Moravian School Advisory Board of St. Thomas v. Rawlins , 70 F.3d 270 ( 1995 )

Opinions of the United
1995 Decisions States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit
11-14-1995
Moravian v Rawlins
Precedential or Non-Precedential:
Docket 94-7359
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"Moravian v Rawlins" (1995). 1995 Decisions. Paper 288.
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 94-7359
THE MORAVIAN SCHOOL ADVISORY BOARD OF ST. THOMAS, V.I.
V.
HELEN RAWLINS; THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,
GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS,
Appellant
No. 94-7421
JANE ROGERS, on behalf of herself;
THE ESTATE OF INGRID CORENA ROGERS;
NIRONE PAVON FRANCIS, minor*;
LAUREL SIMONE FRANCIS, minor
V.
GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS;
ST. THOMAS HOSPITAL; ELENA AGUAS, M.D.,
Appellants
* (Amended as per the Clerk's 12/27/94 Order)
ON APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT
OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS
(D.C. Civil Action Nos. 91-00364 and 93-00055)
Argued April 18, 1995
Before: BECKER, NYGAARD and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed November 14, 1995)
ROBERT W. BORNHOLT, ESQUIRE (Argued)
FREDERICK HANDLEMAN, ESQUIRE
PAMELA R. TEPPER, ESQUIRE
1
Office of Attorney General of Virgin Islands
Department of Justice
48B-50 Kronprindsens Gade, Suite 1
Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas
United States Virgin Islands 00802
Attorneys for Appellant Department of Labor
RICHARD R. KNOEPFEL, ESQUIRE
STEVEN L. MIERL, ESQUIRE (Argued)
Briggs, Knoepfel & Ronca
30 Dronningens Gade
P.O. Box 6286
Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas
United States Virgin Islands 00804
Attorney for Appellants Gov't Virgin Islands,
St. Thomas Hospital and Elena Aguas, M.D.
DENISE R. REOVAN, ESQUIRE (Argued)
4A Commandant Gade
Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas
United States Virgin Islands 00802
Attorney for Appellee Moravian School
DEBORAH K. ROBINSON, ESQUIRE
Legal Services of the Virgin Islands
57 Dronnigens Gade
Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas
United States Virgin Islands 00801
Attorney for Appellee Helen Rawlins
RICHARD AUSTIN, ESQUIRE (Argued)
Legal Services of the Virgin Islands
No. 3017 Estate Orange Grove
Christiansted, St. Croix
United States Virgin Islands 00820
Attorney for Appellee Helen Rawlins
LEMUEL F. CALLWOOD, ESQUIRE
VERA D. JEAN, ESQUIRE (Argued)
Law Office of Lemuel F. Callwood
P.O. Box 7397
#1 4th Street Estate Thomas
Charlotte Amalie, St. Thomas
United States Virgin Islands 00801
Attorney for Appellees Jane Rogers,
Estate of Ingrid Corena Rogers,
Nirone Pavon Francis, and
Laurel Simone Francis
2
OPINION OF THE COURT
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge:
These two appeals were combined for this opinion
because the issue in both is whether the District Court of the
Virgin Islands, when it lacks subject matter jurisdiction, may
nonetheless transfer a cause to the Territorial Court of the
Virgin Islands rather than dismiss it. Because we conclude that
a district court must dismiss the suit where there is no
colorable basis for exercising subject matter jurisdiction, we
will reverse and remand both cases with instructions to dismiss.
I.
Helen Rawlins filed a complaint with the Virgin Islands
Department of Labor, alleging that she was wrongfully discharged
from her employment as a teacher with the Moravian School. She
alleged only claims based on territorial law. The hearing
officer ruled that Rawlins had been wrongfully discharged and
ordered that Moravian reinstate her with back pay. The Moravian
School Advisory Board filed a writ of review in the District
Court of the Virgin Islands. Rawlins then filed a motion to
dismiss based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Moravian, which did not respond to the motion to
dismiss, did not then and does not now argue that there is
federal jurisdiction over the suit. Nevertheless, the district
3
court, rather than granting the motion to dismiss, transferred
the case to the territorial court.
