United States v. Carlos Santurtan-Teran ( 2023 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
________________
No. 22-2034
_______________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
CARLOS SANTURTAN-TERAN,
Appellant
________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(District Court No. 3-17-cr-00298-006)
District Judge: Honorable Robert D. Mariani
______________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on
March 23, 2023
_______________
Before: JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and McKEE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: June 14, 2023)
______________
OPINION *
______________
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
McKEE, Circuit Judge:
Carlos Santurtan-Teran appeals the District Court’s denial of his motion to dismiss
for lack of venue. We will affirm. 1
I.
Santurtan-Teran challenges his indictment for conspiracy to distribute and possess
with intent to distribute a controlled substance on the ground that venue in the Middle
District of Pennsylvania was improper. Specifically, he asserts that the only relevant
conduct that occurred in the Middle District were phone calls between him and co-
defendant Jose Luis Gonzalez, Sr., where Gonzalez was physically present in the district,
but he was not. In doing so, Santurtan-Teran mischaracterizes our precedent.
It is well settled that “any offense . . . begun in one district and completed in
another, or committed in more than one district, may be inquired of and prosecuted in any
district in which such offense was begun, continued, or completed.” 2 Moreover, venue is
proper “wherever a co-conspirator has committed an act in furtherance of the
1
The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have appellate
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Additionally, “[o]ur review of the District Court's
legal decision regarding venue is plenary.” United States v. Auernheimer, 748 F.3d 525,
532 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. Pendleton, 658 F.3d 299, 302 (3d Cir. 2011)).
2
18 U.S.C. § 3237(a). See also Pendleton, 658 F.3d at 303 (“When the crime consists of
distinct acts occurring in different places, venue is proper where any part of the crime
occurs.”) (citing United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. 375, 279 n.1 (1999)).
2
conspiracy.” 3 The government bears the burden to establish venue by a preponderance of
the evidence. 4
Here, it is undisputed that Gonzalez had phone calls about the marijuana grow
operation with several co-conspirators, including Santurtan-Teran, while present in the
Middle District. Gonzalez and Santurtan-Teran specifically discussed the planting of
marijuana plants and solutions to a mechanical problem at the marijuana grow site in
Michigan. These phone calls plainly furthered the conspiracy and thus support venue in
the Middle District. 5
Furthermore, Santurtan-Teran misinterprets our discussion in United States v.
Auernheimer. 6 There, we held that when assessing venue, courts must look to “essential
conduct” elements rather than “circumstance elements” of the charged offense, as
circumstance elements are simply “fact[s] that existed at the time that the defendant
performed [the essential conduct elements].” 7
3
United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 329 (3d Cir. 2002).
4
United States v. Root, 585 F.3d 145, 155 (3d Cir. 2009).
5
See United States v. Renteria, 903 F.3d 326, 331–32 (3d Cir. 2018) (concluding that
venue in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania was appropriate even though the defendant
did not act or direct any actions in the district himself because his co-conspirators
distributed drugs and held phone calls regarding the conspiracy there). See also United
States v. Naranjo, 14 F.3d 145, 147 (2d Cir. 1994) (“Phone calls can constitute overt acts
in furtherance of a conspiracy”); United States v. Smith, 198 F.3d 377, 382 (2d Cir. 1999)
(“[P]hone calls from one district to another by themselves can establish venue in either
district as long as the calls further the conspiracy.”).
6
748 F.3d 525 (3d Cir. 2014).
7
Id. at 533. In Auernheimer, we considered whether venue was established in the District
of New Jersey, where the defendant was prosecuted for conspiracy to violate the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”). Id. at 529. We concluded that the District of
3
Santurtan-Teran contends that, as in Auernheimer, no essential conduct elements
(i.e., the possession and distribution of marijuana) occurred in the Middle District. He is
mistaken. Although Santurtan-Teran himself may not have engaged in these acts in the
Middle District, the record indicates that his co-conspirators did. That alone distinguishes
this case from Auernheimer, where neither the defendant nor any of his co-conspirators
performed any “essential conduct element” in the District of New Jersey. 8 Moreover, in
Auernheimer, we held that venue was improper not only because no essential conduct
element occurred in the district, but also because no overt act in furtherance of the
conspiracy occurred there. 9 As explained above, Santurtan-Teran’s co-conspirators
performed overt acts in furtherance of their conspiracy in the Middle District, in the form
of their phone calls regarding the logistics of their marijuana grow operation. Therefore,
the District Court did not err in concluding that venue in the Middle District was
satisfied.
II.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm.
New Jersey was an improper venue for the defendant’s prosecution, in part, because no
“essential conduct elements” of the CFAA violation occurred in the district. Id. at 533–
34.
8
Auernheimer, 748 F.3d at 535.
9
Id.4