Smith v. Contini ( 2000 )


Menu:
  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2000 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    3-9-2000
    Smith v. Contini
    Precedential or Non-Precedential:
    Docket 99-5293
    Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2000
    Recommended Citation
    "Smith v. Contini" (2000). 2000 Decisions. Paper 49.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2000/49
    This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova
    University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2000 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova
    University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.
    Filed March 9, 2000
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    No. 99-5293
    STANLEY SMITH,
    Appellant
    v.
    ROBERT CONTINI; JOHN BARNES; JOHN
    KROMMENHOEK; RICHARD MULLER; JERRY
    MCCORMICK; LAWRENCE MCDERMOTT; JOHN DOE
    (name being fictitious); TEAMSTERS LOCAL 641 PENSION
    FUND; PETER VAN LENTEN; ROBERT CIRONE, as
    Trustee of the Teamsters Local 641 Pension Fund;
    THOMAS FLANNERY, Trustee of the Teamsters Local 641
    Pension Fund
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of New Jersey
    (D.C. Civ. No. 97-2692)
    District Judge: Hon. William H. Walls
    Argued January 25, 2000
    BEFORE: GREENBERG, ROTH, and ROSENN,
    Circuit Judges
    (Filed: March 9, 2000)
    David Tykulsker (argued)
    David Tykulsker & Associates
    161 Walnut Street
    Montclair, NJ 07042
    Attorneys for Appellant
    Gary A. Carlson (argued)
    Lynch Martin Kroll
    300 Executive Drive, Suite 010
    West Orange, NJ 07052
    Attorneys for Appellees
    OPINION OF THE COURT
    GREENBERG, Circuit Judge.
    I. INTRODUCTION
    This matter is before the court on an appeal by Stanley
    Smith in this Employee Retirement Income Security Act
    ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. SS 1001 et seq., benefits case.1 Smith
    filed a complaint in the district court on May 23, 1997,
    after the defendants denied him retirement benefits. Smith
    asserted that defendants' construction of the pension plan
    they managed violated ERISA, and thus he brought this
    action seeking an injunction and other appropriate
    equitable relief to bring their construction of the plan into
    compliance with the statute. Of course, his ultimate goal is
    to obtain a pension.
    The Teamsters Local 641 Pension Fund (the "Local 641
    Fund") plan is a multiemployer, defined benefits pension
    plan within the meaning of 29 U.S.C. S 1002(2)(A)(37). The
    individual defendants are trustees and officers of the Local
    _________________________________________________________________
    1. The district court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1331
    and 29 U.S.C. S 1132(e)(1) and (f). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28
    U.S.C. S 1291. The defendants assert that the case is not ripe for
    appellate review because the district court granted summary judgment
    "dismissing the complaint" and not dismissing the action. See Appellee
    Br. at 12 (citing Newark Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. Harrison, 
    907 F.2d 1408
    ,
    1416 (3d Cir. 1990)). While it is true that the dismissal of a complaint
    without prejudice in some circumstances may not be afinal and
    appealable order because a court can grant leave to amend a complaint
    even after dismissal, see 
    id. at 1416
    , in this case the district court did
    not dismiss the complaint without prejudice and it did not grant leave to
    amend. Moreover, Smith has stood on his complaint. See Shapiro v. UJB
    Fin. Corp., 
    964 F.2d 272
    , 278 (3d Cir. 1992). Thus, we have jurisdiction.
    2
    641 Fund who, by virtue of their positions, owe afiduciary
    duty to Smith and the other beneficiaries of the Local 641
    Fund plan.
    The Local 641 Fund plan provides an array of retirement
    benefits to employees covered by the plan. As is relevant
    herein, the Local 641 Fund pension plan provides for two
    types of benefits to covered employees upon their reaching
    their normal retirement age. The first, a "Deferred Pension,"
    is available to employees who accumulate at least ten years
    of vesting service under the Local 641 Fund. See Local 641
    Fund plan S 3.15, app. at 27. The second, a"Pro-rata
    Pension," is available to certain employees who have been
    members of other Teamsters locals, but did not attain a
    minimum of ten years of employment with employers within
    the jurisdiction of the Local 641 Fund so as to qualify for
    a Deferred Pension. The Local 641 Fund entered into
    reciprocal agreements with the pension funds of other
    locals to provide for Pro-rata Pensions to certain employees
    who then could accumulate service credits in more than
    one fund so as to qualify for a pension.
