Rajan Patel v. Educational Commission for Foreign Medical Graduat ( 2023 )


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  •                                                                NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 22-1651
    __________
    RAJAN PATEL,
    Appellant
    v.
    EDUCATIONAL COMMISSION FOR FOREIGN MEDICAL GRADUATES
    ____________________________________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. Civil Action No. 2-21-cv-00546)
    District Judge: Honorable Nitza I. Quiñones Alejandro
    ____________________________________
    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    December 13, 2022
    Before: JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed: May 10, 2023)
    ___________
    OPINION *
    ___________
    PER CURIAM
    Rajan Patel appeals pro se from an order of the District Court dismissing his
    amended complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.
    *
    This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
    constitute binding precedent.
    Patel is an international medical school graduate (“IMG”) who is seeking to apply
    to medical residency programs in the United States. The Educational Commission for
    Foreign Medical Graduates (“ECFMG”) is a private, non-profit organization that is
    authorized to certify IMGs as eligible to apply for medical residency programs in the
    United States. The certification process involves taking and passing three examinations
    within a seven-year period. These exams are administered at third-party testing centers.
    When Patel, who alleges that he suffers from asthma and is under the care of a
    pulmonologist, sought to sit for his third exam, he requested an accommodation to the
    testing center’s COVID-19 mask requirement based on his medical conditions. He avers
    that the testing center informed him that it would grant him an accommodation only if
    ECFMG provided notice that it would waive its seven-year requirement, which had
    lapsed as to Patel while testing centers were closed due to the COVID-19 pandemic.
    ECFMG refused to grant Patel a prospective exception to the seven-year requirement and
    advised him that it would consider an exception once he passed the exam.
    Patel subsequently filed a pro se complaint against ECFMG, which he later
    amended to allege violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the
    Equal Educational Opportunities Act (“EEOA”). ECFMG moved to dismiss the
    complaint on the bases that the case was not ripe and that the complaint failed to state a
    claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The District Court concluded that
    Patel’s claims were ripe for adjudication but dismissed the amended complaint for failure
    to state a claim. Specifically, the District Court determined that Patel’s EEOA claim
    2
    failed because ECFMG is not a state or local educational agency, and that his ADA claim
    failed because ECFMG is not the owner or operator of a physical place and is therefore
    not subject to Title III of the ADA. Patel timely appealed.
    We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We exercise
    plenary review over the District Court’s decision to grant a defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6)
    motion. See Talley v. Wetzel, 
    15 F.4th 275
    , 286 n.7 (3d Cir. 2021). “[I]n deciding a
    motion to dismiss, all well-pleaded allegations of the complaint must be taken as true and
    interpreted in the light most favorable to the plaintiff[], and all inferences must be drawn
    in favor of [him].” McTernan v. City of York, 
    577 F.3d 521
    , 526 (3d Cir. 2009)
    (quotation marks and citation omitted). We are mindful of our obligation to construe
    Patel’s pro se filings liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 
    551 U.S. 89
    , 94 (2007) (per
    curiam).
    First, to the extent that Patel has not forfeited a challenge to the District Court’s
    dismissal of his EEOA claim, we agree with the dismissal because ECFMG is not a state
    actor or a local educational agency. See 
    20 U.S.C. § 1703
    ; Issa v. Sch. Dist. of
    Lancaster, 
    847 F.3d 121
    , 131-32 (3d Cir. 2017).
    We disagree, however, with the District Court’s conclusion that Article III of the
    ADA does not apply to ECFMG because it does not own, lease, or operate a physical
    place of public accommodation within the meaning of section 302 of the ADA. See 42
    
    3 U.S.C. § 12182
    . 1 In ending its inquiry at section 302, the District Court failed to consider
    section 309 of the ADA, which provides that “[a]ny person that offers examinations or
    courses related to applications, licensing, certification, or credentialing for secondary or
    postsecondary education, professional, or trade purposes shall offer such examinations or
    courses in a place and manner accessible to persons with disabilities or offer alternative
    accessible arrangements for such individuals.” 
    42 U.S.C. § 12189
    . This Court has held
    that, in the context of ADA claims involving examinations, courts must apply the more
    specific section 309, rather than the general provisions of section 302. See Doe v. Nat’l
    Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 
    199 F.3d 146
    , 154-55 (3d Cir. 1999). The District Court therefore
    erred in dismissing Patel’s amended complaint pursuant to section 302 of the ADA.
    Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s order to the extent that it
    dismissed Patel’s ADA claim against ECFMG. We will otherwise affirm the District
    Court’s ruling. 2 This matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
    opinion.
    1
    ECFMG contends in its brief that Patel has forfeited any challenge to the District
    Court’s ruling by failing to adequately address it in his brief. Construing Patel’s brief
    broadly, as we must, we find that he sufficiently presented the issue on appeal.
    2
    We deny Patel’s motion to seal the documents filed in this Court because they disclose
    that he requested an accommodation for a disability. Patel had to show that “the interest
    in secrecy outweigh[ed] the presumption” under common law that “the public has a right
    of access to judicial [records].” In re Avandia Mktg., Sales Pracs. & Prod. Liab. Litig.,
    
    924 F.3d 662
    , 672 (3d Cir. 2019) (quotation marks and citation omitted). He needed to
    establish, among other things, “that disclosure will work a clearly defined and serious
    injury to the party seeking closure.” 
    Id.
     (quotation marks omitted). Patel failed to make
    this showing, as his filings do not include detailed or sensitive medical information, his
    4
    medical conditions are at issue in this case, and he has not established the requisite injury.
    5