Joan E. Quinn v. Avco Corporation ( 2023 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
__________
No. 22-1596
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JOAN E. QUINN, Individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of James
Albert Quinn, Deceased; JAMES ARNOLD QUINN; ELIZABETH QUINN;
STEPHANIE PFEILSTICKER; SARAH QUINN; ERIN QUINN,
Appellants
v.
AVCO CORPORATION; LYCOMING ENGINES; CONTINENTAL MOTORS, INC.;
TELEDYNE CONTINENTAL MOTORS, INC.; BENDIX CORPORATION; ALLIED
SIGNAL, INC.; HONEYWELL INTERNATIONAL, INC.
__________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D. Del. No. 1-15-cv-1005)
District Judge: Honorable Richard G. Andrews
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Argued on March 23, 2023
Before: RESTREPO, PHIPPS, and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: November 14, 2023)
Cynthia M. Devers [Argued]
Devers Miska Law
Two Bala Plaza
Suite 300
Bala Cynwyd, PA 19004
Counsel for Appellants
Andrea S. Brooks
Wilks Law, LLC
4250 Lancaster Pike, Suite 200
Wilmington, DE 19805
John S. Bagby, Jr. [Argued]
Bagby & Associates, LLC
43 Leopard Road, Suite 301
Paoli, PA 19301
Counsel for Appellee Continental Motors, Inc.
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OPINION*
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RESTREPO, Circuit Judge.
This action arises from a plane accident (“Accident”) that fatally injured the pilot,
James Quinn, and flight instructor, Robert Groh. Appellants challenge the District
Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Appellee Continental Motors, Inc.
(“Continental”). Summary judgment was granted on the basis that the 18-year statute of
repose contained in the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA), Pub. L.
No. 103-298, 108 Stat. 1552 (1994) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note), barred
Appellants’ claims against Continental. We agree and therefore affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
The tragic Accident, which occurred on November 5, 2013, involved a Piper
aircraft (the “Aircraft”) (also known as a Piper Saratoga). The Aircraft was manufactured
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
2
by Piper Aircraft Corporation in 1980 and was delivered to its first purchaser on
November 3, 1980.
As the District Court explained, Appellants contend that “because of a defect in
the magneto, the engine failed to produce enough power, causing the crash.” A1066.
Specifically, Appellants allege the Accident occurred “due to the failure of the engine
caused by the rubbing of the magneto rotor against the pole shoes.” Appellants Br. 4
(citing A322-23). Appellants brought claims against Continental for strict liability,
negligence, breach of warranty, negligent infliction of emotional distress, survival, and
wrongful death.
The engine, which was designed and manufactured by AVCO Corp. and
Lycoming Engines (collectively “Lycoming”), was equipped with a Kelly Aerospace
dual magneto (“Magneto”), which provided electrical energy to the engine’s ignition
system. The Magneto was originally designed by Bendix Corporation. Continental later
acquired the Bendix magneto product line and began manufacturing the magnetos.
Continental rebuilt the Magneto in 2002, and Kelly Aerospace overhauled and
reassembled the Magneto in 2004 and installed it on the Aircraft on or about June 17,
2004.
Appellee filed in the District Court a motion for summary judgment or, in the
alternative, motion for partial summary judgment and a motion to strike sham
declarations. In its motion for summary judgment, Continental argued, among other
things, that Appellants could not prove that the Magneto caused the Accident, and in any
event, that Appellants’ claims are barred by GARA’s 18-year statute of repose.
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Continental argued that GARA’s statute of repose barred Appellants’ claims because: (1)
the Aircraft was a general aviation aircraft for purposes of GARA; (2) Continental was
being sued in its capacity as a manufacturer of the Magneto; and (3) the Accident
occurred more than 18 years after the delivery of the Aircraft to its first purchaser.
Following a hearing and supplemental briefing, the District Court granted
Continental’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that Appellants’ claims were
barred by GARA’s 18-year statute of repose against aircraft manufacturers. The Court
pointed out that the “aircraft was delivered to its first purchaser on November 3, 1980 --
almost 33 years before the Accident,” and therefore “the [18-year] statute of repose for
the aircraft as a whole has run.”1 A1072. Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to Appellants, since GARA’s rolling provision was not triggered and the 18-
year limitation period began in 1980, the Court entered Judgment in favor of
Continental.2
Following the granting of Continental’s summary judgment motion, Appellants
filed a motion for re-argument. Continental responded to Appellants’ motion for re-
1
The Court further pointed out that GARA contains a “rolling” provision: If a “new
component, system subassembly or other part which replaced another component,
system, subassembly or other part originally in . . . the aircraft” is alleged to have caused
the crash, then the statute of repose begins “on the date of completion of the replacement
or addition.” A1072 (quoting GARA § 2(a)(2)). However, the District Court concluded
that GARA’s rolling provision did not apply here, and Appellants do not challenge that
ruling on appeal.
