Leslie Patterson v. Denise Lawhorn , 685 F. App'x 258 ( 2017 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-1936
LESLIE PATTERSON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
DENISE LAWHORN,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema,
District Judge. (1:15-cv-00477-LMB-JFA)
Submitted: March 29, 2017 Decided: April 21, 2017
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and KEENAN and WYNN, Circuit
Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James J. O’Keeffe, IV, JOHNSON, ROSEN & O’KEEFFE, LLC, Roanoke,
Virginia, for Appellant. Mark R. Herring, Attorney General of
Virginia, Rhodes B. Ritenour, Deputy Attorney General, Nicholas
F. Simopoulos, Senior Assistant Attorney General, John G. Butler
III, Assistant Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Leslie Patterson appeals the district court’s grant of
summary judgment to a former criminal investigator for the
Virginia Department of Taxation, Denise Lawhorn. Lawhorn swore
out six felony complaints and seven misdemeanor complaints
against Patterson for violating Virginia Code provisions. The
felony complaints alleged that Patterson underreported his
income on his 2007 through 2010 tax returns and took credit for
2007 and 2008 employee withholding taxes that he did not pay to
the Commonwealth of Virginia. The misdemeanor complaints
alleged that Patterson, as president of his church, failed to
pay the church’s 2009 and 2010 quarterly withholding taxes. The
Commonwealth later entered orders of nolle prosequi for all 13
complaints. Patterson then sued Lawhorn for malicious
prosecution under Virginia law and for a violation of the Fourth
Amendment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). The district court
granted summary judgment to Lawhorn on both grounds, and
Patterson appealed.
We review a district court’s award of summary judgment de
novo, viewing the facts and inferences reasonably drawn from
those facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Core
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Verizon Md. LLC, 744 F.3d 310, 320 (4th Cir.
2014). Summary judgment is only appropriate when no genuine
dispute of material fact remains and the record shows that the
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movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a).
We begin with the malicious prosecution claim. Where, as
here, such a claim arises from criminal proceedings, Virginia
law generally disfavors it. Reilly v. Shepherd, 643 S.E.2d 216,
218 (Va. 2007). To prove malicious prosecution, a plaintiff
must show that the prosecutor: (1) lacked probable cause, (2)
possessed malice, (3) caused the case to be brought against the
plaintiff or cooperated in that effort, and (4) terminated the
prosecution in a manner favorable to the plaintiff. Id.
We conclude that the district court properly granted
summary judgment to Lawhorn on this claim because Patterson has
failed to show Lawhorn lacked probable cause for either the
felony or misdemeanor complaints. In this context, probable
cause means that the prosecutor had “knowledge of such a state
of facts and circumstances as excite the belief in a reasonable
mind, acting on such facts and circumstances, that the plaintiff
[wa]s guilty of the crime of which he [wa]s suspected.” See id.
at 219 (internal quotation marks omitted). Based on
conversations with church personnel and a review of Patterson’s
accounts, Lawhorn had probable cause for all the complaints.
Contrary to Patterson’s argument on appeal, Lawhorn did not need
to consider Patterson’s innocent explanations for his tax
discrepancies because any such self-serving statements could be
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disbelieved when compared to contrary documentary evidence.
Because Patterson has not met his burden to show that Lawhorn
lacked probable cause, his malicious prosecution claim must
fail.
For the same reason, Patterson’s § 1983 claim also fails.
Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to prove a person, acting
under color of state law, deprived the plaintiff of a
constitutional right. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Patterson alleges that
Lawhorn deprived him of his rights under the Fourth Amendment,
which requires warrants to be based on probable cause and for
seizures to be reasonable. U.S. Const., amend. IV. As
described above, the record shows that Lawhorn had probable
cause, meaning that she had “enough evidence to warrant the
belief of a reasonable [prosecutor] that an offense has been or
is being committed.” Brown v. Gilmore, 278 F.3d 362, 367-68
(2002). Because the record supports a finding of probable cause
regardless of any deficiencies in the information set forth in
the warrants, the district court properly granted summary
judgment to Lawhorn on the § 1983 claim.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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