United States v. Clifton Junius ( 2023 )

PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_______________________
No. 22-2208
_______________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
CLIFTON JUNIUS,
a/k/a MAX,
a/k/a TYJAE,
a/k/a TYJAE RAVENELL,
a/k/a TYJAE JENKINS,
Appellant
_______________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
District Court No. 2-01-cr-00457-005
District Judge: The Honorable Mitchell S. Goldberg
__________________________
No. 22-2267
__________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
DANIEL COACH, JR., a/k/a SMOKEY, a/k/a PAULIE,
a/k/a SMOKE,
a/k/a PAUL WESTPHAL, a/k/a UNCLE PAULIE, a/k/a
SMIZ, a/k/a SKELS,
Appellant
______________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
District Court No. 2-01-cr-00457-001
District Judge: The Honorable Mitchell S. Goldberg
_________________________
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
September 29, 2023
Before: KRAUSE, AMBRO, and SMITH, Circuit Judges
(Filed: November 20, 2023)
2
Joanne M. Heisey
Federal Community Defender Office for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania
Capital Habeas Unit
601 Walnut Street
The Curtis Center, Suite 545 West
Philadelphia, PA 19106
Brett G. Sweitzer
Federal Community Defender Office for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania
601 Walnut Street
The Curtis Center, Suite 545 West
Philadelphia, PA 19106
Counsel for Clifton Junius & Daniel Coach
Bernadette A. McKeon
Robert A. Zauzmer
Office of United States Attorney
615 Chestnut Street
Suite 1250
Philadelphia, PA 19106
Counsel for the United States
________________________
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OPINION OF THE COURT
__________________________
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
Daniel Coach and Clifton Junius appeal the denials
of their respective motions for sentence reduction under
the First Step Act, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194
(2018). They argue that a conviction under 28 U.S.C. §
848(e)(1)(A) for intentional killing in furtherance of a
continuing criminal conspiracy is a “covered offense”
under the Act, and that they are therefore eligible for
sentencing relief for their convictions under that statute.
We agree with the District Court that drug-related murder
in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A) is not a covered
offense under the First Step Act, and we thus will affirm.1
1
In the alternative, Appellants argue that the murder and
drug charges on which they were sentenced are
interdependent, so that they are eligible for sentence
reduction under the sentencing package doctrine.
However, the sentencing package doctrine does not apply
to this case.
This Court has recognized that “when a defendant
is found guilty on a multicount indictment, there is a strong
likelihood that the district court will craft a disposition in
which the sentences on the various counts form part of an
4
overall plan.” United States v. Davis, 112 F.3d 118, 122
(3d Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Pimienta-
Redondo, 874 F.2d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 890 (1989)). Under the sentencing package doctrine,
if a conviction on one of the component counts of the
overall plan, or sentencing package, is vacated, and the
sentences on the underlying counts are interdependent, a
judge may “review the efficacy of what remains in light of
the original plan, and []reconstruct the sentencing
architecture upon remand, within the applicable
constitutional and statutory limits . . . .” Id. (quoting
Pimienta-Redondo, 874 F.2d at 14).
This Court recently recognized that “[w]hether two
sentences are interdependent turns on whether they ‘result
in an aggregate sentence’ as opposed to ‘sentences which
may be treated discretely.’” United States v. Norwood, 49
F.4th 189, 203 (3d Cir. 2022) (quoting United States v.
Murray, 144 F.3d 270, 273 n.4 (3d Cir. 1998)). It thus
follows that the sentencing package doctrine does not
usually apply to sentences grouped together under the
Sentencing Guidelines or to concurrent sentences. See id.;
McKeever v. Warden SCI-Graterford, 486 F.3d 81, 87 (3d
Cir. 2007).
The sentences imposed on Coach and Junius for
murder in furtherance of a continuing criminal enterprise
were imposed independently from their cocaine base
distribution charges. So they were not part of a sentencing
package. The sentencing court separated the murder
5
I.
This appeal arises from the involvement of Coach
and Junius in a drug distribution operation in North
Philadelphia from early 1992 through May 2001. Coach
was head of the operation and engaged in multiple acts of
violence, including several homicides. Junius, in his role,
engaged in long-term drug distribution. Like Coach, he
engaged in acts of violence, including homicides.