    With respect to its Pro-rata Pension provisions, the Local
    641 Fund plan provides:
    The Fund has a number of reciprocal agreements with
    other pension funds under which service in the
    jurisdiction of any of the reciprocating funds is
    considered as service under this Fund for the purpose
    of determining eligibility for benefits under the Fund.
    * * * *
    If an employee would meet the eligibility rules under
    this Plan if his Related Credit was considered, but does
    not meet the eligibility rules of the last Fund in whose
    jurisdiction he worked, a Pro-rata pension based on
    the time worked under this Plan only will be payable
    even if the Employee has less than 10 Pension Credits
    under this Plan.
    Local 641 Fund plan S 3.21, app. at 28.
    Generally, the Local 641 Fund plan calculates a Pro-rata
    Pension based on the amount of the pension to which an
    employee would have been entitled under the Local 641
    3
    Fund plan if he had earned all of his combined pension
    credits under the jurisdiction of the Fund. See Local 641
    Fund plan, Addendum A, app. at 37. The Local 641 Fund
    then pays a pro-rata share, or percentage, of the pension to
    the employee that equals the percentage of the combined
    pension credits earned by the employee within the
    jurisdiction of the Local 641 Fund. See id.2 Under this plan,
    however, a Pro-rata Pension generally is paid only to those
    employees who had earned a minimum of 15 years of
    combined service credits. See id. at 28.
    As is relevant here, the Local 641 Fund maintains
    reciprocal agreements with the Teamsters Local 202 Fund
    and the Teamsters Local 816 Fund. Under these
    agreements, the Local 641 Fund agreed to apply service
    credits earned by employees with the Local 202 and 816
    Funds toward service credits earned in the Local 641 Fund
    plan.
    Smith, who was employed as a truck driver, earned two
    quarters of service credits with the Local 202 Fund between
    May and December 1966. From February of 1967 through
    December of 1973, Smith was employed by Eastern
    Express, Inc. ("Eastern Express") in New York City, earning
    26 quarters of service credits with the Local 816 Fund.
    Then Eastern Express moved to Elizabeth, New Jersey, and
    its employees came under the jurisdiction of the Local 641
    Fund. Smith, whom Eastern Express continued to employ
    after the move, earned 16 quarters of service credits with
    the Local 641 Fund between January 1974 and May 1977.
    Pursuant to its reciprocal agreements with the Local 202
    and 816 Funds, the Local 641 Fund accepted the service
    credits Smith had earned within the jurisdiction of those
    funds. Thus, when Smith terminated his covered
    employment in 1977, he had earned a total of 44 service
    credits (the equivalent of 11 years) -- 42 service credits (ten
    and one-half years) as an Eastern Express employee.
    On November 11, 1993, Smith, having turned 65, applied
    for a pension from the Local 641 Fund. By letter dated
    _________________________________________________________________
    2. Apparently the employee obtains the full pension from all of the funds,
    but we are not certain as to the mechanics of the program.
    4
    June 21, 1994, the Local 641 Fund acknowledged that
    Smith had earned 11 years of service credits, but informed
    him that he needed 15 years of service credits before he
    could receive pension benefits. See id. at 85. Smith
    appealed this decision on the ground that the Fund could
    require only ten, not 15, years of service before an employee
    was guaranteed pension benefits. The Fund denied Smith's
    appeal by a letter dated September 22, 1994. See id. at 86.
    Smith then brought this suit in the district court under
    29 U.S.C. S 1132(a)(3), alleging that the defendants'
    adherence to the 15-year service credit requirement was
    contrary to ERISA and constituted a breach of their
    fiduciary duty. In particular, Smith sought a declaration
    that the defendants had breached their fiduciary duties and
    an order enjoining them to conform the rules and
    regulations of the Local 641 Fund plan to ERISA's
    maximum ten-year vesting requirement. See app. at 7. He
    also sought restitution by the award of a pension.
