United States v. Richard Stevens ( 2011 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4031
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
RICHARD LEE STEVENS, a/k/a Stump,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Charleston. Thomas E. Johnston,
District Judge. (2:09-cr-00222-12)
Submitted: September 12, 2011 Decided: September 27, 2011
Before WILKINSON, DUNCAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Gregory J. Campbell, CAMPBELL LAW OFFICE, Charleston, West
Virginia, for Appellant. R. Booth Goodwin II, United States
Attorney, Michael B. Hissam, Assistant United States Attorney,
Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Richard Lee Stevens pled guilty, pursuant to a written
plea agreement, to one count of transporting a stolen vehicle in
interstate commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2312 (2006).
The district court sentenced Stevens to two years’ probation.
On appeal, Stevens argues that the district court erred in
finding that a sufficient factual basis supported his guilty
plea. We affirm.
The district court is required to satisfy itself that
there is a factual basis for a defendant’s guilty plea prior to
entering judgment on the plea. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3). “The
rule is intended to ensure that the [district] court make[s]
clear exactly what a defendant admits to, and whether those
admissions are factually sufficient to constitute the alleged
crime.” United States v. Ketchum, 550 F.3d 363, 366 (4th Cir.
2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because Stevens did
not challenge the sufficiency of the factual basis supporting
his guilty plea in the district court, we review his challenge
for plain error. United States v. Mastrapa, 509 F.3d 652, 656-
57 (4th Cir. 2007). To prevail under this standard, Stevens
must establish that a clear or obvious error by the district
court affected his substantial rights. United States v. King,
628 F.3d 693, 699 (4th Cir. 2011).
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We conclude that Stevens fails to show error by the
district court. A defendant’s guilt on a charge of violating
§ 2312 is established by showing that the defendant:
(1) transported a stolen vehicle interstate commerce and (2)
“knew while so transporting” that the vehicle was stolen.
United States v. Costanzo, 395 F.2d 441, 445 (4th Cir. 1968).
As used in § 2312, the term “stolen” encompasses “all felonious
takings of motor vehicles with intent to deprive the owner of
the rights and benefits of ownership, regardless of whether or
not the theft constitutes common-law larceny.” United States v.
Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 417 (1957). Where a defendant takes a
vehicle across state lines with the intent to deprive a creditor
of a security interest in the vehicle, the vehicle may be deemed
“stolen” for purposes of § 2312. United States v. Bunch,
542 F.2d 629, 630 (4th Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
Stevens contends that the factual basis was
insufficient to show that the vehicle he transported in
interstate commerce was stolen. * We disagree. In this case, the
record makes clear that Stevens transported a vehicle — a Honda
*
Stevens also appears to suggest that the district court
erred in finding that the factual basis was sufficient to
support his guilty plea because his conduct in this case most
closely resembles aiding and abetting mail fraud. We conclude,
however, that Stevens’ argument does not undercut the district
court’s sufficiency finding.
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motorcycle — in interstate commerce and did so knowing he was
depriving the lien holder of its security interest in the
motorcycle and with the intent to dispose of the motorcycle by
selling it to a third party. This evidence is sufficient to
establish that the motorcycle was “stolen” under § 2312.
Accordingly, we discern no error, plain or otherwise, by the
district court.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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