II.
One day before the statute of limitations expired,
appellee Jane Rogers, on behalf of herself and the estate and
heirs of decedent Ingrid Corena Rogers, filed a medical
malpractice action in the District Court of the Virgin Islands
against St. Thomas Hospital, Elena Aguas, M.D., and the
Government of the Virgin Islands, which owns, operates and staffs
the hospital. The suit arises from the allegedly negligent
treatment given Ingrid Corena Rogers at the hospital, which
treatment is alleged to have resulted in her death.
The complaint alleged only medical malpractice and
related negligence claims. The defendant-appellants responded
with a motion to dismiss for, inter alia, lack of subject matter
jurisdiction. The district court stated in the hearing
transcript that it would grant the motion to dismiss and transfer
the action to the territorial court. However, the court
ultimately ordered transfer of the case without mentioning
dismissal.
III.
The U.S. Consititution, Article IV, Section 3 "empowers
Congress to establish all necessary rules and regulations
concerning the unincorporated territory of the Virgin Islands,
including the power to designate the jurisdiction of the District
4
Court and the Territorial Court." Brow v. Farrelly, 994 F.2d
1027, 1032 (3d Cir. 1993). Pursuant to this power, in 1954,
Congress enacted the Revised Organic Act of the Virgin Islands,
Act of July 22, 1954, ch. 558, §§ 22-23, 68 Stat. 497 (codified
as amended at 48 U.S.C. § 1541 et seq.), which is "the Virgin
Islands' equivalent of a constitution." Brow, 994 F.2d at 1032.
Section 1612 of the 1954 Revised Organic Act set forth
the jurisdiction of the District Court of the Virgin Islands,
which included jurisdiction over federal questions, regardless of
the amount in controversy, and general original jurisdiction over
questions of local law, subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of
the local courts over civil actions where the amount in
controversy was less than $500. Act of July 22, 1954, ch. 558,
§§ 22-23, 68 Stat. 506 (amended 1978, 1984); Brow, 994 F.2d at
1032. Section 1613 of the 1954 Act also provided that the local
courts shared concurrent jurisdiction with the district court
over all actions to the extent jurisdiction was conferred upon
them by local law. Act of July 22, 1954, ch. 558, § 23, 68 Stat.
506 (amended 1984); Carty v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 679 F.2d 1051,
1056 n.6 (3d Cir. 1982).
In 1984, Congress amended the Revised Organic Act to
impose new limits on the general original jurisdiction of the
District Court of the Virgin Islands over cases involving local
law. Brow, 994 F.2d at 1033. Specifically, Congress amended
§ 1612(b) of the Revised Organic Act to grant the district court,
in addition to its federal question and diversity jurisdiction,
general jurisdiction over "all causes in the Virgin Islands the
5
jurisdiction over which is not then vested by local law in the
local courts of the Virgin Islands." 48 U.S.C. § 1612(b). At
the same time, Congress amended § 1611(b) of the 1954 Act,
permitting the Virgin Islands legislature to
vest in the courts of the Virgin Islands
established by local law jurisdiction over
all causes in the Virgin Islands over which
any court established by the Constitution and
the laws of the United States does not have
exclusive jurisdiction. Such jurisdiction
shall be subject to the concurrent
jurisdiction conferred on the District Court
of the Virgin Islands by section 1612(a)
[federal question and diversity jurisdiction]
and (c) [criminal jurisdiction] of this
title.
48 U.S.C. § 1611(b).
Thus, as pertaining to purely local matters, the 1984
amendment eliminated concurrent jurisdiction in the district
court if jurisdiction became vested in the local courts of the
Virgin Islands. See Estate Thomas Mall, Inc. v. Territorial
Court of the Virgin Islands, 923 F.2d 258, 260 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 808, 112 S. Ct. 50 (1991). Later, under
§1611(b), the Virgin Islands legislature amended 4 V.I. Code
§76(a) to vest original jurisdiction over all civil actions in
the territorial court as of October 1, 1991. The amended section
76(a) provides:
Subject to the original jurisdiction
conferred on the District Court by section 22
[48 U.S.C. § 1612] of the Revised Organic Act
of 1954, as amended, effective October 1,
1991, the Territorial Court shall have
original jurisdiction in all civil actions
regardless of the amount in controversy....
