Sanjay Bhatnagar v. Matthew Meyer ( 2023 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 22-2848
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SANJAY K. BHATNAGAR,
Appellant
v.
MATTHEW MEYER, individually and in his official capacity
as the New Castle County Executive;
WILSON B. DAVIS, individually and in his official capacity
as the New Castle County Attorney;
NEW CASTLE COUNTY, a municipal corporation
______________
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
(D.C. No. 1-21-cv-00126)
District Judge: Honorable Colm F. Connolly
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Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) on July 11, 2023
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Before: SHWARTZ, RESTREPO, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: August 22, 2023)
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OPINION*
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*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge
Sanjay K. Bhatnagar, a former Assistant County Attorney (ACA) for New Castle
County (NCC or the County), sued his supervisor, Matthew Meyer, and the County
Executive, Wilson Davis, for terminating him. He alleges that he was terminated in
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
For the following reasons, we will affirm.
I. BACKGROUND1
Bhatnagar was employed by the County as an ACA starting in June 2017. He is of
Indian descent and a member of the Hindu religion. Meyer was, at all relevant times, the
County Executive for NCC, and Davis was the County Attorney for NCC. On July 6, 2020,
while working on a project, Bhatnagar reached out to an outside law firm for help. A day
later, Davis emailed Bhatnagar condemning him for not following protocol and seeking
outside help. Bhatnagar replied and explained why he did so and suggested escalating it
to Davis’s boss, County Executive Meyer.
Two days after Bhatnagar emailed the outside law firm asking for help, Davis called
Bhatnagar, told him that he served at Davis’s pleasure, and offered him the choice of
1
Because this is an appeal from a grant of a motion to dismiss, we accept as true “[t]he
facts alleged in the complaint and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from those
facts.” Farber v. City of Paterson, 440 F.3d 131, 134 (3d Cir. 2006). And because
Bhatnagar quoted and relied on the transcript from his unemployment compensation
hearing in his Complaint, which the Defendants attached as an exhibit to their motion to
dismiss, the Court will consider the transcript as part of this appeal. See Pension Benefit
Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[A] court
may consider an undisputedly authentic document that a defendant attaches as an exhibit
to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the document.”)
2
resigning with a separation agreement or being terminated for insubordination. Bhatnagar
did not sign the proposed separation agreement and was then terminated. At his
unemployment compensation hearing, Bhatnagar testified that he did not sign the
termination letter because he believed his civil rights were violated.
Rather than signing the termination letter, Bhatnagar filed suit against Davis, Meyer,
and the County, and alleged that he was terminated in violation of the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment and § 1983. Defendants moved to dismiss. The District
Court dismissed his procedural due process claim (Count I) and municipal liability claim
(Count III), but allowed his equal protection discrimination claim (Count II) to proceed.
JA 18-19. He now timely appeals the dismissal of Counts I and III.2
II. JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The District Court had federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and
1343(a). This Court has appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. This Court exercises
plenary review of a district court’s ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Newman v.
Beard, 617 F.3d 775, 779 (3d Cir. 2010).
III. DISCUSSION
Count I – Procedural Due Process Claim
Bhatnagar wrongly claims that his dismissal from his job without a hearing deprived
him of a property interest without due process of law. “Procedural due process imposes
constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of liberty or property
2
On September 2, 2022, Bhatnagar agreed to a stipulation voluntarily dismissing Count II
with prejudice. Thus, our opinion focuses on Count I and III.
3
interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth
Amendment.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Because Bhatnagar’s Complaint alleges wrongdoing by local actors, rather than
federal actors, the Court addresses his procedural due process claim under the Fourteenth
Amendment. To plausibly state a procedural due process claim, Bhatnagar must establish
that (1) he had a property interest protected under the Fourteenth Amendment; and (2) the
procedures provided to him were constitutionally inadequate. See Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d
107, 116 (3d Cir. 2000). Thus, the threshold question is whether Bhatnagar had a
cognizable property interest protected under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Constitution itself does not create property interests. See Bd. of Regents of State
Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). Instead, property interests are “created and their
dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent
source such as state law—rules or understandings that secure certain benefits and that
support claims of entitlements to those benefits.” Id.; see also Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S.
341, 345 (1976) (“[T]he sufficiency of the claim of entitlement must be decided by
reference to state law.”).
Bhatnagar does not have a property interest in his employment protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment. As the District Court aptly stated, Section 1394 of Title 9 of the
Delaware Code unambiguously states that Assistant County Attorneys, like Bhatnagar,
“shall serve at the pleasure of the County Attorney.”3 See Grimaldi v. New Castle Cnty.,
3
The statute reads that “[t]he County Attorney shall appoint such Assistant County
Attorneys as may be authorized by the County Council. The Assistant County Attorneys
4
No. 15C-12-096 (ESB), 2016 WL 4411329, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 18, 2016) (stating
that “serv[ing] at the pleasure of” the New Castle County Executive is synonymous with
being an “at-will” employee); See Bhatnagar v. Meyer, No. 21-cv-00126-CFC, 2021 WL
7209368, at *2 (D. Del. Dec. 20, 2021). And in Bishop, the Supreme Court held that no
deprivation of property under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment arises
from “the discharge of a public employee whose position is terminable at the will of the
employer when there is no public disclosure of the reasons for the discharge.” 426 U.S. at
348; see also Chabel v. Reagan, 841 F.2d 1216, 1224 (3d Cir. 1988) (same).
