Carmen Barrios Duenas v. Attorney General United States of America ( 2023 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
______________
No. 22-3024
______________
CARMEN AMANDA BARRIOS DUENAS,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
______________
On Petition for Review of Orders from
the Department of Homeland Security and
the Executive Office for Immigration Review
(Agency Case No. A209-228-946)
Immigration Judge: Shana Chen
______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
October 2, 2023
______________
Before: SHWARTZ, MATEY, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: October 3, 2023)
______________
OPINION
______________

This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does
not constitute binding precedent.
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge.
Petitioner Carmen Amanda Barrios Duenas seeks review of an Immigration
Judge’s (“IJ”) ruling that she lacked a reasonable fear of persecution or torture and thus
was not entitled to relief from reinstatement of her prior order of removal. Although we
reject the Government’s contention that the petition for review is untimely, we agree with
the IJ’s decision and will deny the petition.
I
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Guatemala who first entered the United States
in June 2016 without authorization. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
apprehended and removed her pursuant to an expedited order of removal on June 23,
2016. She reentered the United States without authorization in July 2019. DHS
apprehended her near the southern border and reinstated her prior order of removal on
July 6, 2019.
After DHS reinstated her removal order, Petitioner claimed a fear of persecution
and torture in Guatemala, and an asylum officer conducted a reasonable fear interview on
November 17, 2021. At the interview, Petitioner explained that a gang member named
Ronald had killed her uncle after he failed to make extortion payments to Ronald’s gang.
Two years after her uncle was killed, Petitioner was waiting at a bus stop when she was
accosted by Ronald and an associate. Ronald told her that “the same thing that happened
to your uncle will happen to you.” AR 279. Petitioner reported the incident to the police,
but they did not investigate, and she fled days later. Petitioner stated that although
2
Ronald had since been killed, she fears that Ronald’s associate will harm her if she
returns to Guatemala.
The asylum officer issued a negative reasonable fear determination, see 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.31(f), concluding that Petitioner’s testimony was partially credible, but that she (1)
did not experience harm rising to the level of persecution, (2) was not targeted because of
any protected characteristic, and (3) had not demonstrated a reasonable possibility of
torture within the meaning of the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) because she was
not tortured in the past and had not shown that any future harm would be inflicted by or
with the consent or acquiescence of a government official in Guatemala.
Petitioner requested review of the asylum officer’s determination before an IJ, see
8 C.F.R. § 208.31(f)-(g), and the IJ convened a reasonable fear hearing on September 27,
2022.1 The IJ reviewed Petitioner’s documents, including the reasonable fear interview,
and considered Petitioner’s testimony that she (1) fears Ronald’s associate, “Juanaco,”
based on the 2019 incident at the bus stop, (2) was “very close” with her uncle and thus
Ronald might have believed that she knew about Ronald’s extortion, AR 62-63, and (3)
reported the threat to the police, who “did all of the paperwork for everything,” before
fleeing the country, AR 73-74. Petitioner added that no one from Guatemala had
contacted or threatened her since she left, but that she nonetheless fears returning because
Juanaco is still in Guatemala and has “replace[d]” Ronald. AR 70. At the conclusion of
the hearing, the IJ found that Petitioner was credible but that she failed to establish: (1) a
1
The hearing was initially held on April 11, 2022, but a part of the hearing was
not recorded and so the IJ convened the September 2022 hearing.
3
reasonable fear of future persecution because Ronald was killed and there was no
evidence that Juanaco would harm her as he has not tried to locate or threaten her since
the 2019 incident; and (2) a reasonable fear of torture because the single threat she
received was neither “concrete” nor connected to the Guatemalan government. AR 6.
After the September 27, 2022 hearing, the IJ issued a decision. On October 27,
2022, Petitioner filed this petition for review.
II
When a noncitizen unlawfully reenters the United States after having been
previously removed, “the prior order of removal is reinstated from its original date and is
not subject to being reopened or reviewed,” the noncitizen “is not eligible and may not
apply for any relief,” and thus the noncitizen can be removed “at any time.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(a)(5). A noncitizen subject to a reinstated removal order, however, may seek
withholding of removal if she expresses a reasonable fear of persecution or torture, 8
C.F.R. § 241.8(e); Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 35 n.4 (2006) (citing 8
U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A)), in which case she is referred to an asylum officer for a
reasonable fear interview, 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(e); Regulations Concerning the Convention
Against Torture, 64 Fed. Reg. 8478, 8485 (Feb. 19, 1999).