6
Accordingly, under § 1612(b), the district court was divested of
jurisdiction over local civil actions as of October 1, 1991.
Brow, 994 F.2d at 1034.
Although this divestiture is most directly applicable
where a party files a complaint directly in the district court,
as Rogers did, it also applies if a party files a writ of review
in the district court, as Moravian did. Section 1421 allows a
party to appeal an administrative determination to the district
court, which, under section 1423, has the power to "affirm,
modify, reverse, or annul the decision or determination
reviewed...." However, because the amended section 76(a) divests
the district court of jurisdiction over purely local matters, it
also implicitly repealed section 1421 as it pertains to local
matters. Thus, whether Moravian had filed a writ of review or a
complaint, would not change our analysis.
IV.
The Virgin Islands legislature derives its power to
legislate from the Revised Organic Act. Brow, 994 F.2d at 1035
n.6. The Act extends legislative power "to all rightful subjects
of legislation not inconsistent with this chapter or the laws of
the United States made applicable to the Virgin Islands...." 48
U.S.C. § 1574(a); see also 48 U.S.C. § 1574(c) (Virgin Islands
legislature may not amend or repeal local laws so as to be
inconsistent with Revised Organic Act or laws of the United
States applicable to Virgin Islands).
The Revised Organic Act of 1954 permitted the District
Court of the Virgin Islands to transfer any action or proceeding
7
brought in the district court to an inferior court established by
local law (i.e. the territorial court), as long as the action was
within the jurisdiction of the inferior court and the transfer
was made in the interest of justice. 1 V.I. Code, Historical
Documents, Revised Organic Act of 1954 § 23 ("Any action or
proceeding brought in the district court which is within the
jurisdiction of an inferior court may be transferred to such
inferior court by the district court in the interest of
justice."). Section 32(b) of the Virgin Islands Code, title 4,
was enacted pursuant to this section of the Revised Organic Act.
See 4 V.I. Code Ann. § 32 note (Revision Note) (1967) (sections
32(a) and (b) follow the language of §§ 22 and 23 of the Revised
Organic Act of 1954). That section provides:
Any action or proceeding brought in the
district court which is within the jurisdic-
tion of the territorial court may be
transferred by the district court in the
interest of justice to the territorial court
for the proper judicial division.
4 V.I. Code § 32(b). Similarly, section 77(b) of the Virgin
Islands Code states:
A judge of the district court may, in the
interest of justice, cause a case or cases
pending in the territorial court to be
transferred to the district court and may
transfer cases pending in the district court
to the territorial court provided that such
transferred case is within the jurisdictional
competence of [the] court to which the
transfer is made.
8
4 V.I. Code § 77(b). Although section 77(b) does not state its
origins, presumably, it was also enacted pursuant to § 23 of the
Revised Organic Act of 1954.
In the 1984 amendments to the Act, however, Congress
deleted the language in § 23 permitting the district court to
transfer actions to the inferior courts. 48 U.S.C. § 1613 (1984
amendment). Once that language was deleted, the Virgin Islands
legislature lacked the authority to grant the District Court of
the Virgin Islands the power to transfer actions to the
territorial court. Although Congress' intent in deleting the
transfer language is not manifest in the 1984 amendment, we may
infer that Congress deleted the transfer provision purposefully
with the intent to do away with such transfers.
Our disposition of the transfer issue, however, need
not turn on inferences alone. As amended, § 1613 now provides
for the relations between the District Court of the Virgin
Islands and the territorial court to parallel the relations
between the federal courts and the state courts. 48 U.S.C.
