United States v. Leland Edwards , 588 F. App'x 268 ( 2014 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4402
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
LELAND KEITH EDWARDS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,
Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:13-cr-00375-WO-1)
Submitted: December 9, 2014 Decided: December 19, 2014
Before WILKINSON and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, Greg Davis, Assistant
Federal Public Defender, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney, Anand P.
Ramaswamy, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Leland Keith Edwards pled guilty in accordance with a
written plea agreement to failure to register as a sex offender,
18 U.S.C. § 2250 (2012). He was sentenced to twenty-four months
in prison. Edwards appeals, claiming that his sentence is
substantively unreasonable. We affirm.
We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying “a
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007). Because Edwards asserts no
procedural error, we consider whether the sentence is
substantively reasonable, “tak[ing] into account the totality of
the circumstances” and giving due deference to the district
court’s decision. See id. at 51. We presume that a sentence
within or below a properly calculated Guidelines range is
reasonable. United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 421 (2014).
Here, the district court reasonably determined that a
sentence of twenty-four months was appropriate. In imposing
sentence, the court considered Edwards’ Guidelines range of
24-30 months, the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) factors, the
arguments of counsel and Edwards’ allocution. The court was
particularly concerned that the instant conviction was Edwards’
second for failure to register; however, the court also
recognized certain complexities associated with registration
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requirements. The court noted that the offense was serious and
stated that the sentence was tailored to protect the public and
to deter similar conduct. Given the totality of the
circumstances, we hold that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in imposing the presumptively reasonable,
within-Guidelines sentence.
We accordingly affirm. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented
in the materials before us and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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