United States v. James Blakney ( 2014 )


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  •                                                                 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    _____________
    No. 12-3282
    _____________
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
    v.
    JAMES BLAKNEY,
    Appellant
    _____________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. Crim. No. 2-11-cr-00562-001)
    District Judge: Honorable Timothy J. Savage
    ___________
    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    November 6, 2013
    Before: GREENAWAY, JR., VANASKIE, and ROTH, Circuit Judges.
    (Filed: March 11, 2014)
    ___________
    OPINION
    ___________
    VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.
    James Blakney appeals from a judgment entered by the District Court convicting
    him of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1),
    and sentencing him to a 180-month term of incarceration. Blakney contends the District
    Court erred in denying his motion to suppress the firearms evidence, and in determining
    that he should be sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).1
    Finding no error, we will affirm.
    I.
    Blakney was arrested on June 4, 2011 after the police recovered two firearms
    hidden behind a toilet in Blakney’s home. The police found the firearms while executing
    a search warrant. A grand jury later charged Blakney, who had previously been
    convicted of a felony, with possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of
    18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1).
    Blakney moved to suppress the firearms evidence, arguing that the search warrant
    was issued on the basis of false material statements contained in the affidavit of probable
    cause. The District Court held a hearing on Blakney’s motion.
    At the hearing, Terence Sweeney, a detective with the Philadelphia Police
    Department, testified that he sought the search warrant after interviewing seventeen-year-
    old M.P., Jr. (“M.P.”) on June 2, 2011. According to Detective Sweeney, M.P. reported
    that he had been the victim of an assault by two men on May 31, 2011. M.P. stated that,
    during the assault, he was struck several times on the head with a nickel-plated handgun
    by a man he had known for several years by the name, “Bruce.” As a result of the
    1
    In pertinent part, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) provides:
    In the case of a person who violates section 922(g) of this title
    and has three previous convictions by any court referred to in
    section 922(g)(1) of this title for a violent felony or a serious
    drug offense, or both, committed on occasions different from
    one another, such person shall be . . . imprisoned not less than
    fifteen years. . . .
    2
    assault, M.P. was admitted to a hospital intensive care unit. Detective Sweeney
    corroborated the fact that M.P. had been admitted to the hospital with severe head
    injuries.
    Detective Sweeney also testified that he checked the police radio database and
    found that the police had received a phone call reporting a disturbance at the time and
    location that M.P. claimed he had been assaulted. The report was ultimately listed as
    “unfounded,” which Detective Sweeney interpreted as meaning that “when the officers
    responded no one came forth and offered the officers information for the alleged call.”
    (Appendix (“A.”) 24.)
    Additionally, Detective Sweeney testified that M.P. provided “Bruce’s” address to
    him, and that voter registration records listed Blakney as a resident of that address. After
    running Blakney’s name through police records, Detective Sweeney learned that Blakney
    had a prior conviction that prevented him from legally possessing a firearm. Sweeney
    then presented M.P. with a photograph of Blakney, and M.P. identified the photograph as
    the man he knew as “Bruce.” (A. 14-15.) M.P. then signed the photograph and wrote at
    the bottom, “[t]his is Bruce that [sic] hit me a number of times with a nickel-plated gun.”
    (Id. 15.)
    Based upon the evidence presented at the hearing, the District Court found that the
    search warrant was supported by probable cause; that the affidavit of probable cause was
    free of any false statements or omissions material to the finding of probable cause; and
    that the affidavit of probable cause was free of any material false statements made
    3
    knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly. Accordingly, the District Court denied the
    suppression motion.
    Blakney subsequently pleaded guilty pursuant to a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea
    agreement that called for a prison term of 180 months. The plea agreement, although
    containing an appellate waiver, preserved Blakney’s right to challenge the denial of his
    suppression motion and his qualification for sentencing as an armed career criminal under
    18 U.S.C. § 924(e). At sentencing, Blakney challenged the government’s contention that
    he qualified as an armed career criminal subject to the mandatory minimum prison term
    of 15 years called for by 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). Specifically, Blakney argued that the
    original certified copy of his 1995 robbery conviction, which the government produced at
    sentencing as evidence of a third qualifying felony conviction, was insufficient proof of
    that conviction. The District Court disagreed, finding that the certified copy established
