally used language suggesting that it had converted
Williams’s complaint into a habeas motion, we conclude that it ultimately (and correctly)
treated the complaint as presenting a civil action under the FDCPA. Therefore, Williams
does not need to obtain a certificate of appealability to prosecute this appeal.
4