Deborah Grooms v. Ally Financial ( 2023 )


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  •                                                                NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 23-2285
    __________
    DEBORAH GROOMS,
    Appellant
    v.
    ALLY FINANCIAL
    ____________________________________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. Civil Action No. 2:23-cv-01124)
    District Judge: Honorable Paul S. Diamond
    ____________________________________
    Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
    November 22, 2023
    Before: JORDAN, PHIPPS, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed: November 29, 2023)
    ___________
    OPINION *
    ___________
    PER CURIAM
    *
    This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
    constitute binding precedent.
    Deborah Grooms appeals pro se from an order of the District Court dismissing her
    complaint pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)(B)(ii). For the following reasons, we will
    affirm.
    In March 2023, Grooms filed a complaint against Ally Financial, alleging
    violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 
    15 U.S.C. § 1692
     et seq.
    Grooms alleged that, prior to filing the instant complaint, “Plaintiff and Defendant had
    zero business transactions together.” Dkt No. 1 ¶ 3. She further alleged that on or about
    December 2, 2022, she received correspondence from Ally Financial “regarding an
    unverified alleged debt.” 
    Id. at ¶ 4
    . Attached to her complaint, however, Grooms
    submitted correspondence between herself and Ally Financial from as far back as July
    2015, wherein Ally referred to Grooms as an “Ally customer” and which appears to
    indicate that Ally financed Grooms’ purchase of a used vehicle. 
    Id. at 5
    . Grooms also
    submitted a letter from Ally, dated August 2, 2021, indicating that Grooms was late in
    making her payments to Ally, 
    id. at 7
    , and the December 2, 2022 letter from Ally,
    indicating that Grooms’ last payment was made in May 2021, she had an outstanding
    balance of $5,987.98, and that her account “was charged off as a Loss[,]” 
    id. at 6
    .
    On June 14, 2023, the District Court granted Grooms’ request to proceed in forma
    pauperis and, pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), dismissed the complaint for failure to state
    a claim upon which relief may be granted. Dkt No. 5. Specifically, the District Court
    concluded that Grooms failed to adequately allege that Ally is debt collector and
    therefore failed to state a claim under the FDCPA. Noting that amendment would be
    2
    futile, the District Court dismissed the complaint with prejudice without providing an
    opportunity for amendment. Grooms appeals.
    We have jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . Our review of the District
    Court’s sua sponte dismissal of the complaint is plenary. See Allah v. Seiverling, 
    229 F.3d 220
    , 223 (3d Cir. 2000). We review the District Court’s denial of leave to amend
    for abuse of discretion, although we review de novo the determination that amendment
    would be futile. U.S. ex rel. Schumann v. AstraZeneca Pharms. L.P., 
    769 F.3d 837
    , 849
    (3d Cir. 2014).
    To state a claim under the FDCPA, a plaintiff must allege that “(1) she is a
    consumer; (2) the defendant is a debt collector, (3) the defendant’s challenged practice
    involves an attempt to collect a ‘debt’ as the Act defines it, and (4) the defendant has
    violated a provision of the FDCPA in attempting to collect the debt.” Jensen v. Pressler
    & Pressler, 
    791 F.3d 413
    , 417 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Douglass v. Convergent
    Outsourcing, 
    765 F.3d 299
    , 303 (3d Cir. 2014)). Here, in particular, the District Court
    concluded that Grooms failed to satisfy the second prong, that Ally was a debt collector
    under the statute.
    Pursuant to the FDCPA, a “debt collector” includes, as relevant here, (1) “any
    business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any debts,” (2) any person
    “who regularly collects or attempts to collect . . . debts owed or due another,” and (3)
    “any creditor who, in the process of collecting his own debts, uses any name other than
    his own which would indicate that a third person is collecting or attempting to collect
    3
    such debts.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). We conclude that the District Court correctly held
    that Grooms failed to allege sufficient facts to demonstrate that Ally met the definition of
    a debt collector under the statute. Most notably, Grooms’ allegations and exhibits
    demonstrate that Ally’s communications concerned a debt owed to itself in connection
    with financing Grooms’ car. 1 See Tepper v. Amos Fin., LLC, 
    898 F.3d 364
    , 366 (3d Cir.
    2018).
    Finally, we agree with the District Court’s determination that amendment would
    be futile and therefore the District Court properly dismissed the complaint with prejudice.
    For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
    The District Court also correctly noted that, although Grooms alleged that
    1
    “[b]efore this action was filed, Plaintiff and Defendant had zero business transactions
    together,” Dkt No. 1 at ¶ 3, the exhibits attached to her complaint contradicted her
    allegation and therefore need not be accepted as true. See Vorchheimer v. Philadelphian
    Owners Ass’n, 
    903 F.3d 100
    , 112 (3d Cir. 2018).
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 23-2285

Filed Date: 11/29/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/29/2023