If the asylum officer concludes that the noncitizen has met the reasonable fear
standard,2 the officer must refer the case to an IJ “for full consideration” of the
2
To demonstrate that she has “a reasonable fear of persecution or torture,” a
noncitizen must establish “a reasonable possibility that . . . she would be persecuted on
account of . . . her race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or
4
noncitizen’s eligibility for withholding of removal, which is conducted with all
procedural requirements attendant to removal proceedings, including appeals to the
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(e). If the officer concludes
that the noncitizen does not have a reasonable fear of persecution or torture, she must
then ask whether the noncitizen wishes to have an IJ review the officer’s “negative
determination,” and at that time the noncitizen “must indicate” whether she desires such
review. Id. § 208.31(f)-(g). If the noncitizen seeks IJ review and the IJ “concurs with the
asylum officer’s determination that the [noncitizen] does not have a reasonable fear of
persecution or torture,” then the noncitizen is removed without further administrative
review. Id. § 208.31(g)(1).
III
A3
Petitioner seeks judicial review of the IJ’s ruling that she does not have a
reasonable fear of persecution or torture if removed to Guatemala. We have jurisdiction
only to review “final order[s] of removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1); Khouzam v. Att’y
political opinion, or a reasonable possibility that . . . she would be tortured in the country
of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(c).
3
DHS has the authority to reinstate Petitioner’s prior removal order under 8
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) and the exclusive jurisdiction to make the negative reasonable fear
determination under 8 C.F.R. § 208.31(a). The IJ has exclusive jurisdiction to review a
negative reasonable fear determination under 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.31(a), (f), and (g). We
have jurisdiction to determine our jurisdiction, Orie v. Dist. Att’y Allegheny Cnty., 946
F.3d 187, 190 n.7 (3d Cir. 2019), and we review questions of our own jurisdiction de
novo, Castro v. Att’y Gen., 671 F.3d 356, 364 (3d Cir. 2012).
5
Gen., 549 F.3d 235, 247 (3d Cir. 2008).4 Once a final order of removal is issued, the
noncitizen seeking review must file a petition for review within thirty days. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(1). This time limit is jurisdictional. Stone v. I.N.S., 514 U.S. 386, 405 (1995);
Ruiz-Martinez v. Mukasey, 516 F.3d 102, 105-06 (2d Cir. 2008). Here, we must
determine whether the petition for review is timely where it was filed within thirty days
of the IJ’s negative reasonable fear determination but several years after the order of
removal was reinstated.5
The Supreme Court has instructed that a withholding-only determination, such as
an IJ’s reasonable fear determination, is “not itself a final order of removal.” Nasrallah v.
Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683, 1691 (2020); see also Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct.
2271, 2287 (2021) (stating that final orders of removal and orders resolving withholding-
only proceedings are “two separate orders”). On the surface, these cases are at odds with
our statement in Bonilla v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 87, 90 n.4 (3d Cir. 2018), that an IJ’s
negative reasonable fear determination “constitutes a final order of removal.” However,
4
The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) allows a noncitizen to channel any
related claims into her petition for review of her final order of removal. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(9); E.O.H.C. v. Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 950 F.3d 177, 184 (3d
Cir. 2020) (noting that § 1252(b)(9) allows us to review “all questions of law and fact”
that “aris[e] from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove [a noncitizen]”).
Thus, this provision allows us to review, among other things, a noncitizen’s request for
relief from removal if a final order of removal has been entered. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9);
see Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683, 1691 (2020); Tazu v. Att’y Gen., 975 F.3d 292,
299 (3d Cir. 2020). Therefore, the critical question remains whether there is a “final
order of removal” over which we have jurisdiction.
5
We have held that a reinstatement order is itself a final order of removal and
have no reason to reconsider that conclusion here. Dinnall v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d 247,
251 n.6 (3d Cir. 2005).
