Ann Marie Degenaro-Huber v. Commissioner Social Security ( 2013 )

CLD-347 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 13-1382
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ANN MARIE DEGENARO-HUBER,
Appellant
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(M.D. Pa. Civil No. 3-11-cv-01424)
District Judge: Honorable James M. Munley
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Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
July 25, 2013
Before: RENDELL, JORDAN and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 12, 2013)
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OPINION
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PER CURIAM
Ann Marie Degenaro-Huber appeals from the judgment entered by the District
Court, affirming the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security to deny her claim
for disability insurance benefits. We will summarily affirm because no substantial
question is presented by this appeal.
I.
Degenaro-Huber filed an application for disability insurance benefits, claiming she
suffered severe diabetic neuropathy and psoriasis. On the alleged disability onset date,
she was 41 years of age, had a tenth-grade education, and had been employed as a postal
service distribution clerk, a cook, and a fast food restaurant manager.
Following the denial of her application by the Bureau of Disability Determination,
she was granted a hearing before an administrative law judge, who issued a decision
denying her application. The Appeals Council denied her request for review. Thereafter,
Degenaro-Huber filed an action in District Court, but the matter was remanded on the
motion of the Commissioner. A second hearing was held before a different administrative
law judge, who also issued a decision denying her application. The Appeals Council
concluded there was no basis upon which to grant Degenaro-Huber’s request for review.
Degenaro-Huber then filed a complaint in District Court, seeking review of the
Commissioner’s decision denying her claim. The District Court affirmed, and Degenaro-
Huber timely appealed.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and we exercise
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review legal issues decided by the
Commissioner de novo and factual findings for substantial evidence. See Poulos v.
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Comm’r of Soc. Security, 474 F.3d 88, 91 (3d Cir. 2007). Substantial evidence is “such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate.” Fargnoli v. Massanari,
247 F.3d 34, 38 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation omitted). Where findings are supported
by substantial evidence, they are “conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see Hartranft v.
Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999).
To qualify for disability benefits, an applicant must demonstrate that she is
“unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve
months.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). Further, the applicant’s physical or mental
impairments must be “of such severity that [s]he is not only unable to do [her] previous
work but cannot, considering [her] age, education, and work experience, engage in any
other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 42 U.S.C. §
1382c(a)(3)(B).
A five-step, sequential evaluation is used to determine whether an applicant is
disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. The Commissioner must determine: (1) whether the
applicant has engaged in substantial gainful activity since the alleged disability onset
date; (2) whether the applicant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments;
(3) whether the impairment or combination of impairments meets the criteria of a listed
impairment; (4) whether, despite the severe impairment, the applicant retains the residual
functional capacity to perform her past relevant work; and (5) whether the applicant is
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capable of performing other jobs that exist in the national economy, considering her age,
education, work experience, and residual functional capacity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4);
Poulos, 474 F.3d at 91-92.
The administrative law judge conducted a thorough evaluation of Degenaro-
Huber’s claim, performing each of the five steps of the required analysis. He considered
her extensive medical history, her age, education and work history, and her testimony, as
well as medical assessments and the testimony of a vocational expert. He concluded that:
(1) Degenaro-Huber had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her alleged
disability onset date; (2) she suffered from obesity, diabetes, and psoriasis; (3) these
impairments limited her ability to perform some basic work-related activities but did not
rise to listing level severity; (4) she retained the residual functional capacity to perform
light work, but her past relevant work exceeded her residual functional capacity; and (5)
she was capable of making a successful transition to other light work that existed in
significant numbers in the national economy. The administrative law judge’s conclusions
are supported by substantial evidence.
The District Court conducted a comprehensive analysis with extensive citation to
the record. Crucial to the District Court’s affirmance were its conclusions that (1)
Degenaro-Huber failed to meet her burden to “present medical findings equal in severity
to all the criteria” of a listed impairment, Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 531 (1990)
(emphasis in original); (2) the administrative law judge appropriately relied on the
physical functional assessment of the board-certified doctor who examined Degenaro-
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Huber on behalf of the Bureau of Disability Determination in setting her residual
functional capacity, see Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Security, 667 F.3d 356, 362 (3d Cir.
2011); and (3) the administrative law judge’s determination regarding Degenaro-Huber’s
credibility should be afforded great deference, see Reefer v. Barnhart, 326 F.3d 376, 380
(3d Cir. 2003).
III.
As we agree with the District Court’s analysis and conclude that no substantial
question is presented on appeal, we will summarily affirm its judgment.
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