Lorelie Hartwell, as personal represetative v. United States ( 2023 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 20-3524
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LORELIE HARTWELL,
as Personal Representative of Lawrence Saffeels,
Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 4-20-cv-01832)
District Judge: Hon. Matthew W. Brann
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Argued on September 6, 2023
Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, HARDIMAN, and FREEMAN, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: October 2, 2023)
Xiao Wang [Argued]
University of Virginia School of Law
580 Massie Road
Charlottesville, VA 22903
Counsel for Appellant
Michael J. Butler [Argued]
Joseph J. Terz
Office of United States Attorney
Middle District of Pennsylvania
Sylvia H. Rambo United States Courthouse
1501 N 6th Street, 2nd Floor
P.O. Box 202
Harrisburg, PA 17102
Counsel for Appellee
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OPINION*
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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
Lorelie Hartwell, as personal representative of her brother, Lawrence A. Saffeels,
appeals the District Court’s order dismissing Saffeels’s habeas corpus petition as moot.
We will dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
I
Saffeels was serving a state prison sentence in 1991 when he was convicted in
federal court of firearms charges and sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment. That
judgment of sentence gave Saffeels 153 days of credit for time he served between his
arrest and sentencing. Following developments in Supreme Court jurisprudence, the
sentencing court later resentenced Saffeels to 300 months’ imprisonment, but the revised
judgment did not mention the 153-day credit.
In 2019, Saffeels asked the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) to apply the credit to his
sentence, but the BOP denied his request. After exhausting his administrative remedies,
Saffeels filed a habeas petition with the District Court under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 seeking
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
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application of the credit and release on November 25, 2020. While his habeas petition
was pending before the District Court, Saffeels’s sentencing court notified the BOP that
his federal and state prison sentences were to run concurrently rather than consecutively.
This led the BOP to release Saffeels on November 10, 2020, fifteen days prior to the date
he requested in his habeas petition. Saffeels began a five-year term of supervised release
upon leaving federal prison.
The Government claimed that Saffeels’s release from custody rendered his case
moot. The District Court agreed with the Government, holding that Saffeels’s release
eliminated any possible relief under § 2241. Saffeels timely appealed the District Court’s
order and we appointed him pro bono counsel,1 but he passed away during the pendency
of this appeal, so Hartwell was substituted in his stead.
II2
When Saffeels filed his notice of appeal, we had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 to review the District Court’s order dismissing his petition as moot. Ruocchio v.
United Transp. Union, Loc. 60, 181 F.3d 376, 382 & n.8 (3d Cir. 1999). But things
changed when Saffeels died. “Under Article III of the Constitution, federal courts may
adjudicate only actual, ongoing cases or controversies.” Lewis v. Cont’l Bank Corp., 494
U.S. 472, 477 (1990). We lack jurisdiction if there is no relief available to an injured
1
We are grateful to the students of the Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law’s
Appellate Advocacy Center and their director, Xiao Wang, for their able representation of
Saffeels and Hartwell.
2
The District Court had jurisdiction over Saffeels’s habeas petition under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331 and 2241.
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party or if the outcome of a case will not affect the litigants’ rights. Id. The purpose of a
petition for writ of habeas corpus is release from custody. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
475, 494 (1973). But a prisoner who dies is no longer in government custody. See, e.g.,
Keitel v. Mazurkiewicz, 729 F.3d 278, 280 (3d Cir. 2013).
Notwithstanding Saffeels’s death, Hartwell argues that his estate may be entitled
to damages for time he wrongfully spent in prison. We express no opinion on that
argument, except to say it is not a collateral consequence that supports maintaining this
habeas action. See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 17 (1998) (rejecting the argument that
a speculative future monetary damages claim is relevant when determining if a habeas
claim is moot). Saffeels sought only an earlier release from custody based on the time-
served credit. That remedy can no longer benefit Saffeels or Hartwell, so the appeal is
moot.
Contrary to Hartwell’s argument, our decision in Keitel does not undermine our
decision today. In that case, a habeas petitioner died while his appeal was pending, and
we vacated the district court’s order and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case as
moot. But we did so after the district court had ruled against the petitioner on the merits.
729 F.3d at 279–80. That appeal’s procedural posture dictated that disposition. See, e.g.,
Cnty. of Butler v. Governor of Pa., 8 F.4th 226, 231–32 (3d Cir. 2021). Unlike in Keitel,
here the District Court dismissed Saffeels’s petition as moot without deciding the merits.
It thus makes little sense for us to vacate and remand with instructions to the District
Court to do again what it already did. So we will dismiss the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction.
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