    Ultimately, after proceedings that we need not describe,
    the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. By
    an opinion and order dated April 8, 1999, the district court
    denied Smith's motion but granted the defendants' motion.
    See Smith v. Contini, No. 97-2692 (D.N.J. Apr. 8, 1999). In
    its opinion, the district court examined the Local 641
    Fund's pension plan and determined it complied with
    ERISA guidelines. The court noted that the ERISA provision
    Smith thought applicable to this case, 29 U.S.C.
    S 1053(a)(2)(A), required plans to provide that an employee's
    right to his normal retirement benefit be nonforfeitable
    upon the attainment of his normal retirement age, provided
    that the employee have at least ten years of qualifying
    service. See id. at 9-10. But the court determined that the
    Deferred Pension offered by the Local 641 Fund plan
    complied with ERISA's vesting provisions. See id. at 10 -11.
    The district court also noted that the Local 641 Fund
    plan provided a pension for those employees who had
    performed less than ten years of vesting service within the
    jurisdiction of the Local 641 Fund, but who had
    accumulated service credits with a reciprocating fund. See
    id. But under the reciprocal pension, an employee would
    not receive any benefits unless he had a minimum of 15
    5
    years of combined service within the jurisdiction of the
    various reciprocating funds. See id. It is undisputed that
    Smith did not meet that threshold.
    The district court concluded that the Pro-rata Pension
    offered by the Local 641 Fund pursuant to its reciprocity
    agreements with other funds was not governed by ERISA's
    ten-year vesting requirements. See id. at 11. The court
    stated:
    Defendants are correct in their argument that ERISA
    does not require them to provide pro-rata pensions or
    reciprocal agreements with other funds. Under 29
    U.S.C. S 1053(b)(1), defendants may disregard years of
    service performed for an employer during a period in
    which that employer did not maintain a pension plan
    with the Local 641 Fund or a predecessor plan. The
    pro-rata provisions in the Local 641 Fund's pension
    plan do not violate the vesting requirements of ERISA,
    29 U.S.C. S 1053(a)(2). Because neither the pro-rata
    provisions nor the vesting schedule of the Local 641
    Fund's pension plan violate ERISA, defendants' motion
    for summary judgment to dismiss the complaint is
    granted.
    Id. at 11.
    In addition to contending that the Pro-rata Pension was
    subject to a ten-year maximum vesting requirement, Smith
    argued that the Local 641 Fund should recognize his ten
    and one-half years of service with Eastern Express as
    vesting service under its plan, thereby entitling him to a
    Deferred Pension. The district court found that"[a]lthough
    plaintiff 's argument may have merit, the Court may not
    consider it at this point because it deals with the
    application of the terms of the pension plan to plaintiff, not
    whether the terms of the pension violate ERISA. The Court
    may not consider this argument unless and until plaintiff
    brings an action under 29 U.S.C. S 1132(a)(1)(B) to
    challenge his denial of benefits under the Local 641 Fund's
    pension plan." See id. at 12. Smith appeals.
    II. DISCUSSION
    We exercise plenary review with respect to the district
    court's decision on the cross-motions for summary
    6
    judgment. See Seibert v. Nusbaum, Stein, Goldstein,
    Bronstein & Compeau, 
    167 F.3d 166
    , 170 (3d Cir. 1999);
    Petruzzi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co.,
    
    998 F.2d 1224
    , 1230 (3d Cir. 1993). We will affirm only if
    we conclude that the pleadings, depositions, answer to
    interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the
    affidavits, show that the defendants were entitled to
    judgment as a matter of law on the basis of the undisputed
    facts. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
    We start our discussion of the issues by recognizing that
    ERISA neither mandates the creation of pension plans nor
    in general dictates the benefits to be afforded once a plan
    is created. See Dade v. North American Philips Corp., 
    68 F.3d 1558
    , 1561 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Hlinka v. Bethlehem
    Steel Corp., 
    863 F.2d 279
    , 283 (3d Cir. 1988); H.R. Rep. No.
