United States v. Ladarrell Crockett ( 2021 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 20-4418
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LADARRELL JAVON CROCKETT,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder, Chief District Judge. (1:15-cr-00101-TDS-1)
Submitted: March 25, 2021 Decided: April 20, 2021
Before KEENAN and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael E. Archenbronn, LAW OFFICE OF MICHAEL E. ARCHENBRONN,
Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Michael A. DeFranco, Assistant United
States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Ladarrell Javon Crockett appeals from the district court’s judgment revoking his
supervised release and imposing a 14-month prison term, to be served consecutively to the
144-month federal prison term he was already serving. On appeal, Crockett’s attorney has
filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no
meritorious issues for appeal, but raising as issues for review whether the district court
failed to adequately consider Crockett’s non-frivolous arguments for a concurrent sentence
and whether his revocation sentence is otherwise plainly unreasonable. The Government
did not file a response brief, and Crockett—although notified of his right to do so—did not
file a pro se supplemental brief. We affirm.
“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation of
supervised release.” United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). “We will
affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory maximum and is not plainly
unreasonable.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In determining whether a
revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, we must first determine whether the sentence
is procedurally or substantively unreasonable, see United States v. Padgett, 788 F.3d 370,
373 (4th Cir. 2015), evaluating the same general considerations “employ[ed] in our review
of original sentences,” United States v. Slappy, 872 F.3d 202, 207 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district
court adequately explains the chosen sentence after considering the Sentencing Guidelines’
nonbinding Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
factors.” Id. (internal footnote omitted); see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). “Where the
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defendant . . . presents nonfrivolous reasons for imposing a different sentence than that set
forth in the advisory Guidelines, a district judge should address the party’s arguments and
explain why he has rejected those arguments.” Slappy, 872 F.3d at 207 (internal brackets
and quotation marks omitted). “[A] revocation sentence is substantively reasonable if the
court sufficiently states a proper basis for its conclusion that the defendant should receive
the sentence imposed.” Id. (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). Only if we
determine that a revocation sentence is unreasonable do we consider whether the sentence
“is plainly so, relying on the definition of plain used in our plain error analysis—that is,
clear or obvious.” Id. at 208 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). “If a
revocation sentence—even an unreasonable one—is not plainly unreasonable, we will
affirm it.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
We find no unreasonableness, plain or otherwise, in Crockett’s revocation sentence.
The district court properly calculated Crockett’s advisory policy statement sentence at 24
months’ imprisonment based on his Grade A violation, Category IV criminal history, and
the relevant statutory maximum, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 7B1.4(a),
(b)(3)(A), p.s. The court heard argument from counsel and Crockett’s allocution. After
considering these matters, the advisory policy statement sentence, and applicable § 3553(a)
factors, the district court explained its reasons for imposing the 14-month consecutive term.
The district court’s reasons—which addressed counsel’s arguments for a concurrent
term—are grounded in factors appropriate for consideration in the revocation sentencing
context, namely, the nature and circumstances of Crockett’s violative conduct, his history
and personal characteristics, the needs for the sentence to afford adequate deterrence and
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to protect the public, and the sanctioning of Crockett’s breach of trust while on release,
see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(1), (2)(B)-(C), 3583(e); USSG Ch. 7, Pt. A, introductory cmt.
3(b) (“[A]t revocation the [district] court should sanction primarily the defendant’s breach
of trust. . . . [T]he sanction for the violation of trust should be in addition, or consecutive,
to any sentence imposed for the new [violative] conduct.”). The court adequately explained
its rationale for imposing the consecutive 14-month sentence, and the court’s sentencing
decision properly comports with USSG § 7B1.3(f), p.s. (directing that “[a]ny term of
imprisonment imposed upon the revocation of . . . supervised release shall be ordered to be
served consecutively to any sentence of imprisonment that the defendant is serving”).
There further is no evidence in the record rebutting the presumption of reasonableness
afforded to the 14-month sentence, see United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306
(4th Cir. 2014), or indicating that the sentence is unreasonable, much less plainly so,
see Padgett, 788 F.3d at 373.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have
found no meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s
revocation judgment. This court requires that counsel inform Crockett, in writing, of his
right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Crockett
requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous,
then counsel may move this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s
motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Crockett.
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We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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