6
we may only depart from our precedent, “absent en banc reconsideration,” where
“intervening legal developments have undercut [its] decisional rationale” such that it “no
longer has any vitality or is patently inconsistent with subsequent legal developments.”
United States v. Stimler, 864 F.3d 253, 263 (3d Cir. 2017), vacated in part on other
grounds by United States v. Goldstein, 902 F.3d 411 (3d Cir. 2018) (quotations and
emphasis omitted). Nasrallah and Johnson do not “undercut the decisional rationale”
animating Bonilla’s holding that an extant order of removal does not become “final” for
purposes of judicial review until the conclusion of withholding-only proceedings.6
Nasrallah did not involve the timing or availability of judicial review in
withholding-only proceedings. Rather, Nasrallah addressed the “narrow question” of
whether § 1252(a)(2)(C), which precludes judicial review of factual challenges to “a final
order of removal” in certain cases, also precludes review of factual challenges to a CAT
6
This view comports with the reasoning of several sister circuits, see, e.g.,
Jimenez-Morales v. Att’y Gen., 821 F.3d 1307, 1308 (11th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he reinstated
removal order does not become final until the reasonable fear proceeding is completed.”);
Luna-Garcia v. Holder, 777 F.3d 1182, 1186 (10th Cir. 2015) (same); Ortiz-Alfaro v.
Holder, 694 F.3d 955, 958 (9th Cir. 2012) (same), as well as the Supreme Court’s
definition of finality of agency action, Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997); see
also Yusupov v. Att’y Gen., 518 F.3d 185, 195 (3d Cir. 2008). An agency order is final
when it “mark[s] the ‘consummation’ of the agency’s decision-making process,”
determines “‘rights or obligations,’” or occasions “‘legal consequences.’” Yusupov, 518
F.3d at 195 (quoting Bennett, 520 U.S. at 178). Because “the rights, obligations, and
legal consequences of the reinstated removal order are not fully determined until the
reasonable fear and withholding of removal proceedings are complete,” Luna-Garcia, 777
F.3d at 1185, “the reinstated removal order is not final until the reasonable fear
proceedings are complete,” id. at 1185-86 (relying on the general definition of the finality
of agency action to hold that a negative reasonable fear determination is reviewable
because “[t]he INA defines finality [solely] in terms of availability of review by the
BIA,” but a reinstated removal order is not appealable to the BIA and, therefore, the
statutory definition of finality specific to the immigration context provides no guidance).
7
order. 140 S. Ct. at 1688, 1690. In holding that it does not, the Court had no need to
examine the concept of finality for purposes of judicial review because its holding turned
on the meaning of the term “order of removal.” Indeed, the Court repeatedly referenced
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(A), which defines the term “order of removal,” but it never
mentioned the neighboring provision § 1101(a)(47)(B), which provides the INA’s
definition of “final,” or otherwise discussed when an order of removal, let alone a
reinstated order of removal, becomes final.
In Johnson, the Court held in relevant part that 8 U.S.C. § 1231 prohibits
noncitizens subject to a reinstated order of removal from obtaining “a bond hearing while
they pursue withholding of removal.” 141 S. Ct. at 2280. The Court rejected the
argument that a reinstated removal order does not become “administratively final,” as the
term is used in § 1231, until withholding-only proceedings conclude. Id. at 2287. The
Court, however, expressly declined to decide whether its interpretation of
“administratively final” applied to the phrase “final order of removal” as used in § 1252,
the applicable statute here, which the Johnson Court observed “uses different language
than § 1231 and relates to judicial review of removal orders rather than detention.” 141
S. Ct. at 2285 n.6. We have similarly distinguished the definition of “finality” for
purposes of detention from finality “for the purposes of timely petitioning for judicial
review” and rejected the view that the two are interchangeable. See, e.g., Guerrero-
Sanchez v. Warden York Cnty. Prison, 905 F.3d 208, 218-19 & n.8 (3d Cir. 2018)
(quotation marks and citation omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Johnson v.
