James Hutcherson, Jr. v. Chae Lim ( 2011 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-1937
JAMES N. HUTCHERSON, JR.; SHARON T. HUTCHERSON
Plaintiffs – Appellants,
v.
CHAE Y. LIM, individually and in his professional/employment
capacity,
Defendant – Appellee,
and
WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United Sates District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Roger W. Titus, District Judge. (8:08-
cv-03044-RWT)
Submitted: June 28, 2011 Decided: August 30, 2011
Before KING, GREGORY, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished
per curiam opinion.
Anitha W. Johnson, ODELUGO & JOHNSON, Hyattsville, Maryland, for
Appellants. Gerard J. Stief, Senior Associate General Counsel,
Carol B. O’Keeffe, General Counsel, WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA
TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
James N. Hutcherson, Jr., and Sharon T. Hutcherson
appeal the district court’s orders granting summary judgment in
favor of Officer Chae Lim on their state law tort claims and
denying reconsideration. On appeal, the Hutchersons argue that
the district court should have declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over their state law claims and that the court
erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Officer Lim on
their false imprisonment, assault, and loss of consortium
claims. * We affirm the district court’s judgment in part,
vacate in part, and remand for further proceedings.
The Hutchersons first contend that the district court
erred in exercising supplemental jurisdiction over their state
law tort claims. Once the district court dismissed the
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (“WMATA”) and the
claims over which it had original jurisdiction, the court had
“wide latitude in determining whether or not to retain
jurisdiction over [the] state claims.” Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58
F.3d 106, 110 (4th Cir. 1995); see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), (c)(3)
*
The Hutchersons do not challenge on appeal the district
court’s grant of summary judgment for Officer Lim on the
negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress
claims. See Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 241 n.6
(4th Cir. 1999) (concluding that issue not raised in opening
brief is deemed abandoned).
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(2006). In exercising its discretion, the district court should
consider “convenience and fairness to the parties, the existence
of any underlying issues of federal policy, comity, and
considerations of judicial economy.” Shanaghan, 58 F.3d at 110
(citing Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7
(1988)). Additionally, “[a] district court can consider whether
the plaintiff has engaged in any manipulative tactics when it
decides whether to remand a case. If the plaintiff has
attempted to manipulate the forum, the court should take this
behavior into account. . . .” Cohill, 484 U.S. at 357. Upon
review, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in retaining supplemental jurisdiction over the
Hutchersons’ state law claims.
The Hutchersons also contend that the district court
erred in granting summary judgment for Officer Lim on the false
imprisonment, assault, and loss of consortium claims. We review
a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, “viewing
the facts and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Emmett v.
Johnson, 532 F.3d 291, 297 (4th Cir. 2008); see also Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Summary judgment
is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). If the moving
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party sufficiently supports its motion for summary judgment, the
nonmoving party must demonstrate “that there are genuine issues
of material fact.” Emmett, 532 F.3d at 297.
In Maryland, “[t]he elements of . . . false
imprisonment . . . are: 1) the deprivation of the liberty of
another; 2) without consent; and 3) without legal
justification.” Heron v. Strader, 761 A.2d 56, 59 (Md. 2000).
Maryland courts read “legal justification . . . as equivalent to
legal authority.” Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Paul, 261 A.2d
731, 738 (Md. 1970). “Whatever technical distinction there may
be between an ‘arrest’ and a ‘detention’ the test whether legal
justification existed in a particular case has been judged by
the principles applicable to the law of arrest.” Id. Our
review of the record leads us to conclude that the district
court properly granted summary judgment in Officer Lim’s favor
and denied reconsideration on this issue.
Turning to the assault claim, the Maryland Tort Claims
Act (“MTCA”), on which the district court based its grant of
immunity, is inapplicable to this case. The MCTA provides
immunity from tort liability for “[s]tate personnel” who act
“within the scope of [their] public duties . . . without malice
or gross negligence.” Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-
522(b) (LexisNexis 2009); see Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t § 12-
105 (LexisNexis 2009). WMATA police officers are not, however,
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considered “[s]tate personnel,” Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t
§ 12-101 (LexisNexis 2009), and are therefore not eligible for
immunity under the MTCA. See Houghton v. Forrest, 989 A.2d 223,
230 (Md. 2010) (finding that city police officer was not
included in the MTCA’s list of “state personnel” and so could
not claim immunity under the MTCA). Thus, the district court
improperly based its grant of summary judgment for Officer Lim
on the assault claim on MTCA immunity.
Moreover, we conclude that there is a genuine dispute
of material fact as to whether Officer Lim’s actions were
legally justified. See Cooper v. State, 737 A.2d 613, 617 (Md.
1999) (stating that required elements of an assault claim are
“that the (1) defendant caused a harmful physical contact with
the victim, (2) the contact was intentional, and (3) the contact
was not legally justified”). We therefore vacate the district
court’s grant of summary judgment and denial of reconsideration
on the Hutchersons’ assault claim. Further, because a loss of
consortium claim is premised on the viability of other claims,
Oaks v. Connors, 660 A.2d 423, 430 (Md. 1995), we also vacate
the district court’s grant of summary judgment and denial of
reconsideration on that issue.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of
summary judgment and denial of reconsideration in part, vacate
in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this
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opinion. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal conclusions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED
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