2
Although the District Court also found partial summary judgment in favor of Continental
was warranted even if GARA did not bar Appellants’ claims entirely, and the Court also
denied Continental’s aforementioned motion to strike sham declarations, those rulings are
not on appeal before us.
4
argument, by, among other things, arguing that it was acting in its capacity as a
manufacturer when it rebuilt the Magneto. Continental pointed out that there was no
dispute that only a manufacturer can rebuild a part under the Federal Aviation
Regulations. Therefore, the act of rebuilding a component is an activity that is within the
exclusive province of an aviation manufacturer.
The District Court then granted re-argument on the portions of Count Five of
Appellants’ operative Complaint that alleged negligence “against Continental as a
rebuilder and a seller.” A1175. In particular, the Court granted re-argument on three
issues: (1) whether the phrase “capacity as a manufacturer” includes a manufacturer
acting as a rebuilder or a seller; (2) the status of Appellants’ claims against Continental in
its capacity as a rebuilder; and (3) the status of Appellants’ claims against Continental in
its capacity as a seller. Id. Following further supplemental briefing, the District Court
reaffirmed its conclusion that Appellants’ claims were barred by GARA’s statute of
repose, and the Court reaffirmed its Judgment in favor of Continental and against
Appellants.
Appellants raise the following issue on appeal: “Whether the trial court erred in
granting summary judgment and denying [Appellants’] Motion for Reargument pursuant
to [GARA] for claims made against [Continental] outside of its capacity as a
manufacturer, which are not preempted under GARA, in violation of [Sikkelee v.
Precision Airmotive Corp., 907 F.3d 701, 711 (3d Cir. 2018)].” Appellants Br. 2-3
(emph. added).
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II. DISCUSSION3
GARA contains a statute of repose that, with certain exceptions, bars suits against
airplane manufacturers brought more than 18 years after the delivery date to an initial
purchaser of the aircraft. Robinson v. Hartzell Propeller, Inc., 454 F.3d 163, 165 (3d Cir.
2006) (citing GARA § 2(a)). In particular, GARA provides that
. . . no civil action for damages for death or injury to persons
or damage to property arising out of an accident involving a
general aviation aircraft may be brought against the
manufacturer of the aircraft or the manufacturer of any new
component, system, subassembly, or other part of the aircraft,
in its capacity as a manufacturer if the accident occurred . . .
after the applicable [18-year] limitation period beginning on
. . . the date of delivery of the aircraft.
Id. at 165 n.3 (quoting GARA § 2(a)) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note 2(a)) (emph.
added); see id. (citing GARA § 3) (GARA defines “limitation period” as “18 years with
respect to general aviation aircraft and the components, systems, subassemblies, and
other parts of such aircraft.”). “GARA was adopted to limit the ‘long tail of liability’
imposed on manufacturers of general aviation aircraft.” Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive
Corp., 822 F.3d 680, 696 (3d Cir. 2016) (“Sikkelee II”) (citing Blazevska v. Raytheon
Aircraft Co., 522 F.3d 948, 951 (9th Cir. 2008)).
Appellants argue that separate and apart from Continental’s role as a
manufacturer, Continental wears an entirely different hat, as a provider of maintenance
3
The District Court had jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and we have
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We review the District Court’s grant of
summary judgment de novo,” applying “the same standards and presumptions as the
District Court.” Sapa Extrusions, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 939 F.3d 243, 249 (3d Cir.
2019).