Arteaga-Martinez, 142 S. Ct. 1827 (2022); see also Padilla-Ramirez v. Bible, 882 F.3d
8
826, 836 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that the reinstated removal order was “final for
detention purposes even though it lack[ed] finality for purposes of judicial review of [the
petitioner’s] withholding-only claim”). Therefore, Nasrallah and Johnson are not
“patently inconsistent” with Bonilla and thus do not constitute intervening case law that
strips us of jurisdiction over the present petition for review. Stimler, 864 F.3d at 263.
Our conclusion is further supported by the “well-settled and strong presumption”
that Congress intends agency action, including immigration decisions, to be subject to
judicial review. Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1062, 1069 (2020) (quotation
marks and citation omitted). “The presumption can only be overcome by clear and
convincing evidence of congressional intent to preclude judicial review.” Id. (quotations
omitted). Nasrallah and Johnson both interpreted specific statutes but neither considered
whether the statutes at issue foreclosed judicial review in the context of reinstated
removal orders and requests for relief from such orders. Thus, these cases do not embody
a “strong indication” that judicial review of an IJ’s withholding-only ruling is precluded.
Id. at 1070. Concluding otherwise would also run directly counter to the Court’s
admonishment in Nasrallah that its decision “does not affect the authority of the courts of
appeals to review CAT orders.” 140 S. Ct. at 1693.7
7
Because the reinstatement order is necessarily entered before the request for
relief from such an order is resolved, 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(e), holding that a reinstated
removal order is final in all respects would almost always mean that a petitioner could
not “timely petition for review of any IJ decisions denying him relief or finding that he
does not have a reasonable fear,” Ortiz-Alfaro, 694 F.3d at 958. To be sure, a petitioner
in those circumstances could theoretically obtain judicial review if withholding-only
proceedings concluded within thirty days of the reinstatement order, but such an outcome
is highly unlikely. Here, by way of example, Petitioner’s removal order was reinstated in
9
For these reasons, we see no “clear and convincing evidence” that Congress or the
Court intended to bar judicial review in these circumstances. Guerrero-Lasprilla, 140 S.
Ct. at 1069; see also Kolov v. Garland, 78 F.4th 911, 929 (6th Cir. 2023) (Murphy, J.,
concurring) (“In the end, whether the Supreme Court’s decisions in Nasrallah and
Johnson have ushered in these significant changes to longstanding judicial-review
practices is for the Supreme Court to decide.”).8 As such, under our binding precedent,
the petition for review is timely and thus we have jurisdiction over it.9
July 2019, but her request for review of the reasonable fear determination was not denied
until September 2022. See also Argueta-Hernandez v. Garland, 73 F.4th 300, 301-02
(5th Cir. 2023) (reinstatement in September 2019 but denial of relief in April 2022). To
require the petition to be filed within thirty days of the reinstatement order would thus
effectively bar judicial review of the subsequent reasonable fear determination.
8
Additionally, holding that Nasrallah and Johnson preclude judicial review in this
context could have significant ramifications for the availability of judicial review in other
contexts, including motions to reopen and “mixed” BIA decisions (those in full removal
proceedings that affirm the IJ’s removability finding but remand for further consideration
of withholding claims). See Kolov, 78 F.4th at 925-28 (Murphy, J., concurring).
9
Several of our sister circuits have also held that their similar precedent remains
viable after Nasrallah and Johnson. See Alonso Juarez v. Garland, No. 15-72821, 2023
WL 5811043 at *8-10 (9th Cir. Sept. 8, 2023); Kolov, 78 F. 4th at 918-19; Arostegui-
Maldonado v. Garland, 75 F.4th 1132, 1137 (10th Cir. 2023); Salinas-Montenegro v.
Garland, No. 21-3, 2023 WL 3243985, at *1 n.1 (9th Cir. May 4, 2023). Another sister
circuit, without directly addressing Nasrallah and Johnson, held that an IJ’s reasonable
fear determination constituted a “final order” for purposes of judicial review. Tomas-
Ramos v. Garland, 24 F.4th 973, 980 n.3 (4th Cir. 2022). On the other hand, the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has concluded that Nasrallah and Johnson abrogated its
precedent because “[b]oth cases make clear that the finality of the order of removal does
not depend in any way on the outcome of withholding-only proceedings.” Argueta-
Hernandez v. Garland, 73 F.4th 300, 303 (5th Cir. 2023) (quotations and alterations
omitted). Additionally, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that Nasrallah
and Johnson establish that an IJ’s withholding-only decision is not a final order of
removal for purposes of judicial review. Bhaktibhai-Patel v. Garland, 32 F.4th 180, 190-
91 (2d Cir. 2022).
