United States v. Stacy Delk , 588 F. App'x 236 ( 2014 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4557
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
STACY DUNCAN DELK,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Aiken. Margaret B. Seymour, Senior District
Judge. (1:09-cr-01022-MBS-1)
Submitted: December 16, 2014 Decided: December 18, 2014
Before WILKINSON and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James P. Rogers, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellant. John C. Potterfield, Assistant
United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Stacy Duncan Delk appeals the sentence of three months
of imprisonment followed by twelve months of supervised release
imposed by the district court upon revocation of his probation.
On appeal, counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no
meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning whether Delk’s
sentence is plainly unreasonable. Delk was advised of his right
to file a pro se supplemental brief, but has not filed a brief.
Finding no error, we affirm.
Upon a finding of a probation violation, the district
court may revoke probation and resentence the defendant to any
sentence within the statutory maximum for the original offense.
18 U.S.C. § 3565(a) (2012); United States v. Schaefer, 120 F.3d
505, 507 (4th Cir. 1997). The district court has broad
discretion to impose a sentence after revoking a defendant’s
probation. See United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439 (4th
Cir. 2006). Thus, we assume “a deferential appellate posture
concerning issues of fact and the exercise of [that]
discretion.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
“We review probation revocation sentences, like
supervised release revocation sentences, to determine if they
are plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d
652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007). In conducting our review, “we first
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decide whether the sentence is unreasonable.” Crudup, 461 F.3d
at 438. In doing so, “we follow generally the procedural and
substantive considerations” employed in reviewing original
sentences. Id.
A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if
the district court has considered the policy statements
contained in Chapter 7 of the Sentencing Guidelines and the
applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors, id. at 439, and
has adequately explained the chosen sentence. United States v.
Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). A sentence is
substantively reasonable if the court states a proper basis for
concluding that the defendant should receive the sentence
imposed, up to the applicable statutory maximum. Crudup, 461
F.3d at 440. Only if we find a sentence to be procedurally or
substantively unreasonable will we consider whether the sentence
is “plainly” unreasonable. Id. at 439.
Applying our deferential standard of review, we
conclude that Delk’s sentence is not unreasonable, much less
plainly so. Given the facts of this case, we conclude that the
district court did not abuse its broad discretion in sentencing
Delk.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We
therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
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requires that counsel inform Delk, in writing, of his right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Delk requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
believes that such a petition would be frivolous, counsel may
move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation.
Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on
Delk. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal conclusions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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