Special Risk Insurance Services Inc v. GlaxoSmithKline LLC ( 2023 )


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  •                                                                  NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ____________
    No. 22-1891
    ____________
    SPECIAL RISK INSURANCE SERVICES, INC.,
    Appellant
    v.
    GLAXOSMITHKLINE, LLC, trading as GLAXOSMITHKLINE
    ___________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. No. 2-19-cv-03002)
    District Judge: Honorable Nitza I. Quiñones Alejandro
    ____________
    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
    March 21, 2023
    ____________
    Before: RESTREPO, PHIPPS, and ROTH, Circuit Judges.
    (Opinion filed: May 25, 2023)
    ___________
    OPINION*
    ___________
    PHIPPS, Circuit Judge.
    An insurance broker sued to recover commissions for policies that it brokered for
    a pharmaceutical company with three insurance companies. The insurance companies
    paid the commissions on the policies for several years, until the pharmaceutical company
    *
    This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
    constitute binding precedent.
    terminated the broker as its designated broker of record. After that, although the
    pharmaceutical company continued to use the policies, the insurance companies ceased
    paying commissions. Now, in seeking post-termination commissions, the broker sues the
    pharmaceutical company – not the insurance companies that previously paid the
    commissions.
    The District Court rejected the broker’s claims and entered summary judgment for
    the pharmaceutical company. Through this timely appeal of that final order, see
    
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , the broker argues that its claims for breach of contract and unjust
    enrichment should have proceeded to trial. For the reasons below, on de novo review, we
    will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
    BACKGROUND
    This dispute is between citizens of different states. Special Risk Insurance
    Services, Inc., (‘Special Risk’) is an insurance broker incorporated in Pennsylvania with a
    principal place of business in Blue Bell, Pennsylvania. GlaxoSmithKline, LLC, engaged
    primarily in the pharmaceutical business, is a citizen of Delaware. It is a limited liability
    company with a single member, a holding company that is incorporated in Delaware and
    has a principal place of business in Delaware. See Johnson v. SmithKline Beecham
    Corp., 
    724 F.3d 337
    , 360 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding that GlaxoSmithKline Holdings is a
    citizen of Delaware); see also Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 
    592 F.3d 412
    , 420
    (3d Cir. 2010).
    From 1991 through 2015, GlaxoSmithKline designated Special Risk as its group
    insurance broker of record. In that role, Special Risk helped negotiate and purchase
    group insurance policies for GlaxoSmithKline’s employees. Those included
    GlaxoSmithKline’s group life insurance policies with Liberty Mutual Insurance
    2
    Company and with ACE American Insurance Company as well as its disability insurance
    policy with Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. For several years, these insurance
    companies paid Special Risk annual commissions – ranging from $850,000 to $1.2
    million in total each year – on GlaxoSmithKline’s policies. See 
    40 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 310.1
    , 310.72–.73 (authorizing insurance entities to pay commissions to brokers).
    In 2015, GlaxoSmithKline terminated Special Risk as its broker of record, but
    continued to use the group insurance policies that Special Risk had previously brokered.
    When GlaxoSmithKline terminated Special Risk, the three insurance companies stopped
    paying commissions to Special Risk – even though GlaxoSmithKline continued to use the
    policies.
    To recover those commissions, Special Risk sued GlaxoSmithKline in the Court of
    Common Pleas, Philadelphia County. Special Risk raised claims for breach of contract,
    unjust enrichment, promissory estoppel, and tortious interference with contractual
    relations.
    In response, GlaxoSmithKline removed the action to the United States District
    Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, see 
    28 U.S.C. § 1441
    , due to diversity
    jurisdiction, see 
    28 U.S.C. § 1332
    . After discovery, GlaxoSmithKline moved for
    summary judgment. In applying Pennsylvania law, the District Court granted summary
    judgment to GlaxoSmithKline on every claim. See Special Risk Ins. Servs., Inc. v.
    GlaxoSmithKline, LLC, 
    2022 WL 1093129
    , at *4–7 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 12, 2022). In this
    appeal, Special Risk disputes the rejection of its claims for breach of contract and unjust
    enrichment.
    3
    DISCUSSION
    A.     The District Court Did Not Err in Granting Summary Judgment
    to GlaxoSmithKline on the Claim for Breach of Contract.
    The District Court did not find evidence of either an express or an implied-in-fact
    contract between Special Risk and GlaxoSmithKline for the payment of commissions.