§1613. Congress, in turn, has defined the authority of the
federal courts to transfer a case as follows:
Whenever a civil action is filed in a court
as defined in section 610 of this title or an
appeal...and that court finds there is a want
of jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is in
the interest of justice, transfer such action
or appeal to any other such court, in which
the action or appeal could have been brought
at the time it was filed or noticed....
28 U.S.C. § 1631 (emphasis added). "Court" is defined in § 610
as
9
the courts of appeals and district courts of
the United States, the United States District
Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the
District Court of Guam, the District Court of
the Virgin Islands, the United States Court
of Federal Claims, and the Court of Interna-
tional Trade.
28 U.S.C. § 610.
Because §§ 1631 and 610 clearly demonstrate that
Congress intended to limit the authority of the federal courts to
transfer cases only to other federal courts, we have held that
§ 1631 provides no authority for a federal court to transfer a
case over which it lacks jurisdiction to a state court.
McLaughlin v. Arco Polymers, Inc., 721 F.2d 426, 429 (3d Ctiff
sued in federal district court, alleging, along with state law
claims, that the defendant had violated federal securities laws.
683 F.2d at 745. The district court granted summary judgment for
the defendant, finding no cause of actiobanc), a district court's
transfer of an action to a territorial court, where the district
court has no colorable basis for exercising subject matter
jurisdiction, is inconsistent with § 1631, made applicable to
U.S. territories by § 1613, and thus is outside of the inherent
authority of the district court.
Perhaps most significant to our disposition of these
cases, however, is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3),
which states that, "[w]henever it appears by suggestion of the
parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the
subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action." (Emphasis
added). In Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250,
10
254, 108 S. Ct. 2369, 2373 (1988), the Supreme Court held that a
federal court could not invoke its supervisory power "to
circumvent the harmless-error inquiry prescribed by Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 52(a)." The Court explained that Rule 52
is "as binding as any statute duly enacted by Congress and
federal courts have no more discretion to disregard the Rule's
mandate than they do to disregard constitutional or statutory
provisions." Id. at 255, 108 S. Ct. at 2373-74. Rule 12 (h)(3)
is equally as binding on us.
Neither Rogers nor Moravian disputes that the district
court lacked jurisdiction over their lawsuits. It is clear,
therefore, that the district court not only lacked express or
implied authority under federal law to transfer these cases to
the territorial court, but was expressly compelled by Rule
12(h)(3) to dismiss them. It is equally clear that no such
authority to transfer can be derived from the Virgin Islands
Code, inasmuch as the laws of the Virgin Islands must be
consistent with the laws of the United States. 48 U.S.C.
§1574(a). Accordingly, we conclude that the Virgin Islands
transfer provisions are invalid to the extent they purport to
allow a district court to transfer a case over which it lacks
jurisdiction to the territorial court.
The appellees counter that our decision in Weaver v.
Marine Bank, 683 F.2d 744 (3d Cir. 1982) allows the district
court to transfer a case over which it lacks subject matter
jurisdiction to a state or territorial court where a state or
territorial statute authorizes the transfer. The appellees'
11
reliance on Weaver is misplaced. In Weaver, the plaintiff sued
in federal district court, alleging, along with state law claims,
that the defendant had violated federal securities laws. 683
F.2d at 745. The district court granted summary judgment for the
defendant, finding no cause of action under those laws. We
reversed on appeal, and were in turn reversed by the Supreme
Court, which held that the district court's decision to grant
summary judgment was correct because the case did not involve a
"security" within the scope of federal law. Id.On remand, we noted that Pennsylvania authorized
transferring a case, improperly brought in federal court, to the
proper Pennsylvania court. Id. at 746. Nevertheless, we made
clear that the district court's power to transfer the case in
Weaver was not circumscribed by lack of subject matter
jurisdiction:
We recognize that such a transfer by a
district court is an exercise of a power
granted not by federal, but state, law.
Jurisdiction of a federal court is dependent
upon federal statutory authority, but that
principle does not control the issue here.
