United States v. Veronica Jones , 588 F. App'x 254 ( 2014 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4492
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
VERONICA LEVONNE JONES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,
Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:13-cr-00451-WO-1)
Submitted: December 16, 2014 Decided: December 19, 2014
Before WILKINSON, SHEDD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, Mireille P. Clough,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Winston-Salem, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Stephen Thomas Inman, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Veronica Levonne Jones appeals from her conviction and
thirty-nine month sentence imposed pursuant to her guilty plea
to filing false tax returns and aggravated identity theft. On
appeal, counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), averring that there are no
meritorious issues for appeal but questioning whether Jones’
sentence was greater than necessary to meet the goals of
sentencing. The Government has declined to file a brief.
Although informed of her right to do so, Jones has declined to
file a pro se supplemental brief. We affirm.
Jones contends that her fifteen-month sentence for
filing false tax returns is substantively unreasonable because
it is greater than necessary to accomplish the goals of 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012). She avers that, given the mandatory
two-year, consecutive sentence on the identity theft charges and
her mitigating circumstances, the sentence was too harsh. We
review a sentence for reasonableness, applying “a deferential
abuse of discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 41 (2007). We examine the substantive reasonableness of the
sentence under “the totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 51.
A sentence “within or below a properly calculated
Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable [on appeal].”
United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir.), cert.
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denied, 135 S. Ct. 421 (2014). The defendant bears the burden
to rebut this presumption “by showing that the sentence is
unreasonable when measured against the . . . § 3553(a) factors.”
Id. In evaluating the sentence for an abuse of discretion, this
court “give[s] due deference to the [d]istrict [c]ourt’s
reasoned and reasonable decision that the § 3553(a) factors, on
the whole, justified the sentence.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 59-60.
Considering the totality of the circumstances, we
conclude that Jones cannot rebut the presumption of substantive
reasonableness accorded to her within-Guidelines sentence. To
the extent Jones attacks the district court’s failure to give
more weight to her mitigating circumstances, the court
considered Jones’ lengthy oral argument requesting a 12-15 month
sentence and noted the mitigating concerns, but declined to vary
her sentence after weighing all the factors in the case. The
court found that the totality of the circumstances warranted the
most lenient sentence within the Guidelines range but did not
warrant a variance. Given the district court’s consideration of
the relevant § 3553(a) factors and the fact that the imposed
sentence fell within Jones’ requested range, the court’s
decision was not an abuse of discretion.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case for meritorious issues and have found none.
Accordingly, we affirm Jones’ convictions and sentence. This
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court requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of
her right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If the client requests that a petition be
filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be
frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to
withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that
a copy thereof was served on the client. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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