10
B10
Having concluded that we have jurisdiction, we next examine whether the IJ’s
conclusion that Petitioner did not establish a reasonable fear of persecution or torture is
supported by substantial evidence.
Even assuming Petitioner is a member of a cognizable particular social group,
Petitioner has not shown that she has a reasonable fear of persecution. “[P]ersecution”
encompasses “threats to life, confinement, torture, and economic restrictions so severe
that they constitute a threat to life or freedom.” Fatin v. I.N.S., 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d
Cir. 1993). In evaluating an unfulfilled threat such as the one here, we examine whether
the threat is “concrete and menacing.”11 Herrera-Reyes v. Att’y Gen., 952 F.3d 101, 107-
08 (3d Cir. 2020). An unfulfilled threat is sufficiently “concrete and menacing” to
establish past persecution when the threat, “considered in the context of the full record,”
presents a “severe affront” to a petitioner’s “life or freedom.” Id. (quotations omitted).
Here, the lone unfulfilled threat Petitioner received from Ronald in 2019 did not
pose a “severe affront[] to [her] life or freedom.” Id. Petitioner only encountered Ronald
on one occasion when he approached her and told her the same thing that had happened
to her uncle would happen to her. Ronald did not identify any specific person who would
10
We review the IJ’s denial of withholding of removal and CAT relief for
substantial evidence. Romero v. Att’y Gen., 972 F.3d 334, 342 (3d Cir. 2020). “When
we review for substantial evidence, findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Id. at 340 (quotations
omitted).
11
“A threat is ‘concrete’ when it is ‘corroborated by credible evidence,’ and it is
‘menacing’ when it reveals an ‘intention to inflict harm.’” Doe v. Att’y Gen., 956 F.3d
135, 143 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Herrera-Reyes, 952 F.3d at 108).
11
carry out the threat, did not harm Petitioner, and did not threaten her son who was present
during the encounter or any other family member. Following the incident, Ronald did not
harm or threaten Petitioner or her family and there is no indication that he or his
associates have tried to locate her again. While Ronald’s threat may have been
distressing, “persecution does not encompass all treatment that our society regards as
unfair, unjust, or even unlawful or unconstitutional,” Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1240, and
Petitioner has not demonstrated a reasonable possibility that she will suffer a “severe
affront” to her “life or freedom,” Herrera-Reyes, 952 F.3d at 108; see also Voci v.
Gonzales, 409 F.3d 607, 615 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[I]solated incidents that do not result in
serious injury do not rise to the level of persecution.”). Therefore, substantial evidence
supports the IJ’s finding that Petitioner did not show a reasonable fear of persecution in
Guatemala.
The IJ’s finding that Petitioner did not establish a reasonable fear of torture is also
supported by substantial evidence.12 Petitioner testified that Ronald threatened to harm
her in the same way her uncle had been harmed, but Ronald is now dead and there is no
evidence that Juanaco or his associates ever threatened, harmed, or even attempted to
locate Petitioner or any of her family members after the 2019 incident. Moreover, there
12
To succeed here, Petitioner must show that she has a reasonable fear of:
(1) an act causing severe physical or mental pain or suffering; (2) intentionally
inflicted; (3) for an illicit or proscribed purpose; (4) by or at the instigation of or
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official who has custody or physical
control of the victim; and (5) not arising from lawful sanctions.
Myrie v. Att’y Gen., 855 F.3d 509, 515 (3d Cir. 2017) (quotations omitted).
12
is no evidence of any connection between Juanaco and the Guatemalan government.
While there is general country conditions evidence showing widespread corruption and
crime in Guatemala, such evidence is insufficient to show that Petitioner faces a
particularized risk of torture by or with the consent or acquiescence of a government
official. See Romero v. Att’y Gen., 972 F.3d 334, 343 (3d Cir. 2020). As such,
substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that Petitioner did not show a reasonable
fear of torture.
III
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.
13