Unquestionably, at the time the suit was
filed in the district court, there was a
colorable federal claim and pendent
jurisdiction could properly be assumed. The
question presented then is, whether the
district court, once having acquired
jurisdiction, can transfer the matter to the
state court by virtue of a state enabling
statute. We are persuaded that it can.
Id. at 747 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Finding "no
equitable considerations which would bar transfer...," we
remanded the matter to the district court with directions to
12
transfer the pendent state claims to the state court. Id. at
748.
These cases present far different situations. Here,
the respective appellees never even purported to present a
colorable federal question or claim of diversity jurisdiction.
Rather, they failed to recognize that the Virgin Islands
legislature had divested the district court of jurisdiction over
purely local claims, and erroneously filed suit in the district
court alleging claims premised solely on local law. From the
outset, there never was a basis for federal jurisdiction.
We think the distinction is aptly noted in the
dubitante opinion in Weaver, which noted the difference between a
Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim. Id. at 749. "It is only if the former would have
succeeded that the district court lacks power to entertain the
pendent claim." Id. (Sloviter, J., dubitante opinion) (citing
Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S. Ct. 773, 776 (1946)
("Whether the complaint states cause of action on which relief
could be granted is a question of law and just as issues of fact
it must be decided after and not before the court has assumed
jurisdiction over the controversy.")); see also 5A Charles A.
Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1350,
at 77 (Supp. 1995).
Our decisions since Weaver have emphasized this
distinction. In McLaughlin, supra, the plaintiff sued in
district court, basing jurisdiction on diversity of citizenship.
13
721 F.2d at 427. The district court found that there was in fact
no diversity of citizenship but, nevertheless, purporting to
follow Weaver, transferred the case to Pennsylvania court
pursuant to the same Pennsylvania transfer statute at issue in
Weaver. Id. at 428.
On appeal, we emphasized that Weaver dealt with a
different situation -- one in which "we characterized the state
law claim as pendent to plaintiffs' colorable federal claim that
defendant had violated section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934...." Id. at 429. We noted that it was doubtful
whether the plaintiff in McLaughlin had presented a colorable
federal claim, and that "[t]here is a serious question whether
the Weaver precedent can be extended to authorize the district
court to transfer a state law claim in the absence of any
colorable federal claim to which it could have been pendent." Id.
at 430. However, we did not reach that question in McLaughlin
because, after the district court's transfer order, Pennsylvania
amended its transfer statute to permit the preservation of claims
filed in federal court, even without the transfer order. Id.
Nevertheless, McLaughlin makes clear that Weaver provided no
authority for the district court to transfer this case, nor could
it provide such authority, given the plain language of Rule
12(h)(3).
More recently, we addressed an analogous situation in
Bradgate Assocs. v. Fellows, Read & Assocs., Inc., 999 F.2d 745(3d Cir. 1993). Bradgate Associates brought a diversity suit in
district court and later removed a related state court case
14
between the same parties to the district court. Id. at 747. The
two cases were consolidated, but the district court concluded
that it lacked diversity jurisdiction and remanded the
consolidated case to state court. Id. On appeal, we held that
the district court erred by remanding to state court the portion
of the case that was originally filed in federal court, and
instead should have dismissed that part of the case. We
distinguished 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), which requires a district
court to remand a case over which it lacks jurisdiction to the
court from which it was removed:
Lack of subject matter jurisdiction does not
extinguish a removed state court case;
section 1447(c) only requires the district
court to remand it to state court. In
contrast, lack of subject matter jurisdiction
terminates a case originally filed in federal
court because Rule 12(h)(3) instructs the
district court to dismiss cases which do not
meet jurisdictional prerequisites. See
Weaver v. Marine Bank, 683 F.2d 751 (3d Cir.
1982) (Sloviter, J., dubitante opinion) ("I
need cite no authority for the proposition
that the power of the federal courts is
defined by Article III and the acts of
Congress made pursuant thereto. No federal
statute authorizes transfer of cases from a
federal to a state court.").
