David Webb v. State of Delaware ( 2023 )


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  •                                                            NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 22-3266
    __________
    DAVID Q. WEBB,
    Appellant
    v.
    STATE OF DELAWARE; MOLLY K. MAGARIK, Secretary of Health & Social
    Services; RENEE P. BEAMAN, Director of Division State Service Centers;
    THOMAS HALL, Director of Division of Social Services; JOYCE MIXON, New Castle
    County Regional Administrator of DHSS-DSSC-Family Services; TIFFANY LEWIS,
    Administrator-DHSS-DSSC-DelaWarr Service Center; FRANCIS L. RIDDICK, Senior
    Social Services Administrator-DHSS-DSS-WonderWorks Resource Unit;
    NICOLE P. DRAPER, Master Family Service Specialist - DHSS-DSS-Porter State
    Service Center-WonderWorks Resource Unit; LITA WHITAKER, Senior Vocational
    Rehabilitation Counselor; MATTHEW MEYER, County Executive - New Castle County
    Government - Hope Center; BEST NIGHT INN; RED ROOF INN & SUITES;
    RED ROOF INN; BUDGET INN; SUPERLODGE MOTEL; ALL REMAINING
    HOTEL/MOTEL PROPERTIES AS FEDERAL & STATE CONTRACTORS
    TO DHSS-DSSC EMERGENCY HOTEL VOUCHER PROGRAM
    ____________________________________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Delaware
    (D.C. Civil Action No. 1:22-cv-00461)
    District Judge: Honorable Gregory B. Williams
    ____________________________________
    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    June 22, 2023
    Before: KRAUSE, PHIPPS, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed: July 25, 2023)
    ___________
    OPINION*
    ___________
    PER CURIAM
    David Webb, proceeding pro se, appeals an order of the United States District
    Court for the District of Delaware dismissing his complaint. For the reasons that follow,
    we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
    Webb filed a complaint pursuant to 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     against the State of
    Delaware, nine state and local officials, and five motels. He sought compensatory and
    punitive damages for alleged violations of the United States Constitution, Title VI of the
    Civil Rights Act, the Fair Housing Act, and state law. Dkt. No. 2-1. Webb alleged that,
    inter alia, he was denied housing based on his race and familial status, his alternative
    housing was unsanitary and unsafe, and individual defendants committed negligent
    retention, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and intentional infliction of emotional
    distress (“IIED”). 
    Id. at 10, 13, 15, 23-27
    .
    The District Court screened Webb’s complaint pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)(B) and dismissed it sua sponte with leave to amend five counts.1 Dkt. No.
    10 at 17. Webb filed this timely appeal.
    *
    This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
    constitute binding precedent.
    1
    Webb also filed a motion for emergency injunctive relief, which the District Court
    2
    We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291.2
     We exercise
    plenary review over the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal of Webb’s complaint.
    Dooley v. Wetzel, 
    957 F.3d 366
    , 373 (3d Cir. 2020).
    On appeal, Webb argues that the District Court erred in concluding that the
    Eleventh Amendment barred his § 1983 claims against the State of Delaware and state
    officials in their official capacities.3 C.A. Dkt. No. 7 at 1. The Eleventh Amendment
    protects a state, as well as state officials, from suit in federal court unless Congress has
    specifically abrogated the state’s immunity or the state has waived it, which has not
    occurred here. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 
    491 U.S. 58
    , 66, 71 (1989). We
    agree that these claims against the state and its officials are barred.4
    denied. Dkt. Nos. 8 & 10. Webb does not challenge this denial on appeal.
    2
    The District Court initially dismissed five of Webb’s claims without prejudice and
    placed Webb on notice that the case would be dismissed with prejudice should he fail to
    file an amended complaint. Dkt. No. 11. Rather than amend his complaint, Webb filed a
    notice of appeal. The Clerk of this Court notified him of a possible jurisdictional defect,
    and Webb replied by asserting his intention to appeal. C.A. Dkt. Nos. 3 & 4.