    93-807, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974
    U.S.C.C.A.N. 4670, 4677). Thus, ordinarily only the plan
    can create an entitlement to benefits. Consequently, "we are
    required to enforce the Plan as written unless we can find
    a provision of ERISA that contains a contrary directive."
    Dade, 
    68 F.3d at 1562
    .
    One of the areas in which ERISA requires express
    provisions in benefit plans concerns the nonforfeitability,
    often referred to as "vesting," of normal retirement benefits3
    payable to an employee who reaches the normal retirement
    age.4 In this regard, ERISA section 203(a), 29 U.S.C.
    S 1053(a), provides in relevant part:
    Each pension plan shall provide that an employee's
    right to his normal retirement benefit is nonforfeitable
    upon the attainment of normal retirement age and in
    _________________________________________________________________
    3. ERISA defines normal retirement benefits as "the greater of the early
    retirement benefit under the plan, or the benefit under the plan
    commencing at normal retirement age." 29 U.S.C.S 1002(22).
    4. ERISA allows the normal retirement age to be defined by the plan or
    sets the age as the later of the time a plan participant reaches the age
    of 65 or reaches his or her fifth anniversary of participation in the
    plan.
    See 29 U.S.C. S 1002(24). The parties do not dispute that Smith had
    attained the normal retirement age at the time he requested benefits
    under the Local 641 Fund.
    7
    addition shall satisfy the requirements of paragraphs
    (1) and (2) of this subsection.
    (1) A plan satisfies the requirements of this pa ragraph
    if an employee's rights in his accrued benefit derived
    from his own contributions are nonforfeitable.
    (2) A plan satisfies the requirements of this pa ragraph
    if it satisfies the requirements of subparagraph (A), (B),
    or (C).
    (A) A plan satisfies the requirements of this
    subparagraph if an employee who has completed at
    least 10 years of service has a nonforfeitable right to
    100 percent of the employee's accrued benefit derived
    from employer contributions.5
    The minimum vesting standards to which an employee
    benefit plan is obligated to adhere are based upon"years of
    service" as defined in ERISA section 203(b)(1). That section
    provides:
    In computing the period of service under the plan for
    purposes of determining the nonforfeitable percentage
    under subsection (a)(2) of this section, all of an
    employee's years of service with the employer or
    employers maintaining the plan shall be taken into
    account, except that the following may be disregarded:
    * * * *
    (C) years of service with an employer during any
    period for which the employer did not maintain the
    plan or a predecessor plan, defined by the Secretary of
    the Treasury
    29 U.S.C. S 1053(b)(1).
    Defendants successfully argued in the district court that
    the Pro-rata Pension provided by the Local 641 Fund plan
    to an employee who had not earned the requisite ten years
    of service credit under its plan was not subject to the
    _________________________________________________________________
    5. The ten-year vesting requirement we set forth reflects the version of
    ERISA section 203 in effect at all times relevant to the instant appeal.
    Because the Local 641 Fund plan was ratified before March 1, 1986, the
    parties agree that the current vesting limits do not apply.
    8
    ERISA ten-year vesting requirement even though the
    employee overall had more than ten years of service credits.
    Thus, they assert on this appeal that "ERISA's minimum
    vesting standards [i.e., 29 U.S.C. S 1053] do not apply to
    pro-rata pension benefits." See Appellees Br. at 24. In
    support of this argument, defendants cite ERISA section
    203(b)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C. S 1053(b)(1)(C), quoted above, for the
    proposition that years of service earned under other plans
    may be disregarded for the purposes of vesting. See id. at
    19-20.
    While we seem not to have had the opportunity to
    address the specific question presented on this appeal, in
    Hoover v. Cumberland, Maryland Area Teamsters Pension
    Fund, 
    756 F.2d 977
     (3d Cir. 1984), in an analysis
    instructive here, we did consider whether pro-rata pensions
    were subject to other limitations imposed by ERISA. In
    Hoover, the plaintiffs, as members of Teamsters Local 453,
    participated in the Cumberland Fund, a multiemployer
    pension plan established by the local union and employers
    engaged in collective bargaining with the local. See id. at
    979. The Cumberland Fund was a qualified plan subject to
    the vesting, funding, and participation requirements of the
    Internal Revenue Code of 1954 and ERISA. See id. Starting
    in 1967, the trucking companies employing the plaintiffs
    began moving their terminals to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania,
    because of changes in interstate highway routes. See id.
