Oliver Vaughn:Douce v. DCP&P ( 2021 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 21-1596
___________
OLIVER VAUGHN:DOUCE, Al Dey Consul Inpropria Persona, Sui Juris
Appellant
v.
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY;
MADELIN F. EINBINDER; KERI POPKIN; MELISA H. RASKA; MICHELE
SCENNA; MORGAN KOWSKY; ALEXIS POLLOCK; KEITH MILLER; CARINA
SHORTINO; PAMELA PETERSON; KENNETH MCTIGUE; DR. PUGLIA; LORI
LESSIN, PSY; DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES; TOMS RIVER
HOSPITAL
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3:20-cv-02619)
District Judge: Honorable Michael A. Shipp
____________________________________
Submitted pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
August 4, 2021
Before: CHAGARES, PHIPPS, and COWEN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 4, 2021)
_________
OPINION*
_________
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
PER CURIAM
Appellant Oliver Vaughn:Douce, proceeding pro se, appeals from the order
dismissing his action in the District Court for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. We will
affirm.
Appellant, a New York resident, initiated this action in the District Court by filing
a document nominally requesting a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2242
and 2243, purportedly on behalf of his minor daughter. He alleged that in June 2019,
having not heard from his daughter’s mother in over a year, he investigated and learned
that the mother had died in October 2018. He then tried to locate his daughter, who was
eight years old at the time, and discovered that Defendant New Jersey Division of Child
Protection and Permanency (“NJDCPP”), had put her in a temporary living placement.
According to Appellant’s allegations and filed exhibits, immediately following the
mother’s death, NJDCPP conducted an investigation and, as part of that investigation,
attempted to contact Appellant, but was unsuccessful in those attempts. The investigation
noted that efforts would be made to contact him and other available relatives who could
be assessed for possible placement for the child. Days after the mother’s death, NJDCPP
filed a complaint in state court naming both parents as defendants and requesting an order
granting NJDCPP care and custody of the child on account of parental neglect. The
complaint noted that Appellant’s whereabouts were unknown and that NJDCPP was
trying to contact him. Appellant eventually became aware of the proceedings and began
litigating in state-court, representing himself. Following a January 2020 permanency
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hearing, a state court accepted a plan of termination of Appellant’s parental rights and
determined that adoption was appropriate and acceptable for the child.1 The order further
stated that the child would continue in a placement outside the home, and that by a date in
March 2020, NJDCPP should file to terminate Appellant’s parental rights, and file for its
own kinship legal guardianship or arrange to have the adoption complaint filed with the
court by a date certain. Appellant thereafter filed a motion for leave to file an
interlocutory appeal, which NJDCPP opposed in February 2020. It is unclear if and how
that motion was resolved, or whether the proceedings have concluded. Another exhibit
filed by Appellant, dated May 12, 2020, stated that a case management conference in
preparation for trial had been scheduled for June 25, 2020.
In this case, which Appellant initiated in March 2020, Appellant alleged that his
daughter was being held in an “illegal action for private financial gain” by NJDCPP,
which was holding her “for ransom, attempting to use [a] psychologist to fabricate a
report to the[ir] benefit to prolong, in order to assure[] the[ir] profit.” Appellant appeared
to attempt to bring state-law claims, as well as federal constitutional claims. In his initial
filing, and subsequent filings, he requested injunctive relief in the form of custody of his
daughter. In one filing he also indicated that he was seeking $20 million in damages.
1
The state-court order provided by Appellant references a section of the order that
provides the rationale for its decision; however, Appellant appears to have omitted the
page of the order containing that section.
3
The District Court screened the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and dismissed
the action for lack of jurisdiction. The District Court held in the alternative that if it did
have jurisdiction, the Court would have abstained from hearing the case, pursuant to
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we
exercise plenary review over the District Court’s dismissal of Appellant’s action for lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction, see Freidrich v. Davis, 767 F.3d 374, 377 (3d Cir. 2014),
and also exercise plenary review over the question whether the requirements for
abstention have been satisfied, see Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139, 145-46 (3d Cir.
2010). We may affirm the court’s decision on any basis supported by the record. See
Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
As the District Court concluded, to the extent that Appellant sought habeas relief
for his daughter, the Court lacked jurisdiction because placement in foster care does not
qualify as “custody” for purposes of habeas corpus jurisprudence. Cf. Lehman v.
Lycoming Cnty. Children’s Servs. Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1982).
The District Court also concluded that, to the extent Appellant brought civil rights
claims challenging state-court decisions regarding parental, custodial, and related rights,
the Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over those claims pursuant to the domestic
relations exception. “The Supreme Court has long recognized a domestic relations
exception to federal diversity jurisdiction.” Matusow v. Trans-County Title Agency,
LLC, 545 F.3d 241, 245 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689,
4
693-94 (1992)). This exception encompasses “cases involving the issuance of a divorce,
alimony, or child custody decree.” Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 704.
To the extent that these claims were brought under state law and sought to invoke
the District Court’s federal diversity jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332, we agree with the
District Court that the claims would be barred by the domestic relations exception
because Appellant asserted them as a means to challenge child-custody proceedings and
decisions in state court, see Matusow, 545 F.3d at 244-45.
However, we have held that, “[a]s a jurisdictional bar, the domestic relations
exception does not apply to cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the United
States.” See McLaughlin v. Pernsley, 876 F.2d 308, 312-13 (3d Cir. 1989) (internal
citation and quotation marks omitted). Thus, to the extent that Appellant’s claims alleged
federal constitutional violations, which invoke federal question jurisdiction, see 28
U.S.C. § 1331, the District Court erred in concluding that the claims were barred by the
domestic relations exception.
As noted, the District Court alternatively concluded that it would abstain under
Younger in light of the ongoing state-court proceedings. Younger abstention dictates
that “[w]hen there is a parallel state criminal proceeding, federal courts must refrain from
enjoining the state prosecution.” Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72
(2013). In Sprint, the Supreme Court noted that Younger has been extended to certain
“civil enforcement proceedings,” and cited as an example a case involving “state-initiated
proceedings to gain custody of children allegedly abused by their parents”. See id. at 79
5
(citing Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 419-20 (1979)). Because Appellant’s allegations
and state-court exhibits establish that NJDCPP, a state agency, conducted an
investigation and initiated the proceedings by filing a formal complaint against him to
terminate his parental rights in favor of NJDCPP as legal guardian for purposes of
pursuing adoption for the child, we agree that this case falls within the civil-enforcement-
proceedings extension of Younger abstention. Cf. id. at 80 (rejecting the application of
Younger and noting that a private corporation, rather than the state, initiated the action,
and that no state authority conducted an investigation or lodged a formal complaint).
Therefore, we will affirm.
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