Keith Anderson v. Bowman ( 2013 )

DLD-341 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 13-1844
___________
KEITH ANDERSON,
Appellant
v.
LOUIS FOLINO, SUPERINTENDENT; VICTOR SANTOYA; BOGDEN; NELSON;
STUMP; RUSH; DUKE; BOWMAN; RICK SHAFFER; RAUENSWINDER;
KERFELT; WILSON; DONNA DOE; ROXANNE DOE; MEGA; TANNER;
MICHELE HOWARD-DIGGS; WALTERS; GRIM; JOHN MCNANY
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 10-cv-00937)
District Judge: Honorable Gary L. Lancaster
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
July 18, 2013
Before: AMBRO, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: July 30, 2013)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Keith Anderson appeals the District Court’s order granting Appellees’ motions for
summary judgment. For the reasons below, we will summarily affirm the District
Court’s order.
Because we write primarily for the parties and the District Court thoroughly set
forth the factual and procedural background in its opinion, we will limit our discussion to
the facts that are helpful to our analysis. Anderson, a prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a
civil rights complaint. After Appellees’ motions to dismiss were granted in part,
Anderson filed an amended complaint and then a second amended complaint. After
discovery, Appellees filed motions for summary judgment. The Magistrate Judge
recommended that the motions be granted. The District Court adopted the Report and
Recommendation as its opinion and granted the motions. Anderson then filed his
objections to the Report and Recommendation and a motion to amend or alter the
judgment. The District Court reviewed the belated objections and denied the motion to
amend or alter the judgment. Anderson filed a notice of appeal. Appellee Howard-Diggs
has filed a motion for summary affirmance.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the District Court’s
order granting summary judgment de novo and review the facts in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Burns v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 642 F.3d 163, 170 (3d
Cir. 2011). A grant of summary judgment will be affirmed if our review reveals that
2
“there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
In his response to the summary judgment motions, Anderson did not discuss the
merits of any of his claims. He simply argued that the Appellees’ motions addressed the
first amended complaint instead of the second amended complaint. He did not specify
any claims which had not been addressed or contest any of the Appellees’ evidence. He
did not respond to or dispute the Appellees’ Concise Statements of Material Facts.
Despite Anderson’s limited response, the Magistrate Judge thoroughly described
and addressed his claims in her Report and Recommendation. She noted that she would
not address any claims which had been dismissed with prejudice in the earlier order. In
his objections to the Report and Recommendation, Anderson repeated the same
arguments he made in opposition to the summary judgment motions. He also challenged
the Magistrate Judge’s determination that his lack of response to the concise statements
should be considered an admission of the facts therein. He again did not discuss the
merits of his claims or dispute any specific factual statements by the Appellees. The
District Court adopted the Report and Recommendation and granted summary judgment
to Appellees.
On appeal, Anderson repeats his argument that the Appellees addressed the wrong
complaint. He admits that he failed to respond to Appellees’ Concise Statements of
3
Material Facts. He has not pointed to any mistake made by the District Court in
evaluating his claims or disputed any of the facts in the Appellees’ Concise Statements.
A review of the procedural history of Anderson’s claims indicates that his claims
have been appropriately addressed. In his original complaint, Anderson brought claims
against twenty defendants. The District Court dismissed several claims with prejudice.
However, it dismissed Anderson’s claims of denial of medical care, failure to intervene,
and conspiracy without prejudice to his filing an amended complaint. It denied the
motion to dismiss with respect to Anderson’s claims of failure to intervene and
conspiracy against Rauswinder and his state law tort claims. Appellees had not moved to
dismiss Anderson’s claims of excessive force and retaliation against Shaffer.
In his first amended complaint, Anderson raised two claims—excessive force and
failure to intervene—against three defendants, Folino, Shaffer, and Rauswinder. After
Appellees filed motions to dismiss, Anderson was given the opportunity to file a second
amended complaint. When Anderson asked for clarification, the Magistrate Judge noted
that if Anderson included any new claims or claims previously dismissed, they would be
struck from the complaint.
In his second amended complaint, he brought claims against twenty defendants
including violations of his First Amendment right to petition the government, excessive
force, denial of medical care, and denial of Equal Protection. Appellees again filed
4
motions to dismiss. The Magistrate Judge dismissed the motions to dismiss without
prejudice to Appellees filing motions for summary judgment.
The claims remaining at the time of Appellees’ motions for summary judgment
were those claims that had survived the initial motions to dismiss (excessive force and
retaliation against Shaffer, failure to intervene and conspiracy against Rauswinder and the
state law tort claims) and those claims Anderson was permitted to amend (denial of
medical care, failure to intervene, and conspiracy). While the Correctional Appellees
may have mistakenly referred to the first amended complaint in their motion for summary
judgment, they addressed Anderson’s claims of denial of medical care, excessive force,
conspiracy, and failure to intervene, and argued that Anderson had not exhausted his
administrative remedies with respect to several claims. They noted that Anderson denied
bringing any state law tort claims. In the District Court and on appeal, Anderson has not
pointed to any claim that was not addressed by Appellees or the District Court. The
failure to raise an issue in the District Court results in its waiver on appeal. Webb v. City
of Philadelphia, 562 F.3d 256, 263 (3d Cir. 2009).
Summary action is appropriate if there is no substantial question presented in the
appeal. See Third Circuit LAR 27.4. For the above reasons, as well as those set forth by
the District Court, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s order. See Third Circuit
I.O.P. 10.6. Appellee Howard-Diggs’s motion for summary affirmance is granted.
5