    The drivers affected by these relocations, including the
    plaintiffs, moved with their employers to Pittsburgh and
    transferred to Teamsters Local 249 whose members
    participated in the Western Pennsylvania Teamsters and
    Employers Pension Fund (the "Western Fund"). As a result
    of the move, these drivers terminated their participation in
    the Cumberland Fund and joined the Western Fund,
    although the same company continued to employ them and
    they remained members of the same international union.
    See id.
    Responding to the disruption in local union jurisdiction
    and pension fund affiliation, a number of teamster pension
    funds prepared a reciprocal agreement which the trustees
    of the Cumberland Fund signed in 1968. See id. The
    purpose of the reciprocal agreement was to provide full
    9
    pensions for workers with continuous membership in the
    international union, but who, because of transfers to
    different locals, might not accrue sufficient work credit
    under any one plan to entitle them to full pension benefits.
    See id. at 979-80. Under the reciprocal agreement, a union
    member who transferred from the Cumberland Fund to the
    Western Fund could cumulate his service credit from each
    fund, and if his total combined service credit was sufficient
    on retirement, he would receive proportional pension
    benefits from each fund. See id. at 980. The reciprocal
    agreement did not specify a particular benefit rate, but
    rather required each fund to include in its plan documents
    a method for calculating the partial pensions. See id. The
    trustees of the Cumberland Fund triggered the dispute in
    Hoover by amending the plan in a way that reduced the
    pensions payable from the level in effect prior to the
    amendment.
    In response to the amendment, the Hoover plaintiffs
    brought their suit alleging violations of ERISA section
    204(g), 29 U.S.C. S 1054(g). See Hoover , 756 F.2d at 981.
    Section 204(g) states that the "accrued benefit of a
    participant under a plan may not be decreased by an
    amendment of the plan, other than an amendment
    described in section [302(c)(8)]." 29 U.S.C. S 1054(g)(1)
    (emphasis added). Thus, we indicated in Hoover that "the
    focus of our inquiry is whether the partial pension benefits
    [under the reciprocal agreement involved in that case]
    qualif[ied] as accrued benefits within the meaning of that
    term under ERISA" so that section 204(g) precluded their
    reduction. See Hoover, 756 F.2d at 981.
    A reading of both the Cumberland Fund plan and the
    legislative history of ERISA led us to conclude that the
    plaintiffs' partial pension benefits earned pursuant to
    reciprocity clauses satisfied ERISA's definition of an
    accrued benefit. See id. at 982. Accordingly, we determined
    that pension benefits provided pursuant to the reciprocity
    agreements were subject to the section 204(g) amendment
    limitations. See id. It was inherent in our determination
    that the benefits provided pursuant to the reciprocity
    agreements were provided under a covered plan for
    purposes of ERISA because the restriction in ERISA section
    10
    204(g), 29 U.S.C. S 1054(g), is only on amendments of a
    plan as ERISA defines that term.
    ERISA section 203(a) is similar to the ERISA provision at
    issue in Hoover because it sets forth nonforfeitability
    requirements for pension plans. See 29 U.S.C. S 1053(a). As
    in Hoover, we hold that the benefits provided to employees
    pursuant to the Pro-rata Pension provisions of the Local
    641 Fund plan are provided in a pension plan within the
    meaning of ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. S 1002(2)(A) (defining
    pension plan as any plan, fund or program that provides
    retirement income to employees regardless of the method of
    calculating contributions, benefits or method of distributing
    benefits). Accordingly, the Pro-rata Pension is subject to the
    vesting requirements set forth in ERISA section 203 and
    thus an employee must be provided with a nonforfeitable
    right to his normal retirement benefit if the employee has
    completed ten years of service. See ERISA section
    203(a)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. S 1053(a)(2)(A).
