In re: TH Properties v. ( 2018 )


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  •                                                                  NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    _______________
    No. 17-1922
    _______________
    In re: TH PROPERTIES, d/b/a TH Properties, L.P..,
    Debtors
    MONTGOMERY, MCCRACKEN, WALKER & RHOADS, LLP,
    Appellant
    _______________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. No. 2:16-cv-04080)
    District Judge: Hon. Wendy Beetlestone
    _______________
    Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
    January 19, 2018
    Before: AMBRO, RESTREPO, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion Filed: November 28, 2018)
    _________________
    OPINION
    _________________
    *This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does
    not constitute binding precedent.
    FUENTES, Circuit Judge.
    Montgomery, McCracken, Walker, and Rhoads, LLP, (“Montgomery McCracken”)
    acted as counsel to Reorganized Debtor TH Properties, L.P. (“TH Properties”) in its
    bankruptcy proceedings.1 Montgomery McCracken now appeals the District Court’s order
    affirming the Bankruptcy Court’s interpretation of a fee stipulation between the parties.2
    For the reasons explained below, we will vacate the District Court’s order and remand for
    further consideration.
    I.
    In 2009, TH Properties filed for bankruptcy, retaining Montgomery McCracken as
    counsel.3 From 2009 to 2012, Montgomery McCracken remained as TH Properties’
    counsel and filed nine “[a]pplication[s] for [c]ompensation and [r]eimbursement of
    [e]xpenses,” in the Bankruptcy Court.4 However, in 2012, TH Properties retained new
    counsel and filed an objection to Montgomery McCracken’s tenth and final fee
    application.5 In an effort to settle the fee dispute, the parties negotiated and entered into a
    fee stipulation (the “Stipulation”), which stated in relevant part:
    [Montgomery McCracken] will agree to reduce its total fees and costs claims
    against [TH Properties]. . . from $2.6 million for all pre-bankruptcy,
    bankruptcy, and post-bankruptcy work for [TH Properties] to the total sum
    of $2.325 million, with the said reduction of $275,000 to be applied after
    receipt by [Montgomery McCracken] of $2.325 million. . . .6
    1
    App. at 3.
    2
    Id. at 2.
    3
    Id. at 3.
    4
    Id. at 37-54.
    5
    Id. at 67-72.
    6
    Id. at 74-75.
    2
    The Stipulation was approved by the Bankruptcy Court.7
    In 2016, TH Properties sent a fee payment to Montgomery McCracken along with
    a letter explaining that the payment was its last.8 TH Properties also provided Montgomery
    McCracken with a tally of all the payments it had made to Montgomery McCracken,
    showing that its pre-bankruptcy, bankruptcy, and post-bankruptcy payments totaled $2.325
    million.9 The tally included $680,789 of fee payments that were made to Montgomery
    McCracken before the parties entered into the Stipulation.10
    After receiving TH Properties’ letter and payment, Montgomery McCracken moved
    to reopen the bankruptcy case and enforce the Stipulation.11 Specifically, Montgomery
    McCracken argued that TH Properties had not fulfilled its $2.325 million obligation
    because it still owed $680,789—the amount TH Properties had paid before the
    Stipulation.12
    The Bankruptcy Court granted Montgomery McCracken’s motion to reopen the
    bankruptcy case, but it determined that the Stipulation was unambiguous and explained
    that Montgomery McCracken’s argument that TH Properties still owed $680,789 was
    “manifestly inconsistent with the plain language of the parties’ written agreement.” 13
    7
    Id. at 83.
    8
    Id. at 126.
    9
    Id. at 127-131.
    10
    Id. at 127.
    11
    Id. at 132.
    12
    Id. at 133.
    13
    Id. at 133 n.1.
    3
    Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Court concluded that TH Properties’ interpretation of the
    Stipulation controlled.14
    Montgomery McCracken filed an appeal in the District Court, arguing that the
    Stipulation was ambiguous.15        The District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s
    interpretation of the Stipulation,16 and Montgomery McCracken appealed.17
    II.
    The question before us is whether the District Court and the Bankruptcy Court erred
    in concluding that the language of the Stipulation was unambiguous. We conclude that
    they did.
    Under Pennsylvania law, “[t]he paramount goal of contract interpretation is to
    determine the intent of the parties.”18 “When the words [of a contract] are clear and
    unambiguous, the intent of the parties must be determined from the express language of
    the agreement . . . . Accordingly, where the intention of the parties is clear, there is no need
    to resort to extrinsic aids or evidence.”19
    14
    Id.
    15
    Id. at 5.
    16
    Id. at 5-10.
    17
    The District Court had jurisdiction to review the Bankruptcy Court’s order under 
    28 U.S.C. § 158
    (a) (2018). We have jurisdiction to review the District Court’s order under
    
    28 U.S.C. § 158
    (d). We review the District Court’s determination regarding ambiguity
    de novo. Bohler-Uddeholm Am., Inc. v. Ellwood Grp., Inc., 
    247 F.3d 79
    , 92 (3d Cir.
    2001) (explaining that we exercise “plenary review”).
    18
    Am. Eagle Outfitters v. Lyle & Scott Ltd., 
    584 F.3d 575
    , 587 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing
    Garden State Tanning, Inc. v. Mitchell Mfg. Group, Inc., 
    273 F.3d 332
    , 335 (3d Cir. 2001)).
    19
    