Bhatnagar argues that the statute is ambiguous and should be read to provide “just
cause” protections. He argues that whenever “the Delaware General Assembly uses the
phrase ‘at the pleasure of’ and intends the employee to be dischargeable ‘at any time and
for any reason,’ it adds additional statutory language making that intent explicit.”
Appellant’s Br. at 14. If it does not add additional statutory language, like the relevant
statute here, then “such low level, non-policymaking” employees who serve “at the
pleasure of” other employees “retain various well-established” protections that do not make
them removable at will.4 Id. In other words, “at the pleasure of”—without more—does not
mean “at the pleasure of.”
shall serve at the pleasure of the County Attorney. First Assistant County Attorneys shall
be selected according to provisions of the Merit System of the New Castle County Code.”
Del. Code Ann. tit. 9, § 1394.
4
Bhatnagar also creates a distinction between “high level” and “low level” employees, but
does not cite, nor can the Court find, any case law or Delaware code provision establishing
that distinction in this context. Bhatnagar’s citation to Harmon v. State, 62 A.3d 1198 (Del.
2013) is misplaced. The Delaware Supreme Court’s decision did not mention the
distinction Bhatnagar draws. Id. at 1200–02. In fact, the court left undisturbed the lower
5
That cannot be so. The statute reads that the “Assistant County Attorneys shall serve
at the pleasure of the County Attorney.” Del. Code Ann. tit. 9 § 1394. “[A]t the pleasure
of” is synonymous with “at will.” See Grimaldi, 2016 WL 4411329, at *3; see also Elmore
v. Cleary, 399 F.3d 279, 282 (3d Cir. 2005) (suggesting that an “at-will employee” is the
same as an employee who “serves solely at the pleasure of her employer”); Hill v. Borough
of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 234 (3d Cir. 2006) (same). At will employment is subject to
termination “with or without cause.” See Collision v. State ex rel. Green, 2 A.2d 97, 99–
100 (Del. 1938). Hence, the legislature stating that Bhatnagar, an ACA, serves at will and
is subject to termination with or without cause does not leave room for the Court to interpret
it any other way. See Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54, (1992)
(“[C]ourts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a
statute what it says there. When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first
canon is also the last: judicial inquiry is complete.”) (internal citations and quotations
omitted); see also Lawson v. State, 91 A.3d 544, 549 (Del. 2014) (stating that, under
Delaware law, a statute is ambiguous only if it can have “two or more reasonable
interpretations” or “if a literal reading would lead to an unreasonable or absurd result not
contemplated by the legislature”) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Accordingly,
“at the pleasure of”—without qualification or more—really does mean “at the pleasure of.”
court’s finding that the employee-in-question served at the pleasure of his employee and
was therefore removable at will. Harmon v. State, No. 07C-01-003 WLW, 2011 WL
5966717, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 17, 2011), rev’d, 62 A.3d 119.
6
Count III – Monell Liability Claim
Bhatnagar alleges that the County is liable because the decisions made by Meyer
and Davis are attributable, to NCC under the doctrine of Monell v. Department of Social
Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). This claim fails because Bhatnagar no
longer has a cognizable constitutional claim.
A municipality “cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior
theory.” Id. at 691. But a municipality can be held liable when the “execution of a
government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts
or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury.” Id. at 694; see
also Mann v. Palmerton Area Sch. Dist., 872 F.3d 165, 175 (3d Cir. 2017), as amended
(Sept. 22, 2017) (plaintiff must show that “implementation of a municipal policy or custom,
causes a constitutional violation.”). Accordingly, the Court must analyze “whether
plaintiff’s harm was caused by a constitutional violation” and whether the municipality is
responsible for that violation. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992).
Bhatnagar’s Monell liability claims fail because he has no remaining cognizable
constitutional claim. Neither of the alleged constitutional claims—that is, the procedural
due process claim (Count I) nor the equal protection discrimination claim (Count II)—
remain. The procedural due process claim fails, as explained above, see supra, Section
III.A., and Bhatnagar voluntarily chose to dismiss his equal protection claim with prejudice
to proceed with this appeal, see supra, n.1.5 Therefore, because Bhatnagar lacks an
5
Even if the dismissal of Bhatnagar’s equal protection claim did not foreclose his Monell
claim, his Monell claim would still fail because neither Davis nor Meyer constitute
7
underlying claim of a constitutional violation, there cannot be a Monell claim. See City of
Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986).
Dismissal with Prejudice
The District Court also did not err in dismissing Bhatnagar’s complaint with
prejudice and it did not need to provide Bhatnagar an opportunity to amend. While
Defendants argue that Bhatnagar’s failure to identify additional facts he would include in
an amended complaint should bar him from seeking permission to amend, we have held
that, in civil rights cases, “leave to amend must be granted sua sponte before dismissing”
the complaint. Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 103,
108 (3d Cir. 2002). Here, no new facts would change the legal conclusions that Bhatnagar
did not have a property interest in his continued employment and neither Davis nor Meyer
were official policymakers. As such, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in
dismissing the complaint with prejudice.
IV. CONCLUSION
We will affirm the District Court’s order dismissing Counts I and III with prejudice.
official policymakers sufficient to hold NCC liable for their termination of Bhatnagar.
McGreevy v. Stroup, 413 F.3d 359, 367–68 (3d Cir. 2005) (explaining that a municipality
can only be liable for the single act of a municipal official when that official is an official
policymaker).
8