    that Blakney was convicted of the qualifying offense. The District Court accepted the
    binding plea agreement and sentenced Blakney to 180 months’ incarceration in
    accordance with that agreement.2
    II.
    The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have appellate
    jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
    Blakney first contends that the District Court erred in denying his motion to
    suppress the firearms because the affidavit of probable cause was inadequate. He relies
    2
    Blakney’s advisory imprisonment guidelines range was calculated to be 210 to
    262 months.
    4
    on Franks v. Delaware, 
    438 U.S. 154
    (1978), which “requires suppression of evidence
    obtained pursuant to a warrant issued on the basis of a false statement that was both
    material to the finding of probable cause and made either knowingly and intentionally or
    with reckless disregard for the truth.” United States v. Brown, 
    631 F.3d 638
    , 641-42 (3d
    Cir. 2011) (citing 
    Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56
    ). Blakney concedes that Detective
    Sweeney did not knowingly or intentionally include a false statement in the affidavit.
    Thus, his argument succeeds only if he demonstrates that the affidavit included a false
    statement made “with reckless disregard for the truth,” and that the false statement was
    “necessary to the finding of probable cause.” See 
    Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56
    .
    When considering a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we review the
    district court’s factual findings for clear error, and we exercise plenary review over the
    court’s application of the law to the facts. United States v. Perez, 
    280 F.3d 318
    , 336 (3d
    Cir. 2002). The District Court’s determination that Detective Sweeney did not act with
    reckless disregard for the truth is a mixed question of law and fact, which we review for
    clear error. See 
    Brown, 631 F.3d at 642
    (“[A] district court’s resolution of the question
    whether a particular false statement in a warrant affidavit was made with reckless
    disregard for the truth is subject to reversal only upon a finding of clear error.”).
    Blakney contends that the affidavit of probable cause was problematic for two
    reasons. First, Blakney asserts that M.P.’s allegations – which formed the basis of the
    affidavit – were unreliable because M.P. was only seventeen years old at the time, and he
    “appeared nervous and apprehensive.” (Appellant’s Br. 9.) Second, Blakney asserts that
    the affidavit failed to disclose that the officers who responded to an initial radio call
    5
    about the incident marked the call “unfounded,” and that this omission was material. (A.
    24.)
    Blakney’s arguments fail for several reasons. His assertion that Detective
    Sweeney acted with reckless disregard for the truth in failing to conduct further
    investigation into M.P.’s allegations is belied by the record. Detective Sweeney testified
    before the District Court that he verified M.P.’s statements by reviewing M.P.’s hospital
    discharge papers and calling the hospital to confirm that M.P. had been admitted to the
    intensive care unit with severe head injuries. He likewise confirmed that Blakney was
    known to M.P. as “Bruce” and that Blakney lived at the address provided by M.P. as
    “Bruce’s” residence.
    Blakney’s claim that the warrant would not have been issued if it had indicated
    that the police radio call was categorized as “unfounded” is unpersuasive. Detective
    Sweeney testified before the District Court that the police report was designated
    unfounded because, “when the officers responded[,] no one came forth and offered the
    officers information for the alleged call.” (A. 24.) Based on this testimony, the District
    Court did not clearly err in concluding that the omission of this information was
    immaterial.
    Finally, Blakney’s brief fails to address the second prong of the Franks analysis;
    i.e., whether the allegedly false information was necessary to a finding of probable cause.
    Blakney’s brief does not identify a specific statement that is allegedly false, and the
    omission of the report being “unfounded” is immaterial to a finding of probable cause.
    We will therefore uphold the District Court’s denial of Blakney’s motion to suppress.
    6
    Blakney also contends that the District Court erred in sentencing Blakney as an
    armed career criminal pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) because the government failed to
    move the certified copy of Blakney’s 1995 robbery conviction into the record. We need
    not address this issue at length. Blakney does not deny that the certified copy of this
    conviction was accurate, nor does he argue that this prior robbery conviction fails to
    qualify for § 924(e)’s sentencing enhancement. Furthermore, Blakney does not cite to
    any authority for the proposition that the District Court may only consider documents
    entered into evidence at sentencing. Thus, we reject his argument that the District Court
    erred in relying on the certified copy of Blakney’s 1995 robbery conviction because the
    government failed to move the document into evidence.
    III.
    For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
    7
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 12-3282

Judges: Greenaway, Roth, Vanaskie

Filed Date: 3/11/2014

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/6/2024