    Defendants' argument that the vesting requirements of
    ERISA are not applicable here because the Local 641 Fund
    was not required to provide its employees with a Pro-rata
    Pension is misplaced. As we mentioned, a plan is not
    required to provide any particular benefits to its employees
    and thus the ERISA provisions become applicable only after
    benefits are provided. See Dade, 
    68 F.3d at 1562
    . The Pro-
    rata Pension provision here seeks to provide normal
    retirement benefits to plan participants who reach normal
    retirement age. ERISA sets forth clear vesting requirements
    for the provision of such benefits. See ERISA section 203(a),
    29 U.S.C. S 1053(a).
    Defendants argue, however, that even if ERISA section
    203(a) is found to be applicable, section 203(b)(1)(C) allows
    the Local 641 Fund to disregard service with an employer
    for any period in which the employer did not maintain the
    Local 641 Fund plan. We reject this argument. The
    underlying policy goal of ERISA is the protection of
    retirement benefits. Congress's chief purpose in enacting
    the statute was to ensure that workers receive promised
    pension benefits upon retirement. See Nachman Corp. v.
    Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 
    446 U.S. 359
    , 375, 
    100 S.Ct. 1723
    , 1733 (1980). In constructing ERISA, Congress
    11
    perceived the statute's accrual and vesting provisions as
    being at the heart of that protection. See Hoover, 756 F.2d
    at 985.
    Unless an employee's rights to his accrued pension
    benefits are nonforfeitable, he has no assurance that
    he will ultimately receive a pension. Thus, pension
    rights which have slowly been stockpiled over many
    years may suddenly be lost if the employee leaves or
    loses his job prior to retirement. Quite apart from the
    resulting hardships, ... such losses of pension rights
    are inequitable, since the pension contributions
    previously made on behalf of the employee may have
    been made in lieu of additional compensation or some
    other benefit which he would have received.
    S. Rep. No. 93-383, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974
    U.S.C.C.A.N. 4890, 4930.
    Although the concepts of accrued benefits and vested
    benefits are distinct, the concerns expressed by this court
    in Hoover have force here. In fact, a district court, relying
    on the reasoning of Hoover, recently determined that the
    vesting requirements set forth in ERISA section 203 applied
    to service credits earned pursuant to reciprocity clauses.
    See Helms v. Local 705 Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters Pension Plan,
    
    1999 WL 965230
    , at *10-12 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1999)
    (finding that plan that offered both a standard deferred
    pension and a pension based upon reciprocity agreements
    was required to adhere to ERISA's vesting provisions for
    both pensions). This conclusion is consistent with our
    reasoning in Hoover and with the concerns expressed by
    Congress regarding the protection of accrued benefits and
    vested rights.
    The establishment of reciprocal pension agreements
    promotes transfers of employees between employers within
    funds that are parties to reciprocity agreements and
    provides the employees with the apparent security that they
    will receive a pension based upon their combined years of
    service. See Helms, 
    1999 WL 965230
    , at *12. It would be
    inconsistent with the purpose of ERISA to allow funds to
    promote movement by employees in these circumstances
    while at the same time subjecting such employees to
    "penalties" for having so moved.
    12
    Further, by opting to provide pension benefits based
    upon years or service earned under other funds, the Local
    641 Fund chose not to avail itself of the provisions of
    ERISA section 203(b) for the purposes of the Pro-rata
    Pension. Section 203(b) is permissive in that it states that
    a plan may disregard service with an employer during any
    period in which the employer did not maintain the plan.
    See 29 U.S.C. S1053(b)(1)(C). Thus, ERISA does not require
    a plan to disregard such service. Having chosen to provide
    a pension plan expressly based upon years of service
    earned with certain employers not within the Local 641
    Fund jurisdiction, the Local 641 Fund is barred from
    disregarding those years of service for the purposes of
    vesting under ERISA Section 203(a).
    We reiterate that we agree with the defendants and the
    district court that the defendants were under no obligation
    under ERISA to provide for reciprocal agreements and Pro-
    rata Pensions. Nevertheless, once having made the
    determination to provide for such pensions, the defendants
    were obliged to formulate a plan providing for vesting in
    accordance with ERISA section 203(a)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C.
