Deborah Redman v. United States ( 2023 )

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 23-1871
__________
DEBORAH A. REDMAN,
Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; COMM’R CHARLES RETTIG;
MARJORIE GALLAGHER; LUCINDA COMEGYS; STEVEN MNUCHIN;
JANET YELLEN
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-21-cv-00124)
District Judge: Honorable Cathy Bissoon
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
November 1, 2023
Before: SHWARTZ, RESTREPO, and FREEMAN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: December 8, 2023)
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OPINION*
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PER CURIAM
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
Pro se Appellant Deborah Redman appeals from the District Court’s text-only
order dismissing her case and its order denying her motion pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 60(b) to reopen the case. For the following reasons, we will affirm both
orders.
In 2021, Redman filed a complaint in the District Court against the United States
(“specifically, the [Internal Revenue Service (IRS)]”), the IRS Commissioner, and a
former and then-current Treasury Secretary, among others. ECF No. 14 at 1. She sought
“compensation for overpaid federal income taxes for tax years 2015 and 2016 and for the
cost for wrangling with the [IRS]” for her returns. Id. at 2. Redman alleged that the IRS
owed her $15,000, in addition to “the associated income for over 1.5 years” that she
“forfeit[ed]” while responding to the IRS. Id. at 4. She sought $3.5 million in
compensatory damages.
On March 21, 2023, shortly after the defendants were properly served, the
presiding judge recused from the case because Redman had filed “an accusation of
slander” against her, and the matter was reassigned to District Judge Cathy Bissoon. See
ECF No. 59. That same day, Redman filed a “Motion to Move Case to the Court of
Public Opinion,” which the District Court denied, stating that the relief sought was “not
recognized in the law.” ECF Nos. 61 & 63. Redman filed a “Motion for Clarification,”
disputing the denial of her motion and demanding that the IRS be directed to pay her
$250,000 “immediately” as “partial compensation” to allow her to “pay off much of her
debts” while the litigation was pending. ECF No. 65 at 7. In a text-only order, the
District Court denied the request as “inconsistent with the law.” ECF No. 66. In a
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response filed challenging the “unsound reasoning” of that order, Redman asserted that
“as a result of the destitution that the IRS and Court prefer to ignore, this is likely
Redman’s last filing. She does not have means to continue . . . Plaintiff can no longer
tend to this matter due to destitution.” ECF No. 67 at 5-6.
A week later, on April 19, 2023, Redman filed a “Notice of Inability to Continue
to Participate in Any Way in This Proceeding” (“the Notice”), stating only that she could
not continue with the litigation “[d]ue to the Court’s and Defendant IRS’s actions.” ECF
No. 69. The District Court construed the document as a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i). See 4/19/23 Docket Entry.
Noting that defendants had neither answered the complaint nor filed a motion for
summary judgment, the District Court indicated that the Notice was effective upon filing
and that no court order was required.1 See id. The text-only entry stated that the case
was dismissed and marked closed. Id.
Four days later, on April 24, 2023, Redman filed a “Notice to Reopen Case and
Assign to Neutral Judge,” ECF No. 71, which the District Court construed as a motion to
reopen and denied. See ECF No. 72. It also denied the request for recusal as moot.
1
Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) provides, in pertinent part, that a plaintiff “may dismiss an action
without a court order by filing: (i) a notice of dismissal before the opposing party serves
either an answer or a motion for summary judgment.”
3
Redman appealed.2
The District Court properly construed the Notice as a Rule 41(a)(1) voluntary
dismissal. The filing stated only that Redman was giving “notice that she can no longer
continue to participate in any way in this proceeding.” Redman maintains on appeal that
the Notice “should read” that she was unable to participate “in Any Meaningful Way” in
her case. Reply Br. at 13. But it did not read as such, and although the District Court
was required to construe Redman’s pleading liberally, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519, 520-21 (1972) (per curiam), it was not required to fill in the blanks for her. Redman
had indicated that her filing prior to the Notice was likely her “last.” See ECF No. 67.
When she filed the Notice a week later plainly indicating that she did not intend to
continue with the matter, the District Court properly deemed it a voluntary dismissal. See
generally Anago Franchising, Inc. v. Shaz, LLC, 677 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2012)
(explaining that, in determining whether party intended to voluntarily dismiss action, “the
best indication of [a party’s] intent is the document itself”).