Id. at 751 (footnote omitted). We noted that Weaver dealt with
pendent state claims following a determination that federal
question jurisdiction was lacking. Id. at 751 n. 5. While we
also noted that, unlike in Weaver, there was no state transfer
statute at issue in Bradgate Associates, the plain language of
Rule 12(h)(3) makes clear that, where it appears at the outset
that the district court is without subject matter jurisdiction,
15
it is powerless to do anything but dismiss the action. Weaver is
consistent with this rule in that the district court there had
jurisdiction because the plaintiff had pleaded a colorable
federal claim. Weaver, 683 F.2d at 747; see also Bell, 327 U.S.
at 682, 66 S. Ct. at 776.0 There is no such claim in the present
case.
V.
We conclude that the district court erred by
transferring these cases to the territorial court. The district
court was compelled by Rule 12(h)(3) to dismiss both actions.
Accordingly, we will vacate the transfer orders and remand with
instructions to dismiss each cause0.
The Moravian School Advisory Board of St. Thomas, V.I. v.
Helen Rawlins; The Department of Labor, Government of The Virgin
Islands Department of Labor, Government of The Virgin Islands,
Appellant, No. 94-7359
0
In Brow, we upheld the District Court of the Virgin Islands'
order dismissing, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, an
action to enforce an order of the territorial court. In a
footnote, we stated that the district court could have elected to
transfer the case to the territorial court pursuant to the Virgin
Islands transfer provisions at issue here. 994 F.2d at 1037 n.
10. However, because this statement was dictum, we are not bound
by it, and decline to follow it inasmuch as it is in
contradiction with Rule 12(h)(3).
0
Without prejudging the matter, we note that Rogers, in
particular, may not be totally without remedy as she may have an
action against her attorney for malpractice. Her medical
malpractice action was filed in the district court on April 5,
1993, more than a year and a half after October 1, 1991, when the
local legislature vested jurisdiction over such matters in the
territorial court.
16
Jane Rogers, on behalf of herself; THE ESTATE OF INGRID CORENA
ROGERS; NIRONE PAVON FRANCIS, minor; LAUREL SIMONE FRANCIS, minor
v. GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS; ST. THOMAS HOSPITAL; ELENA
AGUAS, M.D., No. 94-7421
BECKER, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting.
The majority believes the district court's transfer of
Ms. Rogers' and Moravian's claims to the territorial court is
inappropriate for three reasons. I find its first two reasons
(centering on the change in language of 4 V.I. Code § 23 and on
an analysis of 28 U.S.C. § 1631 and 48 U.S.C. § 1613)
unpersuasive. I agree in principle with the third prong of the
majority's analysis (centering on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(h)(3)) but believe that it counsels remand of Moravian's case
for reevaluation of the jurisdictional issue. While Rule
12(h)(3) precludes transfer of Rogers' claim, this result so
troubles me that I am prompted to recommend to the Virgin Islands
Senate that it enact savings legislation that would, in the
future, save claims such as those of Rogers and Moravian from
extinction.
I.
Under the Revised Organic Act of 1954, the District
Court of the Virgin Islands was permitted to transfer any action
brought in the district court to the territorial court. 4 V.I.
Code, Historical Documents, Revised Organic Act of 1954 § 23. In
17
1984, as part of a comprehensive restructuring of Virgin Islands
jurisdiction, Congress amended § 23 by deleting the language that
authorized such transfers. See 48 U.S.C. § 1613, note (1984
Amendment). The majority infers that this deletion evinces
congressional intent to prohibit such transfers. I disagree.
Deciphering congressional silence is always a tricky business.
This is especially true when, as here, Congress authorizes a
total restructuring with sweeping legislation. In such
circumstances, no reasonable inference can be drawn from
Congress' deletion of any particular provision.
