Venus Springs v. Ally Financial Incorporated , 684 F. App'x 336 ( 2017 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-2146
VENUS YVETTE SPRINGS, a/k/a Yvette Springs,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
ALLY FINANCIAL INCORPORATED, f/k/a GMAC Incorporated; AMY
BOUQUE,
Defendants – Appellees,
and
KATHLEEN PATTERSON; YEQUIANG HE, a/k/a Bill He; CYNTHIA
DAUTRICH,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Max O. Cogburn, Jr.,
District Judge. (3:10-cv-00311-MOC-DCK)
Submitted: March 28, 2017 Decided: April 10, 2017
Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Herman Kaufman, HERMAN KAUFMAN, ESQ., Old Greenwich,
Connecticut; Venus Yvette Springs, SPRINGS LAW FIRM PLLC,
Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Kirk G. Warner,
Clifton L. Brinson, SMITH, ANDERSON, BLOUNT, DORSETT, MITCHELL &
JERNIGAN, LLP, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Venus Yvette Springs appeals the district court’s order
adopting the magistrate judge’s order granting Ally Financial
Incorporated (“Ally”) and Amy Bouque’s (collectively, Appellees)
motion for a protective order.* Finding no reversible error, we
affirm.
Springs first contends that the district court violated
this Court’s mandate by modifying a protective order and that
the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to enter a
postjudgment protective order, even though we previously ruled
that it had such jurisdiction. “We review de novo the district
court’s interpretation of the mandate.” United States v.
Pileggi, 703 F.3d 675, 679 (4th Cir. 2013). The mandate rule
“forecloses relitigation of issues expressly or impliedly
decided by the appellate court,” as well as “issues decided by
the district court but foregone on appeal or otherwise waived.”
United States v. Susi, 674 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 2012).
Moreover, “any issue that could have been but was not raised on
appeal is waived and thus not remanded.” Doe v. Chao, 511 F.3d
461, 465 (4th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). We
*This case has been before us on two prior occasions,
Springs v. Ally Fin., Inc., 475 F. App’x 900 (4th Cir. 2012)
(No. 12-1258), and Springs v. Ally Fin., Inc., 657 F. App’x 148
(4th Cir. 2016) (Nos. 15-1244, 15-1888).
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conclude that the district court faithfully carried out our
mandates.
Next, Springs contends that Appellees’ motion was not
timely filed. Rule 26(c), Fed. R. Civ. P., authorizes the
district court to issue protective orders, but does not contain
a timeframe in which a party must seek such an order. However,
“courts regularly have grafted reasonable time requirements onto
otherwise silent federal procedural rules in both the criminal
and civil contexts.” Resolution Tr. Corp. v. N. Bridge Assocs.,
Inc., 22 F.3d 1198, 1204 (1st Cir. 1994) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Here, Appellees first sought to resolve this
dispute without seeking judicial intervention, as required by
Rule 26(c). We further conclude that Appellees filed their
motion within a reasonable time.
Finally, Springs contends that good cause does not support
the protective order and that it violates her First Amendment
rights. We review a “district court’s entry of a protective
order . . . for abuse of discretion.” Fonner v. Fairfax Cty.,
415 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2005). “The district court abuses
its discretion if its conclusion is guided by erroneous legal
principles or rests upon a clearly erroneous factual finding.”
Belk, Inc. v. Meyer Corp., U.S., 679 F.3d 146, 161 (4th Cir.
2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The Supreme Court has held that “where . . . a protective
order is entered on a showing of good cause as required by Rule
26(c), is limited to the context of pretrial civil discovery,
and does not restrict the dissemination of the information if
gained from other sources, it does not offend the First
Amendment.” Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 37
(1984). Springs correctly notes that the video deposition at
issue in the protective order was not just pretrial civil
discovery, but was attached to her opposition to Ally’s motion
for summary judgment. We have “held that the First Amendment
right of access [to judicial documents] attaches to materials
filed in connection with a summary judgment motion.” Doe v.
Pub. Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 267 (4th Cir. 2014). Thus, we
conclude that the district court should have conducted an
explicit First Amendment analysis.
However, “we may affirm a district court’s ruling on any
ground apparent in the record.” United States ex rel. Drakeford
v. Tuomey, 792 F.3d 364, 375 (4th Cir. 2015). In the sealing
context, the First Amendment limits restricting access to court
documents to restrictions “necessitated by a compelling
government interest” and that are “narrowly tailored to serve
that interest.” Doe, 749 F.3d at 266 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Applying this framework to the protective order at
issue, we readily conclude that the district court’s order does
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not unduly infringe on Springs’ First Amendment rights. The
district court has a compelling interest in preventing litigants
like Springs from using discovery to mock and harass a private
party on the Internet. See Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 34 (“Rule
26(c) furthers a substantial governmental interest unrelated to
the suppression of expression.”). Moreover, the district
court’s order is narrowly tailored to support that interest,
only preventing Springs from using the video and audio
recordings to distribute her message.
Finally, we conclude that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in concluding that good cause supports issuing
the protective order. “Broad allegations of harm,
unsubstantiated by specific examples or articulated reasoning,
do not satisfy” Rule 26(c). Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc.,
785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3d Cir. 1986). However, Springs accused
Bouque of perjury, which amounts to defamation per se under
North Carolina law. See Gudger v. Penland, 13 S.E. 168, 170
(N.C. 1891).
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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