United States v. Loretta Meredith , 602 F. App'x 102 ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4713
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
LORETTA MEREDITH,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Clarksburg. Irene M. Keeley,
District Judge. (1:13-cr-00017-IMK-JSK-2)
Submitted: February 9, 2015 Decided: February 12, 2015
Before KING, GREGORY, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Charles T. Berry, Fairmont, West Virginia, for Appellant. Shawn
Angus Morgan, Assistant United States Attorney, Clarksburg, West
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Loretta Meredith appeals the district court’s criminal
judgment sentencing her to one year and one day of imprisonment
for conspiring to knowingly and corruptly attempt to obstruct,
influence, and impede an official proceeding, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2) and (k) (2012). In accordance with
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), counsel for Meredith
filed a brief certifying that there are no meritorious grounds
for appeal but questioning whether the district court
(1) wrongly increased the base offense level for Meredith’s
Guidelines range for substantially interfering with the
administration of justice, (2) clearly erred in increasing the
base offense level for Meredith’s Guidelines range because the
offense was extensive in scope, planning, or preparation, or
(3) imposed an unreasonable sentence. Although advised of her
right to do so, Meredith did not file a pro se supplemental
brief. We affirm.
In determining whether the district court properly
applied a sentencing enhancement, this court “review[s] factual
findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo.” United
States v. Adepoju, 756 F.3d 250, 256 (4th Cir. 2014).
Meredith first questions whether the district court
improperly enhanced her sentence because “the offense resulted
in substantial interference with the administration of justice.”
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U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (USSG) § 2J1.2(b)(2).
“‘Substantial interference with the administration of justice’
includes . . . the unnecessary expenditure of substantial
governmental or court resources.” USSG § 2J1.2 cmt. n.1.
Our review of the record reflects that the district
court properly increased Meredith’s offense level for
substantial interference with the administration of justice.
Because significant government resources were invested to
resolve Meredith’s attempts at obstruction, the district court
did not clearly err in this conclusion. Nor did the district
court erroneously “double-count” by applying the enhancement
even though she was convicted of obstruction of justice. See
United States v. Dudley, 941 F.2d 260, 264 (4th Cir. 1991)
(defendant may properly receive “substantial interference with
the administration of justice” enhancement for underlying
perjury offense).
Meredith next questions whether the district court
clearly erred in enhancing her sentence because her offense
“(A) involved the destruction, alteration, or fabrication of a
substantial number of records, documents, or tangible objects;
. . . or (C) was otherwise extensive in scope, planning, or
preparation.” USSG § 2J1.2(b)(3). After reviewing the record,
we hold that the district court appropriately applied this
enhancement. Meredith’s attempts at obstruction were extensive
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in scope, planning, and preparation. Accordingly, given the
statute’s disjunctive construction, whether she fabricated a
“substantial number” of documents is immaterial.
Finally, we review Meredith’s sentence for
reasonableness using an abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). We must first review for
“significant procedural error,” including “improperly
calculating[] the Guidelines range, . . . failing to consider
the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [(2012)] factors, selecting a sentence
based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately
explain the chosen sentence.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
If we find no procedural error, we examine the
substantive reasonableness of the sentence under “the totality
of the circumstances.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. The sentence
imposed must be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary[,]”
to satisfy the goals of sentencing. See § 3553(a). We presume
on appeal that a sentence below or within a properly calculated
Guidelines range is reasonable. United States v. Montes-Pineda,
445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The defendant bears the burden to rebut the
presumption by showing “that the sentence is unreasonable when
measured against the § 3553(a) factors.” Id.
Meredith received an adequate, individualized
explanation of her below-Guidelines sentence. Our review of the
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record leads us to conclude that her sentence was neither
procedurally nor substantively unreasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform Meredith, in writing, of her right
to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If she requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel
may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on the appellant.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
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