    See 
    id. at *5
     (explaining that there is “no evidence” that GlaxoSmithKline “agreed—
    either orally, in writing, or by any inference” to compensate Special Risk for lost
    commissions); see also Solis-Cohen v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 
    198 A.2d 554
    , 555–56
    (Pa. 1964) (explaining that any right to commissions “is a matter of contract either
    express or implied”); 3 Steven Plitt et al., Couch on Insurance § 46:76 (3d ed. 2022)
    (“The insured . . . is not liable to compensate an agent or broker unless there is an express
    or implied agreement to pay compensation.”). And on that basis, it rejected Special
    Risk’s breach-of-contract claim. See Special Risk, 
    2022 WL 1093129
    , at *5.
    On appeal, Special Risk does not dispute the District Court’s ruling that there was
    no express contract for a commission. Instead, Special Risk argues that GlaxoSmithKline
    – by designating Special Risk as its broker of record – impliedly promised continuing
    commissions on any brokered contracts to Special Risk. But Special Risk does not make
    a sufficient showing of such an implied promise. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
    477 U.S. 317
    , 323 (1986) (explaining that summary judgment properly issues where “the
    nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her
    case”); Gardiner v. V.I. Water & Power Auth., 
    145 F.3d 635
    , 645 (3d Cir. 1998)
    (affirming grant of summary judgment on implied-in-fact contract claim for want of a
    triable issue of material fact). The record does not indicate that GlaxoSmithKline ever
    paid commissions to Special Risk – not even when Special Risk was its broker of record.
    Nor is there any evidence of an industry custom or practice of implying such a promise.
    4
    Without such facts, Special Risk argues that, as a matter of law, it has a vested
    right to a brokerage commission upon the writing of a policy. Even if that is a correct
    statement of Pennsylvania law (an issue not addressed here), it would concern only the
    timing of when a commission becomes due. And for Special Risk to succeed on the law
    alone, it needs a legal rule that an entity, by designating a broker as its insurance broker
    of record, is liable for that broker’s commissions. Yet Special Risk offers nothing in that
    respect. Cf. 
    40 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 310.1
    , 310.72–.73 (authorizing the insurer to pay
    commissions to a broker); Solis-Cohen, 198 A.2d at 554–56 (holding that a real estate
    broker could not recover commissions from a landlord, where the landlord’s tenant – but
    not the landlord – had promised the commissions). Thus, the District Court did not err in
    rejecting Special Risk’s claim for breach of an implied contract.
    B.     The District Court Did Not Err in Rejecting Special Risk’s Claim
    for Unjust Enrichment.
    To succeed on its alternative claim for unjust enrichment, Special Risk must
    demonstrate that GlaxoSmithKline knowingly benefitted from the insurance companies’
    non-payment of the commissions such that GlaxoSmithKline’s retention of such a benefit
    would be not just unfair, but unconscionable. See Torchia v. Torchia, 
    499 A.2d 581
    , 582
    (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (“To sustain a claim of unjust enrichment, a claimant must show
    that the party against whom recovery is sought either ‘wrongfully secured or passively
    received a benefit that it would be unconscionable for her to retain.’” (quoting Roman
    Mosaic & Tile Co. v. Vollrath, 
    313 A.2d 305
    , 307 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1973))); see also
    Meyer, Darragh, Buckler, Bebenek & Eck, P.L.L.C. v. Law Firm of Malone Middleman,
    P.C., 
    179 A.3d 1093
    , 1102 (Pa. 2018) (articulating three elements for an unjust
    enrichment claim); Sovereign Bank v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 
    533 F.3d 162
    , 180 (3d
    Cir. 2008) (same). Here, GlaxoSmithKline has knowingly benefitted through its
    5
    retention of the group insurance policies brokered by Special Risk. But that is not
    sufficiently unjust under these circumstances. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Jim
    Bowe & Sons, Inc., 
    539 A.2d 391
    , 393 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (“[T]he most significant
    requirement for recovery is that the enrichment is unjust.”); cf. Restatement (Third) of
    Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 1 cmt. d (2011) (“The third element . . . referring to
    ‘circumstances making it inequitable for the defendant to retain the benefit,’ incorporates
    the whole of the question presented, making the rest of the formula superfluous.”).
    Special Risk already received millions of dollars in commissions for several years in
    return for brokering those policies. And it was the insurance carriers – not
    GlaxoSmithKline as the purchaser of the group insurance policies – who paid the
    commissions for those policies. Also, Special Risk, in negotiating with GlaxoSmithKline
    to be its broker of record, could have insisted that GlaxoSmithKline be liable for its
    commissions, but Special Risk did not do so. See Restatement (Third) of Restitution and
    Unjust Enrichment § 2 cmt. d (explaining that no claim for unjust enrichment exists when
    “the claimant neglects an opportunity to contract” for compensation for the benefit
    conferred). Thus, the degree of unfairness here does not rise to the level required for an
    unjust enrichment claim.
    ***
    For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.
    6