United States v. Naresh Rane ( 2023 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
______________
No. 22-2345
______________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
NARESH RANE
a/k/a RAJ RANE,
Appellant
______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 3-17-cr-00308-001)
District Judge: Zahid N. Quraishi
______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
March 21, 2023
______________
Before: JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and McKEE, Circuit Judges.
(Opinion Filed: May 4, 2023)
______________
OPINION *
______________
*This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.
Rane filed falsified medical records in the District Court. Whether he did so with
the purpose of delaying or diminishing his sentence is of no consequence: his actions are
inconsistent with acceptance of responsibility. Contrary to Rane’s suggestion, the
District Court applied the proper legal standard and correctly considered conduct (a) after
entry of a plea but before sentencing that (b) does not deny guilt of the underlying
offense. Attempting to delay or lessen the consequences of one’s criminal actions
through fraud on the sentencing court, without more, can properly form the basis for
denying an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility.
I. FACTS
Naresh Rane owned and operated a business purporting to offer training and
certification in massage therapy. In actuality, the business was a sham, offering falsified
transcripts and certifications, at least in part, to provide cover for prostitution services.
Rane was indicted for various crimes related to promoting prostitution under
federal law and pleaded guilty to one count of using facilities in interstate commerce to
promote prostitution, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3). In his plea agreement, Rane
agreed to a total offense level of 15, including a two-point reduction for acceptance of
responsibility pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. The plea agreement noted that this reduction
was contingent upon Rane’s “acceptance of responsibility continu[ing] through the date
of sentencing.” A30. At that time, Rane had admitted guilt and seemingly agreed to
cooperate with the government.
2
This cooperation would be short-lived. Between April 2018 and September 2021,
Rane submitted multiple fabricated documents to the court, purporting to document dire
health conditions that prevented him from proceeding with his sentencing. Rane now
admits that at least some of these documents were false, reflecting conditions he did not
have. 1 Moreover, Rane admits that he submitted these false documents to (a) “delay his
sentencing” and (b) “obtain a more lenient sentence based on his medical conditions.” 2
A62. These documents, at least in part, had their intended effect: the District Court
adjourned Rane’s sentencing numerous times based on the false representations reflected
in the documents.
Rane’s deception would not go unnoticed forever. When a Probation Officer grew
suspicious of the authenticity of the documents, an investigation began, ultimately
revealing that the documents had been fabricated. As a result, the Probation Office
altered its sentencing recommendation, concluding that Rane no longer merited a
reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Indeed, the Probation Office concluded that
Rane should receive an enhancement for obstruction of justice pursuant to U.S.S.G.
§3C1.1.
At Rane’s sentencing hearing, the District Court adopted these recommendations,
concluding that “based on the totality of the circumstances” Rane was “not eligible for
1
It is unclear exactly how many of these documents are false. But all parties agree that at
least some are. We are not compelled to resolve this factual dispute.
2
The Government does not allege that Rane’s counsel knowingly participated in this
fraud, and the record before us does not suggest that Rane’s counsel was aware that the
documents submitted were false.
3
the acceptance of responsibility points [reduction].” A43. The District Court made
particular note of the “time period” in which the fraudulent documents were submitted—
“post-plea prior to sentencing,” A43, during “the time that [Rane] allegedly was taking
responsibility for the offense,” A54,—and the “number of times” Rane acted
fraudulently—amounting to “over three years” of fraudulent conduct. Id.
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. This Court has
jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
The question before us is whether the District Court “applied the incorrect legal
standard [in] determining whether Mr. Rane’s obstructive conduct disqualified him” from
receiving a sentencing reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Appellant’s Br. at 14.
This is a question of law, and one that Rane’s counsel preserved before the District
Court. As such, our review is plenary. United States v. Adair, 38 F.4th 341, 355 (3d Cir.
2022).
III. DISCUSSION
The Sentencing Guidelines authorize a sentencing judge to reduce a defendant’s
offense level if the judge finds that “the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of
responsibility for his offense.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a). The defendant bears the burden of
proving entitlement to this reduction. Id.; United States. v. Muhammad, 146 F.3d 161,
167 (3d Cir. 1998). Entry of a guilty plea constitutes “significant evidence of acceptance
of responsibility . . . [, h]owever, this evidence may be outweighed by conduct of the
defendant that is inconsistent with such acceptance.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n. 3.
4
For example, “[c]onduct resulting in an enhancement under § 3C1.1 (Obstructing
or Impeding the Administration of Justice) ordinarily indicates that the defendant has not
accepted responsibility for his criminal conduct.” U.S.S.G. §3E1.1 cmt. n.4. “There
may, however, be extraordinary cases in which adjustments under both §§ 3C1.1 and
3E1.1 may apply.” Id.
Rane has failed to show that this is an extraordinary case. Rane lied—
repeatedly—to a federal court in an effort to delay his sentence and receive a lesser
penalty. Having been found out, Rane now admits his deceptive conduct but argues
nonetheless that the District Court erred.
His legal arguments are to no avail. Rane’s suggestion that the District Court
applied a conflicting “legal standard adopted by [the] Eighth Circuit in United States v.
Honken, 184 F.3d 961, 968 (8th Cir. 1999)” is incorrect. Appellant’s Br. at 16. The
District Court made its determination based on the “totality of the circumstances,” A43,
the same standard cited in United States v. Lessner, 498 F.3d 185, 199 (3d Cir. 2007)
(citing United States v. McDowell, 888 F.2d 285, 295 n.2 (3d Cir. 1989)). In evaluating
the “totality of the circumstances,” the District Court looked to several factors set out by
the Eighth Circuit in Honken, including whether (a) the obstruction was “an isolated
incident,” (b) the defendant “voluntarily terminated” the obstruction, (c) the defendant
pleaded guilty, and (d) the defendant aided the prosecution. Honken, 183 F.3d at 968–69.
Looking to these factors is consistent with Lessner’s “totality” based inquiry, not contrary
to it.
5
Rane’s other legal arguments also fail. Despite Rane’s suggestion to the contrary,
a defendant need not deny guilt or offer a defense to be denied an adjustment for
acceptance of responsibility. Defendants have been denied an adjustment for acceptance
of responsibility for attempting to avoid trial by feigning mental incompetence, United
States v. Batista, 483 F.3d 193, 197–98 (3d Cir. 2007), failing to show remorse, Lessner,
498 F.3d at 200–01; Muhammad, 146 F.3d at 168, encouraging a witness to commit
perjury before a grand jury, McDowell, 888 F.2d at 292–93, and fleeing custody, United
States v. Miller, 77 F.3d 71, 74–75 (4th Cir. 1996). None of these circumstances involve
denying guilt, and yet they all form a valid basis on which to deny an adjustment because
they show a lack of acceptance of responsibility. That the conduct occurred after entry of
a plea similarly posed no barrier to the District Court’s holding. See Lessner, 498 F.3d at
200 (considering conduct at sentencing in evaluating acceptance of responsibility).
In sum, Rane bore the burden of demonstrating his acceptance of responsibility.
Muhammad, 146 F.3d at 167. He failed to meet that burden when he lied to a federal
court in an attempt to delay and diminish his sentence. The decision below was not in
error, and we will affirm.
6