    S 1053(a)(2)(A). Thus, this case represents a situation, not
    unusual in the law, that an actor`s discretion in how it
    engages in certain conduct is circumscribed, even though it
    was not obliged to engage in the conduct in thefirst
    instance.
    Finally, the defendants argue that they cannot be
    required to grant Smith a Pro-rata Pension because he
    brought this action under ERISA section 502(a)(3), 29
    U.S.C. S 1132(a)(3), rather than ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B),
    29 U.S.C. S 1132(a)(1)(B). See Ream v. Frey, 
    107 F.3d 147
    ,
    151-53 (3d Cir. 1997). Smith contends, however, that he
    appropriately did not bring this action under 29 U.S.C.
    S 1132(a)(1)(B) because that section applies to actions
    brought "under the terms of the plan" and he acknowledges
    that the defendants acted consistently with the terms of the
    plan. Yet in his view they nevertheless breached their
    fiduciary duties because the plan as written does not
    comply with ERISA.
    Our recent opinion in Harte v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., No.
    98-2052, 
    2000 WL 225896
    , at *1 (3d Cir. Feb. 29, 2000),
    13
    supports Smith's position that a fiduciary acting
    consistently with a plan nevertheless may breach its
    fiduciary duty. Smith thus proceeded properly in this case
    under ERISA section 502(a)(3). But we will not linger on the
    question of whether Smith sued under the wrong
    subsection of ERISA section 502, as we expect that the
    defendants now will apply the plan in accordance with the
    ERISA ten-year vesting requirements. Moreover, we would
    be reluctant to order benefits granted, a remedy that might
    be appropriate relief under ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B), as
    we do not know whether there is any impediment aside
    from the ten-year vesting requirement to Smith's recovering
    Pro-rata Pension benefits. For example, Smith may be
    entitled to a Deferred Pension, and we doubt that he will be
    entitled to obtain both pensions. Of course, in light of our
    disposition, we are acting without prejudice to Smith's
    taking such other steps as may be necessary to recover
    Pro-rata Pension benefits.
    In view of our foregoing conclusions, we will reverse the
    summary judgment of the district court to the extent that
    it held the Local 641 plan did not violate ERISA with
    respect to the statute's ten-year vesting requirement. The
    Pro-rata Pension requirements violate the vesting
    requirements by making benefits contingent on obtaining
    service credits beyond ERISA's permitted forfeiture periods
    and defendants have a fiduciary obligation to comply with
    the law.
    In addition to arguing that the Local 641 Fund's Pro-rata
    Pension violated ERISA's vesting provisions, Smith also
    contends that by reason of his ten and one-half years of
    service with Eastern Express, he was entitled to a Deferred
    Pension from the Local 641 Fund plan. The district court
    found that while this argument may have merit, it concerns
    the application of the terms of the plan to Smith and not
    whether the terms violate ERISA. The district court
    concluded that such a challenge must be brought pursuant
    to ERISA section 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. S 1132(a)(1)(B),
    dealing with the denial of benefits, and not in an action
    seeking equitable relief to remedy a breach of fiduciary duty
    under ERISA section 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. S 1132(a)(3). We
    agree with the district court on this point and consequently
    14
    we will affirm the order for summary judgment to that
    extent without further discussion and without prejudice to
    a later action under section 502(a)(1)(B), if that should be
    appropriate.
    III. CONCLUSION
    For the reasons set forth above, the order for summary
    judgment of April 8, 1999, will be reversed in part and
    affirmed in part. The district court erred when it concluded
    that the Local 641 Fund plan's 15-year service credit
    requirement for a Pro-rata Pension did not violate ERISA.
    Accordingly, to the extent Smith sought to challenge the
    propriety of the 15-year requirement, this matter will be
    remanded to the district court for the entry of judgment in
    favor of Smith and the fashioning of appropriate relief
    pursuant to ERISA section 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. S 1132(a)(3).
    The decision of the district court will be affirmed, however,
    to the extent it held that Smith cannot proceed pursuant to
    ERISA section 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. S 1132(a)(3), to assert
    his rights to a Deferred Pension under the Local 641 Fund
    plan.
    A True Copy:
    Teste:
    Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    15