Francienna Grant v. Marshall Williams ( 2023 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 22-3108
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FRANCIENNA GRANT,
Appellant
v.
MARSHALL L. WILLIAMS; SUPERIOR COURT OF CAMDEN NEW JERSEY;
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION;
SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-19-cv-16952)
District Judge: Honorable Noel L. Hillman
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 1, 2023
Before: JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: May 23, 2023)
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OPINION *
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PER CURIAM
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
Francienna Grant appeals the District Court’s orders dismissing her complaint and
denying her motion for reconsideration. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the
District Court’s judgment.
In 2008, Grant filed a counseled employment discrimination complaint in the
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. The District Court dismissed
the complaint as a sanction for failing to comply with discovery orders, and we affirmed
the District Court’s judgment. See C.A. No. 09-4403. Grant then filed a claim of legal
malpractice against her attorney, Marshall Williams, in the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Camden County. That court determined after a bench trial that Williams’s
representation had fallen below the acceptable standards of care but that Grant had not
shown that she would have recovered any damages as her underlying case had no value.
The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s determination. See Grant v. Williams,
No. A-1411-15T1, 2018 WL 1936827, at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 25, 2018).
In 2019, Grant filed a complaint in the District Court alleging that Williams had
sexually harassed her and refused to provide legal services, resulting in the dismissal of
her first District Court case. She stated that she had won a malpractice case in state court
against Williams but that the state court judge refused to award her damages. She
requested that the District Court reverse the state courts’ findings, award her damages,
and order the defendants to attend sensitivity training. In an amended complaint, she
named Williams, the Superior Court Law Division, the Superior Court Appellate
Division, and the Supreme Court of New Jersey as defendants.
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In January 2021, the District Court dismissed her claims against the State Court
Appellees based on Eleventh Amendment immunity and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 1
It also denied her motion for a default judgment against them. As for her claims against
Williams, it ordered her to show cause why those claims should not be dismissed for lack
of prosecution for failure to serve him or for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Grant
then filed a motion for reconsideration with respect to the District Court’s dismissal of
her claims against the State Court Appellees.
In August 2021, the District Court denied her motion for reconsideration and
dismissed her claims against Williams for lack of prosecution. It also noted that allowing
Grant additional time to serve Williams would be futile because she failed to establish
that the District Court had subject matter jurisdiction over her claims against Williams.
Grant then filed a timely motion for reconsideration, arguing that she had newly
discovered evidence, i.e., a decision by the Office of Attorney Ethics of the Supreme
Court of New Jersey to suspend Williams for two years. She also appeared to argue that
she had served Williams: “return service and regular mail was not returned. Which
constitutes service.” ECF #23 at 3. In June 2022, the District Court denied the motion
for reconsideration. Grant filed a notice of appeal and challenges the January 2021 and
June 2022 orders. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
1
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives a District Court of jurisdiction to review,
directly or indirectly, a state court adjudication. See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman,
460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
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Claims against Williams
The District Court determined that Grant had failed to serve Williams and had not
provided good cause for this failure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) (providing that “[i]f a
defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the court . . . must
dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made
within a specified time. But if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court
must extend the time for service for an appropriate period”). We review a District
Court’s dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) for an abuse of discretion. See Ayres
v. Jacobs & Crumplar, P.A., 99 F.3d 565, 568 (3d Cir. 1996).
In response to the order to show cause, Grant stated that in November 2019, after
attempting service on Williams at his office with a professional process server, she
“personally served Williams with a second Summons. No return of mailed documents to
date.” ECF #18 at 3. 2 We agree with the District Court that Grant did not establish that
she properly served Williams. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e) (describing methods to serve an
individual, including following state law where the District Court is located or where
service is made); N.J. Ct. R. 4:4-4 (describing manner of proper service under New
Jersey law); Pa. R. Civ. P. No. 402 (describing manner of proper service under
Pennsylvania law); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(2) (allowing an adult who is not a party
2
It appears that by using the word “personally,” Grant meant that she herself mailed the
summons to Williams and not that she handed the summons to him in person. Either
method would not constitute proper service.
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to serve a complaint). And, after failing to properly serve Williams for over a year and a
half, Grant did not show good cause such that the District Court was required to further
extend the original 90-day deadline for service. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). Nor did the
District Court abuse its discretion in declining to grant her request for substitute service
as she had not indicated that she had attempted to serve Williams at his place of abode as
allowed by statute. See N.J. Ct. R. 4:4-4(b)(1) (allowing substitute service if service
cannot be made pursuant to Rule 4:4-4(a)(1) despite diligent effort and inquiry); see also
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2) (allowing service by leaving a copy of the summons at the
defendant’s dwelling or usual place of abode with resident of suitable age); N.J. Ct. R.
4:4-4(a)(1) (same ); Pa. R. Civ. P. No. 402 (allowing service at defendant’s residence by
handing a copy to an adult family member).
Grant also challenges the District Court’s denial of her motion for reconsideration
based on the new evidence of the Ethics Board’s opinion. However, this evidence does
not undermine the District Court’s determination that Williams was not properly served
with the complaint.
As we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of Grant’s claims against Williams
for lack of prosecution, we need not reach the issue of whether the District Court had
subject matter jurisdiction over her claims against Williams.
Claims against the State Court Appellees
Grant challenges the District Court’s refusal to grant her a default judgment
against the State Court Appellees. We review the District Court’s denial of her request
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for a default judgment for an abuse of discretion. See Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210
F.3d 154, 164 (3d Cir. 2000). Grant has not shown any prejudice from the denial of the
default, and the Appellees had a litigable, and, in fact, meritorious defense. See id.(discussing factors to consider in reviewing refusal to enter default judgment). The
District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying her request for a default judgment
against the State Court Appellees.
To the extent that Grant requested that the District Court reverse a state court’s
judgment, the District Court lacked jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
See Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir.
2010) (describing the requirements for applying the Rooker-Feldman doctrine).
To the extent that the complaint was not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,
we agree with the District Court that the State Court Appellees were entitled to Eleventh
Amendment immunity. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,
100–02 (1984) (explaining that Eleventh Amendment immunity protects a state and its
agencies from suit unless Congress has specifically abrogated the state’s immunity or the
state has waived its immunity). Grant argues that Appellees were not entitled to
immunity, but the cases she cites do not support her argument. See Pierson v. Ray, 386
U.S. 547, 553 (1967) (holding that judicial defendant was immune from suit); Bradley v.
Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 357 (1871) (holding that judge was not liable for damages to
attorney whose name was struck from the roll of attorneys for threatening judge).
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Grant argues that New Jersey waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity and
consented to being sued when it enacted a law that extended the state statute of limitation
for claims of sexual abuse. However, there is nothing in that statute that supports this
argument. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:14-2a(a)(1).
Grant also criticizes the time the District Court took to adjudicate her case and
asserts generally that the District Judge was biased against her. However, any delay in
the adjudication of this case is not a ground to vacate the judgment. See In re Fine Paper
Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982) (noting that the manner in which a
court disposes of cases on its docket is generally within its discretion). And her claim of
bias is not supported by the record. Cf. Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom Inc.,
224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2000) (“We have repeatedly stated that a party’s displeasure
with legal rulings does not form an adequate basis for recusal . . . .”).
For the above reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
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