Ryan Givey v. DOJ ( 2023 )


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  •                                                       NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 23-2330
    ___________
    RYAN P. GIVEY,
    Appellant
    v.
    UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE;
    JENNIFER ARBITTIER WILLIAMS
    ____________________________________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. No. 2:22-cv-00298)
    District Judge: Honorable Nitza I. Quinones Alejandro
    ____________________________________
    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
    on December 21, 2023
    Before: BIBAS, PORTER, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed: December 26, 2023)
    ____________________________________
    ___________
    OPINION *
    ___________
    PER CURIAM
    In January 2022, pro se appellant Ryan Givey filed a petition for a writ of manda-
    mus in the District Court. 1 The respondents are the U.S. Department of Justice and Jen-
    nifer Arbittier Williams, who at the time was the United States Attorney for the Eastern
    District of Pennsylvania. In his petition, Givey states that he is the target of a wide-rang-
    ing conspiracy that has caused him misfortune in various aspects of his life. He alleges
    that a network of hostile figures has conspired to, among other things, have him wrong-
    fully declared mentally ill, harm him professionally, isolate him from his family, surveil
    him 24 hours a day, and undermine his legal interests. He believes that the network in-
    cludes secret societies (particularly the Freemasons), the mob, government officials, and
    his own attorneys.
    Givey’s mandamus petition asks the District Court to order the DOJ and Williams
    to investigate and prosecute the network’s crimes against him. It also asks that Givey, his
    children, and his supporters be admitted to the federal witness protection program. The
    District Court dismissed the petition under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). The
    District Court held that Givey’s petition was so insubstantial and implausible that it
    *
    This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
    constitute binding precedent.
    1
    Givey’s petition also included a “Motion for Temporary Emergency Injunction,” which
    the District Court denied.
    2
    presented no actual federal case or controversy, thus depriving the court of subject-matter
    jurisdiction to hear the claims. Givey appeals. 2
    We agree with the District Court. Some claims are “so insubstantial, implausi-
    ble, . . . or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy.”
    Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Oneida Cnty., 
    414 U.S. 661
    , 666 (1974). Federal courts
    lack power to entertain such claims. A claim meets the standard for dismissal if it is “ob-
    viously without merit” or its unsoundness so clearly results from previous Supreme Court
    decisions “as to foreclose the subject.” Cal. Water Serv. Co. v. City of Redding, 
    304 U.S. 252
    , 255 (1938) (per curiam); see also Davis v. Wells Fargo, 
    824 F.3d 333
    , 350 (3d Cir.
    2016); Taussig v. Wellington Fund, Inc., 
    313 F.2d 472
    , 475 (3d Cir. 1963). As a pro se
    appellant, Givey is afforded liberal construction of his pleadings. See Haines v. Kerner,
    
    404 U.S. 519
    , 520–21 (1972) (per curiam). And the standard for dismissing a federal
    claim as wholly insubstantial is “especially high.” Hill ex rel. Republic First Bancorp Inc.
    v. Cohen, 
    40 F.4th 101
    , 111 (3d Cir. 2022) (quoting Davis v. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n,
    
    716 F.3d 660
    , 666 (D.C. Cir. 2013)). But even when viewing the well-pleaded facts in the
    light most favorable to Givey, his claims are “so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be ab-
    solutely devoid of merit,” “wholly insubstantial,” “obviously frivolous,” “plainly unsub-
    stantial,” or “no longer open to discussion.” Hagans v. Lavine, 
    415 U.S. 528
    , 536–37
    (1974) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
    2
    We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . In reviewing a dismissal under Rule
    12(b)(1), we review only whether the well-pleaded allegations on the face of the com-
    plaint, taken as true, allege facts sufficient to invoke the subject-matter jurisdiction of the
    District Court. Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. Zoning Bd., 
    458 F.3d 181
    , 188 (3d Cir. 2006).
    3
    Givey has undoubtedly had many struggles over the last nine years involving,
    among other things, his doctoral program, his family, his job, his application for disabil-
    ity benefits, his attorneys, and his rental properties. But given his efforts to weave these
    allegations into a vast conspiracy against him, as well as the outlandish nature of some of
    his claims (such as a secret society spending eight years hiring Givey’s friends and family
    in order to turn those people against him), we agree that his petition was so insubstantial
    as not to present a federal case or controversy. Thus, the District Court lacked subject
    matter jurisdiction and therefore lacked the power to adjudicate Givey’s mandamus peti-
    tion.
    For these reasons, the District Court’s order is affirmed.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 23-2330

Filed Date: 12/26/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/26/2023