United States v. Arniel Carlton ( 2017 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-4516
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ARNIEL LAMONT CARLTON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Newport News. Arenda L. Wright Allen,
District Judge. (4:15-cr-00031-AWA-DEM-1)
Submitted: March 21, 2017 Decided: March 29, 2017
Before WILKINSON and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON,
Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Scott W. Putney, SCOTT W. PUTNEY, P.C., Norfolk, Virginia, for
Appellant. Dana J. Boente, United States Attorney, Amy E.
Cross, Assistant United States Attorney, Newport News, Virginia,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Arniel Lamont Carlton was sentenced to 48 months’
imprisonment upon entering a conditional guilty plea to being a
felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1) (2012). Carlton reserved the right to appeal the
district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence
obtained in a warrantless entry into and search of his home by
police and Carlton’s subsequent statements. On appeal, Carlton
contends that police lacked probable cause, that exigent
circumstances did not justify the warrantless entry and search,
and that any statements attributable to him were tainted by the
initial search. We affirm.
When considering the denial of a motion to suppress, “[w]e
review de novo a district court’s rulings with respect to
reasonable suspicion and probable cause.” United States v.
Palmer, 820 F.3d 640, 648 (4th Cir. 2016). “Absent clear error,
we will not disturb factual findings made by a district court
after an evidentiary hearing on suppression issues.” Id.
Because the Government prevailed on the suppression issue below,
“we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
government.” Id.
“Searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are
presumptively unreasonable.” Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452,
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459 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). But exigent
circumstances may justify warrantless entry. Id. at 460. To
rely on exigent circumstances, police “need only possess a
reasonable suspicion that such circumstances exist at the time
of the search or seizure in question.” Figg v. Schroeder, 312
F.3d 625, 639 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “[C]ourts should not engage in unreasonable second-
guessing of the officers’ assessment of the circumstances that
they faced.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Exigencies that may justify a warrantless entry or
protective sweep include concern for officer safety and the need
to preserve evidence. Id. “With respect to officer
safety, . . . the protection of police officers is of particular
concern in cases” involving firearms and drugs. United
States v. Watson, 703 F.3d 684, 693 (4th Cir. 2013). “[P]olice
officers need to be assured that the persons with whom they are
dealing are not armed with, or able to gain immediate control
of, a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against
[them].” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). With respect
to evidence preservation, officers may enter without a warrant
where they “reasonably believe that evidence may be destroyed or
removed before they could obtain a warrant.” United States v.
Moses, 540 F.3d 263, 270 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation
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marks omitted). In determining whether exigent circumstances
exist, a court should consider:
(1) the degree of urgency involved and the amount of
time necessary to obtain a warrant; (2) the officers’
reasonable belief that the contraband is about to be
removed or destroyed; (3) the possibility of danger to
police guarding the site; (4) information indicating
the possessors of the contraband are aware that the
police are on their trail; and (5) the ready
destructibility of the contraband.
United States v. Yengel, 711 F.3d 392, 397 (4th Cir. 2013)
(internal quotation marks omitted). The inquiry focuses on the
officers’ reasonable belief rather than “concrete proof” of the
exigency. Moses, 540 F.3d at 270 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Here, the officers had probable cause at the time of their
entry into Carlton’s home. Although the underlying offense of
brandishing a firearm is a misdemeanor under Virginia law, Va.
Code Ann. § 18.2-282 (2014), the circumstances here involved
“violence or threats of it,” Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 744,
751 (1984).
We conclude that Carlton has shown no error in the district
court’s ruling that exigent circumstances justified the
officers’ warrantless entry into Carlton’s home, subsequent
protective sweep, and seizure of the shotgun. The officers’
concerns for safety and evidence preservation were objectively
reasonable under the circumstances. See Moses, 540 F.3d at 270.
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Consideration of the Yengel factors confirms the existence of
exigent circumstances. See Yengel, 711 F.3d at 397.
Additionally, contrary to Carlton’s argument, the record reveals
that the exigencies were not officer-created. See King, 563
U.S. at 461 (precluding reliance on exigent circumstances
exception where officers manufactured exigency). The officers
did not engage or threaten to engage in conduct violative of the
Fourth Amendment, id. at 462, and “[f]aulting the police for
failing to apply for a search warrant at the earliest possible
time after obtaining probable cause imposes a duty that is
nowhere to be found in the Constitution,” id. at 467. Moreover,
the officers took only a quick look around Carlton’s home to
verify that no one else was present, a reasonable, limited
intrusion for officer safety purposes that did not offend the
Fourth Amendment. See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 336-37
(1990); Watson, 703 F.3d at 693.
Absent a Fourth Amendment violation, any statements
attributable to Carlton were not “fruit of the poisonous tree.”
Moreover, Carlton admitted that he was apprised of his Miranda
rights before he made the inculpatory statements, and that he
understood those rights. Therefore, we conclude denial of
Carlton’s suppression motion was proper in all regards.
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Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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