    Id.
     (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
    4
    A contract is ambiguous “if . . . it is reasonably or fairly susceptible of different
    constructions and is capable of being understood in more senses than one.”20            “To
    determine whether ambiguity exists in a contract, the court may consider ‘the words of the
    contract, the alternative meaning suggested by counsel, and the nature of the objective
    evidence to be offered in support of that meaning.’”21 When the language of a contract is
    ambiguous, “deciding the intent of the parties becomes a question of fact for the jury.”22
    In this case, the District Court concluded that the Stipulation was not ambiguous on
    its face because it “contains no defective, obscure, or indefinite language.”23 Instead, the
    District Court explained that the Stipulation “clearly states     . . . that [Montgomery
    McCracken] agrees to reduce its ‘total’ fee and cost claims from $2.6 million ‘for all pre-
    bankruptcy, bankruptcy, and post-bankruptcy work’ to the ‘total sum’ of $2.325 million.”24
    The District Court thus decided in favor of TH Properties.
    On appeal, Montgomery McCracken argues that the Stipulation is ambiguous
    because it is “reasonably susceptible” to being understood in “more than one sense.”25
    20
    Bohler-Uddeholm Am., 
    247 F.3d at 93
     (quoting Duquesne Light Co. v. Westinghouse
    Elec. Corp., 
    66 F.3d 604
    , 614 (3d Cir. 1995) (citation omitted)).
    21
    
    Id.
     (quoting Melon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Bus. Credit, Inc., 
    619 F.2d 1001
    , 1011 (3d Cir.
    1980)).
    22
    See Am. Eagle Outfitters, 
    584 F.3d at
    587 (citing Community Coll. Of Beaver County v.
    Community Coll. Of Beaver, 
    375 A.2d 1267
    , 1275 (Pa. 1977)).
    23
    App. at 6.
    24
    Id.
    25
    Am. Eagle Outfitters, 
    584 F.3d at 587
     (internal quotation marks omitted).
    5
    Specifically, Montgomery McCracken focuses on the word “claims” and asserts that it can
    be understood to signify “money owed”26 or money “both paid and unpaid.”27 We agree.
    The District Court focused its analysis on the words and phrases “total,” “for all pre-
    bankruptcy, bankruptcy, and post-bankruptcy work,” and “total sum,” but it neglected to
    consider the word “claims.” As Montgomery McCracken asserts, “claims” could refer to
    the amount that Montgomery McCracken was still owed when the Stipulation was
    negotiated, or it could account for all of the money it was ever owed, regardless of whether
    TH Properties had previously paid or not. Although the Stipulation does include the words
    that the District Court focused on, like “total” and “all,” as well as others, none of them
    illuminate which potential meaning of “claims” is correct. Furthermore, there is no explicit
    reference in the Stipulation to TH Properties’ previous $680,789 payment and how it
    should be considered. Black’s Law Dictionary, which defines “claim” as “any right to
    payment,” also does not provide us with a clear answer because it does not clarify whether
    the payments that TH Properties had already made were to count towards the $2.325
    million it owed Montgomery McCracken.28
    Accordingly, we conclude that “claims” is susceptible to multiple meanings.
    Because the parties’ obligations change based on which proposed definition of “claims” is
    used, we conclude that the Stipulation is ambiguous.29
    26
    Appellant’s Br. at 15.
    27
    Id. at 20.
    28
    Claim, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
    29
    Montgomery McCracken and TH Properties focused much of their briefs on arguing
    whether the Stipulation contained latent ambiguity. Because we find the Stipulation to be
    ambiguous on its face, we need not analyze the Stipulation for latent ambiguity.
    6
    III.
    For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s order and remand
    the case for further proceedings.
    7
    AMBRO, Circuit Judge, dissenting
    Judge Fuentes, writing for the majority, makes a plausible case that, without
    understanding whether “claims” is meant to include or exclude the $680,789 TH
    Properties had previously paid to Montgomery McCracken, the Stipulation is ambiguous.
    On the one hand, why would Montgomery McCracken have a “claim[]” for money
    already paid? On the other hand, under the Stipulation Montgomery McCracken agrees
    “to reduce its total fees and costs claims against [TH Properties] . . . from $2.6 million for
    all pre-bankruptcy, bankruptcy, and post-bankruptcy work for [TH Properties] to the total
    sum of $2.325 million . . .” (Emphases supplied.) It would be hard to draft any more
    clearly that “all pre-bankruptcy, bankruptcy, and post-bankruptcy work” means for all
    time. Words with no constraint cannot be limited by a neutral noun—“claims.” Maybe
    you could get around this logical impediment if the “total fees and costs claims” said
    $3,280,789 ($2,600,000 + $680,789) instead of $2,600,000, but that is not said.
    Thus I align with Judge Beetlestone’s judgment and analysis. From a practical
    standpoint it may make sense to rule as do my colleagues, but the words of the
    Stipulation, drafted by counsel consummate in their craft, belie that practical concern.
    Thus I respectfully dissent.
    1