To further buttress its inferential argument that the
District Court of the Virgin Islands may not lawfully transfer a
case to the Territorial Court of the Virgin Islands, the majority
relies upon 28 U.S.C. § 1631 and 48 U.S.C. § 1613. According to
the majority, § 1613 "provides for the relations between the
District Court of the Virgin Islands and the territorial court to
parallel the relations between the federal courts and the state
courts."0 The majority further explains that § 1631 "limits the
authority of the federal courts to transfer cases only to other
0
That section reads:
The relations between the courts established by the
Constitution or laws of the United States and the
courts established by local law with respect to
appeals, certiorari, removal of causes, the issuance of
writs of habeas corpus, and other matters or
proceedings shall be governed by the laws of the United
States pertaining to the relations between the courts
of the United States, including the Supreme Court of
the United States, and the courts of the several States
in such matters and proceedings.
48 U.S.C. § 1613.
18
federal courts." (Emphasis added).0 Thus, federal courts may not
transfer cases to state courts and, via § 1613, the District
Court of the Virgin Islands may not transfer cases to the
Territorial Court of the Virgin Islands.
In my view, the majority has mischaracterized § 1631.
Section 1631 is an efficiency-oriented provision that governs
transfers of cases between federal courts. The problem with the
majority's analysis is that, as I document in footnote 3, the
federal transfer provision, § 1631, deals only with the relations
of different federal courts to each other.0 See also McLaughlin
0
The Section provides:
Whenever a civil action is filed in a court as defined
in section 610 of this title or an appeal . . . and
that court finds there is a want of jurisdiction, the
court shall, if it is in the interest of justice,
transfer such action or appeal to any other such court,
in which the action or appeal could have been brought
at the time it was filed or noticed.
28 U.S.C. § 1631 (emphasis added).
"Court" is defined in § 610 as, "the courts of appeals
and district courts of the United States, the United States
District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District
Court of Guam, the District Court of the Virgin Islands, the
United States Court of Federal Claims, and the Court of
International Trade." 28 U.S.C. § 610.
0
See S. Rep. No. 275, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1981), which
explains the purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 1631 as follows:
In recent years much confusion has been engendered
by provisions of existing law that leave unclear which
of two or more federal courts including courts at both
the trial and appellate level--have subject matter
jurisdiction over certain categories of civil actions.
The problem has been particularly acute in the area of
administrative law where misfilings and dual filings
have become commonplace. The uncertainty in some
statutes regarding which court has review authority
19
v. Arco Polymers, Inc., 721 F.2d 426, 429 (3d Cir. 1983). This
has two implications. First, § 1631's failure to authorize
transfers to state courts cannot fairly be read to proscribe such
transfers. Second, § 1631 does not pertain to "relations
between" federal and state courts and thus does not, via § 1613,
affect the relations between the district and territorial courts
of the Virgin Islands.
Thus, the only legal impediment to transferring cases
to the territorial court is Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(h)(3). This rule states that, "[w]henever it appears by
suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks
jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the
action." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (Emphasis added). Consistent
with principles announced by this court in Weaver v. Marine Bank,
683 F.2d 744 (3d Cir. 1982), and McLaughlin v. Arco Polymers,
Inc., 721 F.2d 426 (3d Cir. 1983), the majority interprets Rule
creates an unnecessary risk that a litigant may find
himself without a remedy because of a lawyer's error or
a technicality of procedures.
At present, the litigant's main protective device,
absent an adequate transfer statute is the wasteful and
costly one of filing in two or more courts at the same
time. This puts increased burdens on the courts as
well as on the parties.
Although most problems in this regard relate to
controversies involving the district courts and the
court of appeals, there also have been cases involving
the Court of International Trade, and the Temporary
Emergency Court of Appeals. Therefore, the language of
Part A of Title III [§ 1631] is broadly drafted to
permit transfer between any two federal courts.
Thus, this statute was written to cover federal transfers. It
has nothing to say on the issue of transfers between federal and
state courts.
20
12(h)(3) to bar transfer of an action when the court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction. I agree. With this in mind, the
majority correctly concludes that Ms. Rogers' case should be
remanded with instructions to dismiss.
Contrary to the majority's suggestion, however,
Moravian's case cannot be disposed of similarly. In her
complaint filed with the Virgin Islands Department of Labor, Ms.