In 2003, Coach and Junius pled guilty to multiple
charges related to their involvement in the drug
distribution operation. Coach pled guilty to possession
with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of cocaine
base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A)
and intentional killing in furtherance of a continuing
criminal enterprise (“CCE”) in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 848(e)(1)(A), along with other counts. 2 Junius pled
offense of each Appellant from the rest of his offenses.
The District Court also imposed their sentences on the
separate offenses to run concurrently. Because it is clear
that each Appellant’s drug-related murder sentence could
be treated discretely, the sentencing package doctrine does
not apply.
2
He also pled guilty to operation of a house for the storage
and distribution of a controlled substance in violation of
6
guilty to conspiracy to distribute more than 50 grams of
cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and
intentional killing in furtherance of a continuing criminal
enterprise in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A). The
District Court sentenced Coach to 60 years on each charge
to which he pled guilty and Junius to 40 years on each
charge to which he pled guilty. The prison sentences on all
counts, as to each defendant, are to run concurrently. 3
21 U.S.C. § 856 and engaging in a continuing criminal
enterprise in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848.
3
In addition to determining that 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A)
is not a covered offense under the First Step Act, the
District Court declined to exercise its discretion to reduce
defendants’ drug offense sentences. The Appellants argue
in their opening brief that “[t]his Court cannot be satisfied
with the district court’s statements that it would not reduce
Appellants’ sentences if it had the discretion to do so.”
Appellants’ Opening Brief at 42. They elaborate in their
reply brief that “the district court cannot have properly
considered the statutory sentencing factors because it
misunderstood the currently applicable penalty ranges.”
Appellants’ Reply Brief at 9 (internal citation omitted).
That is not the case. When judges conduct First Step Act
resentencings, they must “‘articulate . . . a brief statement
of reasons’ in which they ‘explain their decisions and
demonstrate that they considered the parties’ arguments.’”
7
The District Court also denied all motions that
Coach and Junius filed seeking sentence reductions. For
Coach, those included motions to correct the sentence,
construed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a motion for
compassionate release, and the instant motion for sentence
reduction pursuant to the First Step Act. For Junius, they
included a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct the
sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, post-conviction
sentence reduction motions pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(2), a motion for compassionate release, and the
First Step Act motion which is at issue here.
Undaunted by the District Court’s denial of their
previous motions, Coach and Junius both filed motions
seeking a sentence reduction under the First Step Act.
They asserted that their convictions were covered offenses
under the First Step Act, thus making them eligible for
sentencing relief. Coach and Junius supported their
United States v. Shields, 48 F.4th 183, 193 (3d Cir. 2022)
(quoting Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481, 501
(2022)). For each Appellant, the District Court articulated
the statutory factors courts consider in adjudicating First
Step Act motions, acknowledged Appellants’
rehabilitation arguments, and explained why it would
nevertheless exercise its discretion to deny sentencing
relief. The Court’s alternative analyses were procedurally
sound and did not otherwise constitute an abuse of
discretion.
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motions with descriptions of their rehabilitation efforts
and letters from character references. The District Court
denied both motions, holding in relevant part that a
conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A) for murder in
furtherance of a CCE is not a “covered offense” under the
First Step Act and the sentencing package doctrine is
inapplicable. Further, the District Court reasoned that,
even if Coach’s and Junius’ offenses were covered
offenses under the First Step Act, the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
sentencing factors counsel against reducing their terms of
imprisonment.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3231. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review statutory interpretation questions and questions
related to the sentencing package doctrine de novo. United
States v. Hodge, 948 F.3d 160, 162 (3d Cir. 2020);
Norwood, 49 F.4th at 200.
III.
The First Step Act operates by making retroactive
the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010,4 a statute which reduced
penalty disparities between offenses involving crack
cocaine and powder cocaine. See United States v. Birt, 966
F.3d 257, 259–60 (3d Cir. 2020). Thus, under the First
4
Pub. L. No. 111–220, 124 Stat. 2372.
9
Step Act, a district court may reduce a pre-2010 sentence
“as if the revised penalties for crack cocaine enacted in the
Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 were in effect at the time the
offense was committed.” Concepcion, 597 U.S. at 486
(internal quotation marks omitted).
The First Step Act’s plain language and structure
confirm that capital murder convictions under 21 U.S.C. §
848(e)(1)(A) are not “covered offenses” under the Act. All
of our sister courts of appeals that have considered
whether a violation of § 848(e)(1)(A) is a covered offense
under the Act have likewise reached this conclusion. See
United States v. Roane, 51 F.4th 541, 548–50 (4th Cir.