The District Court determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant the
motion to reopen, citing In re Bath & Kitchen Fixtures Antitrust Litig., 535 F.3d 161, 166
2
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The notice of appeal designates
both the order denying the Rule 60(b) motion and the text-only order dismissing the case,
and was timely as to both orders. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B). Although the
voluntary dismissal was without prejudice, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(B), it is final for
purposes of § 1291 because it appears that the statute of limitations has run on Redman’s
claims. See Fassett v. Delta Kappa Epsilon (New York), 807 F.2d 1150, 1155 (3d Cir.
1986).
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(3d Cir. 2008). But in that case, we held that a district court lacks authority to deny a
notice of voluntary dismissal and then adjudicate the merits of the dismissed claim. See
id. (noting that “[a] timely notice of voluntary dismissal invites no response from
the district court and permits no interference by it”). Where, as here, a notice of
voluntary dismissal has taken effect, the district court retains the authority to exercise its
discretion to reinstate the voluntarily dismissed complaint under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 60(b). See Williams v. Frey, 551 F.2d 932, 934-35 (3d Cir. 1977), abrogated
in part on other grounds by Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312 (1988); see
also Yesh Music v. Lakewood Church, 727 F.3d 356, 359-63 (5th Cir. 2013) (collecting
cases, including Williams); see also Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 901
F.2d 311, 320 (3d Cir. 1990) (recognizing that “[a]ny time a district [court] enters a
judgment, even one dismissing a case by stipulation of the parties, [it] retains, by virtue
of Rule 60(b), jurisdiction to entertain a later motion to vacate the judgment on the
grounds specified in the rule” (citation omitted)).
Where a district court fails to recognize its authority to act, we ordinarily remand
the matter for it to consider the merits in the first instance. See Lasky v. Cont’l Prod.
Corp., 804 F.2d 250, 255 (3d Cir. 1986). However, we may affirm on any basis
supported by the record, see Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per
curiam), and will do so here because the District Court’s order makes clear that there was
no basis for Rule 60(b) relief, see generally Lasky, 804 F.2d at 255 (declining to remand
and “address[ing] the discretionary aspects of Rule 60(b)” where the district court’s order
indicated that, even if it had jurisdiction, it would nevertheless deny relief).
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Rule 60(b) provides for relief from a final judgment, order, or proceeding on
various grounds. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1)-(6). In her motion to reopen, Redman did
not invoke a specific ground for relief under Rule 60(b); she argued that the District
Court “unjustifiably construed” the Notice as a Rule 41(a) motion. ECF No. 71 at 1.
Even construed liberally, the only bases the motion arguably states for reopening concern
“mistake,” pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1), or “extraordinary circumstances,” pursuant to Rule
60(b)(6).
As the District Court noted, it was “clear and unambiguous” from the Notice that
Redmond did not intend to pursue the litigation further. The District Court therefore saw
no “mistake” in its treatment of the Notice as a Rule 41(a) motion, nor, as previously
discussed, do we. There is also nothing in the motion to reopen to warrant Rule 60(b)(6)
relief. Even had the motion to reopen stated Redman’s regret for failing to state that she
could not participate in the case in any “meaningful way,” it would still fail to
demonstrate the kind of extraordinary circumstances necessary to justify vacating the
dismissal order. See Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 255 (3d Cir. 2008)
(noting that “extraordinary circumstances rarely exist when a party seeks relief from a
judgment that resulted from the party’s deliberate choices”); see also Coltec Indus., Inc.
v. Hobgood, 280 F.3d 262, 273 & n.15 (3d Cir. 2002) (explaining that Rule 60(b)(6) does
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not provide a means “to escape the effects of a bargain [the movant] regretted in
hindsight”).3
Based on the foregoing, we will affirm the District Court’s orders.4
3
The District Court denied Redman’s request to reassign the case to a “neutral judge” as
moot. On appeal, she presses her arguments of judicial bias. We note our agreement
with the District Court that there was no basis to support the District Judge’s recusal. See
Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (noting that “judicial rulings alone
almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion”).
4
Appellant’s motion for default judgment is denied.
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