Rawlins may have alleged a colorable federal claim of age and
national origin discrimination. She averred, inter alia, that:
The employment practices at Memorial
Moravian School, as well as its forms and
conditions of employment have a disparate
impact on persons who are of different
national origin and are in the protected age
group. For example:
[A]. The majority of the faculty members are
not in the protected age group. B. Rev.
Peters favors recruiting persons who are from
the former British Colonies of the West
Indies, as he is. I am a native Virgin
Islander. C. Persons who have been absent
from work due to sickness or any other leave
of absences did not have their employment
affected as mine was. D. The person who
replaced me (Mrs. Ham) is not in the
protected age group, and is from one of the
former British Colonies of the West Indies."
(Complaint In Re Helen Rawlins, WD-005-90-STT
- pages 1-3).
21
If Ms. Rawlins' originally alleged federal claims, such claims
might provide an adequate basis for supplemental jurisdiction
over her state law claims, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367, and thereby
support Moravian's contention that the district court has the
power to transfer. I would remand to the district court for
determination of what claims Ms. Rawlins asserted and whether
they support supplemental jurisdiction. If the court concludes
that it has supplemental jurisdiction over Ms. Rawlins' state law
claims, it should transfer them pursuant to 4 V.I. Code §§ 32(b),
77(b).0 If not, it should dismiss them.
II.
0
Section 32(b) provides:
Any action or proceeding brought in the district court
which is within the jurisdiction of the territorial
court may be transferred by the district court in the
interest of justice to the territorial court for the
proper division.
4 V.I. Code § 32(b).
Section 77(b) provides:
A judge of the district court may, in the interest of
justice, cause a case or cases pending in the
territorial court to be transferred to the district
court and may transfer cases pending in the district
court to the territorial court provided that such
transferred case is within the jurisdictional
competence of [the] court to which the transfer is
made.
4 V.I. Code § 77(b).
22
While I must agree with the majority's conclusion as to
Ms. Rogers' claim, I am nonetheless troubled by it. In 1984,
Congress set in motion a restructuring of the entire Virgin
Islands' judicial system. This restructuring divested the
District Court of the Virgin Islands of its purely local
jurisdiction and transferred it to the Territorial Court of the
Virgin Islands. See generally Brow v. Farrelly, 994 F.2d 1027,
1034 (3d Cir. 1993). Congress must have known that significant
confusion including cases being filed in the wrong court would
result during this restructuring.0 Allowing numerous actions to
lapse due to statutory confusion seems improvident, and this
rings especially true in the Virgin Islands. Deeply ingrained
into the Virgin Islands legal culture is a policy of eschewing
technical niceties in favor of hearing cases on the merits and
effecting substantial justice.
In Ms. Rogers' case, the plaintiff's serious medical
malpractice claim was filed in a timely manner, but the statute
of limitations has now expired. Given Rule 12(h)(3), this
improperly filed claim cannot be transferred to the appropriate
court. The availability of a malpractice suit against a lawyer
who may have various defenses or be uninsured and impecunious
provides scant relief. To avoid this unduly harsh result, I urge
the Virgin Islands Legislature to enact a savings statute, like
the one in Pennsylvania, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5103(b)
0
For example, on February 3, 1993, Chief Judge Moore found it
necessary to issue a memorandum of the entire Virgin Islands Bar
on where writs of review should be filed.
23
(1995), which would allow preservation of claims filed in federal
court without the necessity of a transfer order. Such a statute
would permit litigants to refile cases dismissed by a district
court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in a state court
simply by filing a certified transcript of the district court
proceedings with the appropriate state authority. To eliminate
any time limitation problems, the savings statute would allow
litigants to use the date the federal suit was instituted as the
filing date for the state law claim.0 In this manner, a savings
statute would facilitate the efficient dispensation of justice
throughout the Virgin Islands.
0
See McLaughlin v. Arco Polymers, Inc., 721 F.2d 426, 430-431 (3d
Cir. 1983), for a further description of the Pennsylvania savings
statute.
24