Daniel Spuck v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ( 2023 )


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  •                                                      NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 23-1193
    ___________
    DANIEL L. SPUCK,
    Appellant
    v.
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,
    JANE/JOHN DOE, LEADER/HEAD OF
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
    ____________________________________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. No. 1:22-cv-00341)
    District Judge: Honorable Cathy Bissoon
    ____________________________________
    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    On April 25, 2023
    Before: SHWARTZ, BIBAS, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed: April 25, 2023)
    ____________________________________
    ___________
    OPINION *
    ___________
    PER CURIAM
    Daniel Spuck, proceeding pro se, appeals an order of the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Pennsylvania denying his motion for a preliminary injunction
    and dismissing his complaint with prejudice. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm
    the judgment of the District Court.
    Spuck filed a complaint against the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and Jane/John
    Doe, “Leader/Head” of the Commonwealth. Spuck sought compensatory and punitive
    damages for various claims relating to criminal and civil state court proceedings. 1 Dkt.
    No. 3 at 4-6. Spuck also requested that the District Court enjoin the Commonwealth from
    recovering debts he owes and pursuing contempt charges against him. 2 Id. at 6; Dkt. No.
    4. The District Court, over Spuck’s objections, adopted the Report and Recommendation
    of a Magistrate Judge, denied Spuck’s motion for a preliminary injunction, and dismissed
    *
    This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
    constitute binding precedent.
    1
    Our review is limited to the record before the District Court, which did not include spe-
    cific information about the state court proceedings. See In re Capital Cities/ABC, Inc.’s
    Application for Access to Sealed Transcripts, 
    913 F.2d 89
    , 96 (3d Cir. 1990). We do not
    search unspecified state court records in an attempt to clarify an appellant’s arguments.
    2
    Although Spuck categorized the debts as restitution, the state court order accompanying
    his motion for a preliminary injunction indicated that he owes no restitution. Dkt. No. 4-
    1. The history of Spuck’s debt is unclear.
    2
    the complaint with prejudice pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2). Dkt. No. 7. Spuck filed
    this timely appeal.
    We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We exercise plenary review over the
    District Court’s sua sponte dismissal of Spuck’s complaint. Dooley v. Wetzel, 
    957 F.3d 366
    , 373 (3d Cir. 2020). We review the District Court’s denial of Spuck’s motion for a
    preliminary injunction for “abuse of discretion, an error of law, or a clear mistake in the
    consideration of proof.” Kos Pharms., Inc. v. Andrx Corp., 
    369 F.3d 700
    , 708 (3d Cir.
    2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
    On appeal, Spuck challenges only the District Court’s denial of his requests for in-
    junctive relief. C.A. Dkt. No. 5 at 2-3. To the extent Spuck requested that the District
    Court intervene in a pending criminal contempt proceeding against him, the District Court
    correctly determined that it must abstain from doing so. 3 See Younger v. Harris, 
    401 U.S. 37
    , 45 (1971) (explaining that federal courts have power to enjoin state officers from insti-
    tuting criminal actions only “where the danger of irreparable loss is both great and imme-
    diate”). The extraordinary circumstances that would allow such interference do not exist
    here, and we discern no abuse of discretion by the District Court in denying Spuck’s re-
    quest.
    Spuck also asks that we direct the Commonwealth to suspend the collection of his
    debts while his contempt proceeding is pending. C.A. Dkt. No. 5 at 3. However, Spuck’s
    3
    Spuck’s filings do not reveal the exact nature of the Commonwealth’s contempt pro-
    ceedings. Regardless, even if Spuck’s request for intervention was related to civil con-
    tempt proceedings, that, too, is squarely barred by Younger. See Sprint Commc’ns, Inc.
    v. Jacobs, 
    571 U.S. 69
    , 78-79 (2013).
    3
    vague assertions regarding this request are void of any information demonstrating that in-
    junctive relief is warranted. See Kos Pharms., 
    369 F.3d at 708
     (explaining a party’s burden
    in seeking a preliminary injunction).
    Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the District Court.
    4