United States v. Mario Holifield , 683 F. App'x 256 ( 2017 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-4018
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MARIO ANTWAINE HOLIFIELD,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Big Stone Gap. James P. Jones,
District Judge. (2:15-cr-00009-JPJ-PMS-1)
Submitted: March 30, 2017 Decided: April 3, 2017
Before TRAXLER and WYNN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Larry W. Shelton, Federal Public Defender, Nancy C. Dickenson,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Abingdon, Virginia, for
Appellant. John P. Fishwick, Jr., United States Attorney, Jean
B. Hudson, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlottesville,
Virginia, Debbie H. Stevens, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Beaver, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Mario Antwaine Holifield appeals his 188-month sentence
imposed following his guilty plea to four controlled substance
offenses. Holifield challenges his designation as a career
offender under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1 (2014).
The Government seeks to invoke Holifield’s appellate waiver if
we conclude that Holifield’s prior manslaughter convictions
remain career offender predicates.
Holifield has two prior convictions for manslaughter, in
violation of Alabama law. The Alabama manslaughter statute,
Ala. Code § 13A-6-3, corresponds to the generic definition of
manslaughter in USSG § 4B1.2 cmt. n.1. United States v.
Peterson, 629 F.3d 432, 436–37 (4th Cir. 2011). Holifield’s
argument that his prior manslaughter convictions are not
predicate crimes is foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s recent
holding that the Sentencing Guidelines “are not subject to
vagueness challenges under the Due Process Clause.” Beckles v.
United States, ___ S. Ct. ___, No. 15-8544, 2017 WL 855781, at
*3 (U.S. Mar. 6, 2017). Holifield does not dispute that his
appellate waiver was knowing and voluntary, and his sentencing
challenge falls squarely within the scope of the waiver.
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
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presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED
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