United States v. Justin McConnell ( 2023 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 22-3153
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JUSTIN McCONNELL,
Appellant
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 2-20-cr-00132-001)
District Judge: Honorable J. Nicholas Ranjan
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Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
on October 23, 2023
Before: KRAUSE, FREEMAN, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges
(Filed: November 9, 2023)
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OPINION*
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*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, under I.O.P. 5.7, is not binding
precedent.
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.
Justin McConnell was convicted of possession of a firearm and ammunition by a
convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). On appeal, he argues that the District
Court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from a search of his home.
Discerning no error, we will affirm.
I. DISCUSSION1
While McConnell was on parole for a prior state sex offense involving a minor, a
team of parole agents conducted a warrantless search of his home after one of the agents
reported seeing McConnell with a child. During that search, the agents recovered a firearm
and ammunition. McConnell now challenges the District Court’s order denying his motion
to suppress that evidence.2 First, McConnell argues that the search violated his Fourth
Amendment rights because it was not supported by a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing.
In the alternative, he argues that the search was unjustified because there was no nexus
between the agents’ suspicion of wrongdoing and his home. Neither argument is
persuasive.
1
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291.
2
McConnell reserved his right to appeal the District Court’s order by tendering a
conditional guilty plea pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(a)(2). We
review the District Court’s denial of McConnell’s motion to suppress for clear error as to
the Court’s factual findings, and we exercise plenary review over the application of the law
to those facts. United States v. Golson, 743 F.3d 44, 55 (3d Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).
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A. Reasonable Suspicion
McConnell first claims that the agents’ search was not supported by reasonable
suspicion3 because it was based on a report that the District Court found to be “implausible”
at the suppression hearing. Opening Br. at 20. But the District Court did not discredit that
report in all respects. While it found certain allegations in the report “implausible,” the
Court credited the reporting agent’s claim that he “saw a child near Mr. McConnell in the
store,” whom the agent believed was “with” McConnell. United States v. McConnell, No.
20-cr-132, 2022 WL 1124822, at *3 & n.5 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 15, 2022). In denying
McConnell’s motion for reconsideration, the Court clarified that the reporting agent’s
credible observation “was that the child was with Mr. McConnell in a purposeful manner.”
United States v. McConnell, No. 20-cr-132, 2022 WL 3293556, at *2 n.3 (W.D. Pa. Aug.
11, 2022).
These findings are sufficient to establish a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing
because purposeful contact with a minor, standing alone, would violate the conditions of
McConnell’s parole, which prohibited him from having “any contact” with a minor,
including “nonverbal communication.” App. 141. So even when stripped to the portions
the District Court found credible, the parole agent’s report still created a reasonable
suspicion of wrongdoing. That is true even if the agent was ultimately mistaken about the
3
For a parolee like McConnell who has consented to searches of his home as a condition
of his parole, “no more than reasonable suspicion” is required to justify a search. United
States v. Williams, 417 F.3d 373, 376 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Knights, 534
U.S. 112, 121 (2001)).
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relationship between McConnell and the child who appeared to be with him, because
reasonable suspicion does not require that an agent “be factually accurate in [his] belief
that a . . . law had been violated.” United States v. Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d 392, 398 (3d
Cir. 2006). Instead, the agent “need only produce facts establishing that [he] reasonably
believed that a violation had taken place.” Id. That burden is satisfied here by the reporting
agent’s observations of McConnell near the child and his reasonable belief, as a result, that
McConnell had violated his parole conditions.
B. Nexus to the Home
McConnell next argues that, even if there was reasonable suspicion, there was no
nexus between that suspicion and his home. But we have observed that “direct evidence
linking the place to be searched to the crime is not required” even in the more demanding
context of probable cause. United States v. Hodge, 246 F.3d 301, 305 (3d Cir. 2001)
(alteration omitted) (quoting United States v. Conley, 4 F.3d 1200, 1207 (3d Cir. 1993)).
Instead, courts are “entitled to draw reasonable inferences about where evidence is likely
to be kept[.]” Id. (quoting United States v. Whitner, 219 F.3d 289, 296 (3d Cir. 2000)).
And courts “may give considerable weight to the conclusions of experienced law
enforcement officers regarding where evidence of a crime is likely to be found.” Whitner,
219 F.3d at 296 (quoting United States v. Caicedo, 85 F.3d 1184, 1192 (6th Cir. 1996)).
Here, the parole agents who searched McConnell’s home were experienced law
enforcement officers who testified that, in their professional experience, evidence such as
children’s clothing, toys, games, books, dolls, and stuffed animals could be found in the
home of a person suspected of having purposeful contact with a child. The District Court
4
was entitled to rely on that professional experience to conclude that a search of
McConnell’s home was supported by reasonable suspicion. See Hodge, 246 F.3d at 307(relying on the belief of an experienced police officer that the suspect’s home would
contain evidence related to drug activities); Whitner, 219 F.3d at 297–99 (same).
II. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm McConnell’s judgment of sentence.
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