    Accordingly, we have jurisdiction over the appeal. See Batoff v. State Farm Ins. Co., 
    977 F.2d 848
    , 851 n.5 (3d Cir. 1992); Borelli v. City of Reading, 
    532 F.2d 950
    , 951-52 (3d
    Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
    3
    Webb argues that the District Court erred in each of its immunity analyses because
    Congress abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7. C.A.
    Dkt. No. 7 at 1-2. This abrogation only applies to Webb’s Title VI claim, see § 2000d-
    7(a), which the District Court did not dismiss on immunity grounds. The District Court
    correctly dismissed that claim without prejudice because Webb’s conclusory allegations
    were insufficient. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
    550 U.S. 544
    , 556 (2007).
    4
    Webb does not specifically argue that the District Court erred in dismissing his § 1983
    claim against Matthew Meyer, a county official, in his official capacity. Regardless, we
    3
    Webb also argues that the District Court erred in concluding that his state law
    claims against state and local officials were barred by sovereign and qualified immunity.
    C.A. Dkt. No. 7 at 2. The District Court correctly explained that the State of Delaware
    “may not be sued without its consent[,]” and its General Assembly has not limited or
    waived sovereign immunity as to Webb’s claims. Doe v. Cates, 
    499 A.2d 1175
    , 1176-77,
    1181 (Del. 1985). As to Webb’s basic negligence claims against the officials in their
    individual capacities, the District Court properly dismissed these claims on qualified
    immunity grounds. See 
    id. at 1180
     (applying immunity under the Delaware State Torts
    Act for officials in their individual capacities to discretionary acts done “without gross or
    wanton negligence”).
    Despite Webb’s contentions, C.A. Dkt. No. 7 at 1-3, we discern no error in the
    District Court’s dismissal of his claims related to his inability to relocate to a New Castle
    County shelter and the conditions of his housing at various motels. Webb’s allegations
    that he was denied by the shelter because of his familial status—as a single man without
    children—do not support a claim of discrimination under the Fair Housing Act. See 
    42 U.S.C. § 3602
    (k) (defining “familial status” as one or more individuals under age 18
    agree with the District Court that Webb failed to state a claim against Meyer because
    Webb did not identify a policy or custom of the county as required under Monell v.
    Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 
    436 U.S. 658
    , 690-94 (1978).
    See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 
    503 U.S. 115
    , 120-21 (1992). Webb was granted
    leave to amend the claim against Meyer but did not.
    4
    living with a parent or other legal guardian). Further, his general allegations that the
    conditions at the motels violated an unspecified federal law did not contain the required
    “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on
    its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 678 (2009) (citation omitted). Webb was
    given leave to amend this claim, but he opted not to do so.
    Finally, Webb argues that the District Court improperly dismissed his IIED claim
    against individual state and local officials. C.A. Dkt. No. 7 at 2-3. However, because
    Webb merely alleged that the defendants ignored his emails, these allegations also did not
    state a plausible claim for IIED. See Hunt ex rel. DeSombre v. State, 
    69 A.3d 360
    , 367
    (Del. 2013) (requiring proof that the defendant “engaged in extreme or outrageous
    conduct that caused severe emotional distress” to establish IIED). Webb was also given
    leave to amend this claim, but he did not.5
    Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.6
    5
    After analyzing and dismissing all of his other claims, the District Court correctly
    dismissed Webb’s claims against the State of Delaware based on vicarious liability. See
    Verrastro v. Bayhospitalists, LLC, 
    208 A.3d 720
    , 724 (Del. 2019). He was given leave to
    amend these claims but did not.
    6
    We do not have the authority to submit Webb’s challenges to the District Court’s
    decision to the United States Supreme Court, as he requests. C.A. Dkt. Nos. 4 at 1 & 7 at
    6. If Webb is dissatisfied with our judgment in this matter, he can file a timely petition
    for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court. See S. Ct. R. 12 & 13.
    5