United States v. Manuel Gordillo-Escandon , 706 F. App'x 119 ( 2017 )


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  •                                     UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 17-4481
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    MANUEL DE JESUS GORDILLO-ESCANDON,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at
    Greenville. Bruce H. Hendricks, District Judge. (6:17-cr-00206-BHH-3)
    Submitted: October 31, 2017                                 Decided: December 13, 2017
    Before WYNN, DIAZ, and HARRIS, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Howard W. Anderson III, LAW OFFICE OF HOWARD W. ANDERSON III, LLC,
    Pendleton, South Carolina, for Appellant. Beth Drake, United States Attorney, D. Josev
    Brewer, Assistant United States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Manuel de Jesus Gordillo-Escandon has been indicted in the District of South
    Carolina on federal drug and firearm offenses. Gordillo-Escandon, previously having
    been convicted on state drug and firearm charges, moved to dismiss the pending federal
    charges as violative of the Double Jeopardy Clause and the Full Faith and Credit Act,
    28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2012).      The district court denied the motion, finding that the
    successive prosecutions by separate sovereigns violated neither the Double Jeopardy
    Clause nor the Full Faith and Credit Act. Gordillo-Escandon then filed this interlocutory
    appeal pursuant to Abney v. United States, 
    431 U.S. 651
    , 662 (1977).
    We review preserved claims concerning the Double Jeopardy Clause de novo.
    United States v. Schnittker, 
    807 F.3d 77
    , 81 (4th Cir. 2015). The protection against
    double jeopardy “prohibits the government from subjecting a person to multiple
    punishments for the same offense.” 
    Id. (internal quotation
    marks omitted). However,
    under the dual sovereignty doctrine, “the Supreme Court has continually held that federal
    and state crimes are not the same offense, no matter how identical the conduct they
    proscribe.” United States v. Alvarado, 
    440 F.3d 191
    , 196 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal
    quotation marks omitted); see Abbate v. United States, 
    359 U.S. 187
    , 194-96 (1959)
    (declining to overrule established principle “that a federal prosecution is not barred by a
    prior state prosecution of the same person for the same acts”). As Gordillo-Escandon
    concedes, his double jeopardy claim could have merit only if the Supreme Court
    overturned its decision in Abbate.      Because Abbate remains good law, Gordillo-
    Escandon’s claim must fail.
    2
    The Full Faith and Credit Act requires federal courts to apply state res judicata law
    to determine the preclusive effects of a state court judgment. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi
    Basic Indus. Corp., 
    544 U.S. 280
    , 293 (2005); In re Genesys Data Techs., Inc., 
    204 F.3d 124
    , 129 (4th Cir. 2000). “Under South Carolina law, to establish res judicata a party
    must show (1) identity of the parties; (2) identity of the subject matter; and (3)
    adjudication of the issue in the former suit.” Sunrise Corp. v. City of Myrtle Beach, 
    420 F.3d 322
    , 327 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have held that
    “[t]he federal government is neither the same as nor in privity with the [s]tate
    [government] and therefore is not barred” by the doctrine of collateral estoppel. United
    States v. Smith, 
    446 F.2d 200
    , 202 (4th Cir. 1971). Accordingly, we conclude that
    Gordillo-Escandon fails to meet the requirements for res judicata under South Carolina
    law and, therefore, his claim under the Full Faith and Credit Act must fail.
    Based on the foregoing, we affirm the district court’s denial of Gordillo-
    Escandon’s motion to dismiss the pending federal indictment. We dispense with oral
    argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
    materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    3