2022); United States v. Fletcher, 997 F.3d 95, 97–98 (2d
Cir. 2021); United States v. Snow, 967 F.3d 563, 564–65
(
6th Cir. 2020) (per curiam).5 Section 404 of the First Step
5
Further, when considering the issue in the Double
Jeopardy Clause context, “[e]very court of appeals to
consider the question has concluded that § 848(e)(1)(A)
sets forth separate offenses—offenses for which the
defendant may be prosecuted, convicted, and punished in
addition to the underlying predicate drug-trafficking
offenses.” United States v. Vasquez, 899 F.3d 363, 383
(5th Cir. 2018) (citing United States v. Honken, 541 F.3d
1146, 1154–58 (8th Cir. 2008); United States v. Collazo-
Aponte, 216 F.3d 163, 200 (1st Cir. 2000), cert. granted in
part and judgment vacated, 532 U.S. 1036 (2001); United
States v. Snow, 48 F.3d 198, 200 (6th Cir. 1995); United
10
Act, in relevant part, defines “covered offenses” under the
Act:
(a) DEFINITION OF COVERED OFFENSE.—In
this section, the term ‘‘covered offense’’ means a
violation of a Federal criminal statute, the statutory
penalties for which were modified by section 2 or 3
of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (Public Law
111–220; 124 Stat. 2372), that was committed
before August 3, 2010.
(b) DEFENDANTS PREVIOUSLY
SENTENCED.—A court that imposed a sentence
for a covered offense may, on motion of the
defendant, the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, the
attorney for the Government, or the court, impose a
reduced sentence as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair
Sentencing Act of 2010 (Public Law 111–220; 124
Stat. 2372) were in effect at the time the covered
offense was committed.
In Terry v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1858, 1862 (2021),
the Supreme Court focused on the text in § 404(a) and
clarified that the term “‘statutory penalties’ references the
entire phrase ‘a violation of a Federal criminal statute,’”
States v. McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087, 1104–05 (10th Cir.
1996)).
11
which “thus directs our focus to the statutory penalties for
petitioner’s offense, not the statute or statutory scheme.”
Id. at 1863 (emphasis in original). It further instructed that
a court determining whether an offense is covered under
the First Step Act must “ask whether the Fair Sentencing
Act modified the statutory penalties for petitioner’s
offense.” Id. at 1862.
Section 2 of the Fair Sentencing Act expressly
modified penalties associated with convictions under only
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A)(iii), 841(b)(1)(B)(iii),
960(b)(1)(C), and 960(b)(2)(C). It did so by increasing
drug quantity thresholds necessary to trigger the
mandatory minimum sentence for each of these statutory
provisions. Section 3, by eliminating mandatory minimum
sentences for cocaine base possession, modified the
penalties related solely to 21 U.S.C. § 844(a). But the Fair
Sentencing Act did not modify the statutory penalty for a
§ 848(e)(1)(A) violation, which remained punishable by a
mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 20 years
and a maximum term of life imprisonment or a sentence
of death.
It is true that a conviction for murder in furtherance
of a CCE rests on a § 841(b)(1)(A) violation. And the Fair
Sentencing Act modified the latter statute by raising the
quantity of crack cocaine, from 50 grams to 280 grams,
that triggers the ten-year mandatory minimum sentence
under that subsection. But, as the Sixth Circuit reasoned,
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the Fair Sentencing Act did not “modify” the penalties for
the drug-related murder violations of § 848(e)(1)(A) for
which Coach and Junius were convicted. Snow, 967 F.3d
at 565. Instead, it eliminated liability for violations of §
848(e) predicated upon drug crimes involving less than
280 grams of crack cocaine. Id. We agree with the Sixth
Circuit that it would “put[] great strain on the ordinary
meaning of the word ‘modify’” to call the elimination of
statutory penalties a modification of them. Id. Thus,
because the Fair Sentencing Act did not modify the drug-
related murder penalties under § 848(e)(1)(A), those
offenses are not “covered” under the First Step Act.
IV.
As murder in furtherance of a CCE is not a “covered
offense” under the First Step Act, and since the sentencing
package doctrine is inapplicable to the facts of this case,
the District Court was correct to conclude that Coach and
Junius were each ineligible for sentence reductions. We
will thus affirm the District Court’s orders denying
Coach’s and Junius’ motions for sentence reduction.
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