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services. They claim it was in that capacity that Continental rebuilt and sold the Magneto
and its component parts in 2002. Therefore, Appellants argue the District Court erred in
finding that Appellants’ claims connected with Continental’s 2002 rebuild and sale are
barred under GARA’s statute of repose, which is a defense only available to
manufacturers operating in their capacity as manufacturers. See, e.g., Appellants Br. 12
(quoting 49 U.S.C. § 40101, note) (“The plain language of GARA affords protection only
to a ‘manufacturer acting in its capacity as a manufacturer.’”). Thus, the determinative
issue here is whether Continental was acting “in its capacity as a manufacturer” when it
rebuilt the Magneto.4
Continental persuasively argues that a defendant is acting “in its capacity as a
manufacturer” when it engages in conduct that is exclusively reserved to aviation
manufacturers. As Continental points out, federal regulations dictate that only a
manufacturer may “[r]ebuild or alter any appliance or part of aircraft, aircraft engines,
propellers, or appliances manufactured by [it] under a Technical Standard Order
Authorization, an FAA-Parts Manufacturer Approval, or Product and Process
Specification issued by the Administrator.” 14 C.F.R. § 43.3(j)(2). Indeed, Appellants
do not dispute that Continental holds Parts Manufacturing Authority to the Magneto, the
FAA regulations state that rebuilding a part is an activity that is within the exclusive
province of an aviation manufacturer, and rebuilding dual magnetos is an activity that is
4
There is no dispute that the Aircraft was a general aviation aircraft for purposes of GARA,
and that the aircraft was delivered to its first purchaser more than 18 years before the
Accident.
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exclusively reserved to manufacturers, such as Continental. Therefore, in producing the
rebuilt Magneto, Continental was acting in its capacity as a manufacturer because it was
engaging in conduct that was exclusively reserved to manufacturers by the Federal
Aviation Regulations.
Appellants argue on appeal that GARA’s plain language affords protection only to
a manufacturer acting in its capacity as a manufacturer and there is no mention of
rebuilders or sellers of aircraft parts. Their argument continues that had Congress wanted
to shield rebuilders and sellers, it could have included them. However, as the District
Court pointed out, “[i]f only manufacturers can rebuild aircraft parts, then it was
unnecessary for Congress to separately reference ‘rebuilders’ in the statute. All
‘rebuilders’ are ‘manufacturers.’” A1210 n.3.
Contending that GARA’s plain language is not clear as to its application here,
Appellants further argue that we may look to GARA’s legislative history. They claim
that “the legislative history is clear that manufacturers are not immunized by performing
activities outside of manufacturing (such as maintenance services and part sales).”
Appellants Br. 13 (emph. added). Initially, we note that GARA does not say merely that
manufacturers are immunized by performing “manufacturing,” as Appellants seem to
contend. Rather, GARA sets forth limitations on civil actions brought for damages
against a manufacturer “in its capacity as a manufacturer.” Here, Continental was acting
in its capacity as a manufacturer in producing the rebuilt Magneto, as only the
manufacturer may rebuild the Magneto under the FAA regulations.
In support of Appellants’ position, they point to H.R. REP. 103-525(II):
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The [limitation regarding a manufacturer in its capacity
as a manufacturer] is intended to insure that parties who
happen to be manufacturers of an aircraft or a component
part are not immunized from liability they may be subject to in
some other capacity. For example, in the event a party who
happened to be a manufacturer committed some negligent act
as a mechanic of an aircraft or as a pilot, and such act was a
proximate cause of an accident, the victims would not be
barred from bringing a civil suit for damages against that
party in its capacity as a mechanic.
See Appellants Br. 13 (quoting HR. REP. 103-525(II)) (emph. added by Appellants)
(bold added). However, here, the challenged performance was Continental providing the
rebuilt Magneto, an activity that is exclusively reserved to Continental as a manufacturer,
and such activity was performed “in its capacity as a manufacturer.” It did not just
“happen to be [a] manufacturer[].” In this case, the rebuilding of the Magneto was
performed by Continental because it was the manufacturer, i.e., in its capacity as a
manufacturer.
Appellants cite Sikkelee v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 907 F.3d 701 (3d Cir. 2018)
(“Sikkelee III”), in support of their position, but Sikkelee III is distinguishable from the
appeal before us and does not support Appellants’ position. The issue in Sikkelee III did
not involve application of the statute of repose, but rather, addressed the application of
the conflict-preemption defense under the doctrine of impossibility-preemption as to
federal and state law. Id. at 709. Perhaps most significantly, regarding the application of
the Sikkelee line of cases to this appeal, is the recognition and clarification in Sikkelee II
that “where GARA’s statute of repose has run . . . state law claims [are] preempted.”
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Sikkelee II, 822 F.3d at 697. As explained above, in this case the statute of repose had
expired by the time of the Accident and Appellants claims are barred.
The District Court correctly interpreted GARA’s plain language to determine that
Appellants’ claims are barred by GARA’s 18-year statute of repose. Continental was
acting “in its capacity as a manufacturer” when it rebuilt the Magneto in 2002.
Accordingly, we affirm.
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