United States v. Robert Trull , 450 F. App'x 281 ( 2011 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 10-4986
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff – Appellee,
    v.
    ROBERT TRULL,
    Defendant – Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
    District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Martin K. Reidinger,
    District Judge. (3:09-cr-00084-MR-2)
    Submitted:   September 27, 2011           Decided:   October 17, 2011
    Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
    Affirmed in part and dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam
    opinion.
    Lawrence W. Hewitt, GUTHRIE, DAVIS, HENDERSON & STATON,
    P.L.L.C., Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant.     Amy
    Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville,
    North Carolina, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Robert Trull pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea
    agreement, to conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent
    to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C.A. §§ 846
    ,
    841(b)(1)(B)     (West    1999    &    Supp.    2011).       The    district         court
    sentenced him to seventy months’ imprisonment, the bottom of the
    Guidelines range.        Trull appealed, and his counsel filed a brief
    pursuant    to    Anders    v.        California,     
    386 U.S. 738
            (1967),
    concluding that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but
    questioning whether the district court erred in declining to
    sentence    Trull   pursuant      to    the    Fair   Sentencing      Act       of     2010
    (“FSA”), Pub. L. No. 111-220, 
    124 Stat. 2372
    , and the amended
    Guidelines.      Trull has not filed a pro se supplemental brief.
    Counsel    for   Trull   subsequently         filed   a    motion    to       remand    for
    resentencing pursuant to the FSA.                In response, the Government
    moved to dismiss Trull’s appeal based upon a waiver of appellate
    rights in the plea agreement.             We affirm in part and dismiss in
    part.
    Pursuant to a plea agreement, a defendant may waive
    his appellate rights.        United States v. Manigan, 
    592 F.3d 621
    ,
    627 (4th Cir. 2010).         A waiver will preclude an appeal of a
    specific issue if the waiver is valid and the issue is within
    the scope of the waiver.           United States v. Blick, 
    408 F.3d 162
    ,
    168   (4th Cir. 2005).           The    question      of    whether       a    defendant
    2
    validly waived his right to appeal is a question of law that
    this court reviews de novo.              Manigan, 
    592 F.3d at 626
    .
    “An    appellate      waiver       is     valid       if     the    defendant
    knowingly       and     intelligently       agreed       to    [waive       the    right    to
    appeal].”       
    Id. at 627
    .       To determine whether a waiver is knowing
    and    intelligent,       this     court     examines         “the    totality       of    the
    circumstances.”             
    Id.
         (internal          quotation          marks    omitted).
    Generally, if the district court fully questions a defendant
    regarding the waiver of his right to appeal during the Fed. R.
    Crim. P. 11 colloquy, the waiver is both valid and enforceable.
    Id.;     United         States      v.     Johnson,           
    410 F.3d 137
    ,     151
    (4th Cir. 2005).
    Trull does not contest the validity of the waiver or
    the voluntariness of his guilty plea.                        Our review of the record
    leads us to conclude that the waiver is valid and enforceable.
    The    magistrate       judge     ensured    that       Trull       had    read    the     plea
    agreement,       that     counsel    explained          it    to    him,     and    that    he
    understood the consequences of the waiver.                           Because the waiver
    is    valid,    it    precludes     review       of    the    sentencing      issue       Trull
    seeks to raise on appeal and any potential issues related to the
    conviction      that     are    covered    by     the    waiver.          Accordingly,      we
    grant in part the Government’s motion to dismiss the appeal and
    dismiss this portion of the appeal, and we deny Trull’s motion
    to remand for resentencing.
    3
    Trull’s appellate waiver, however, does not preclude
    an appeal of his conviction or sentence based upon ineffective
    assistance      of     counsel     or     prosecutorial       misconduct.           In
    accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in
    this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal that
    are not encompassed by the appeal waiver.                   We therefore deny in
    part the Government’s motion to dismiss and affirm this portion
    of the appeal.
    This      court   requires       that    counsel       inform   Trull,    in
    writing,   of    the   right      to    petition    the   Supreme     Court   of    the
    United States for further review.                   If Trull requests that a
    petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
    would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for
    leave to withdraw from representation.                     Counsel’s motion must
    state that a copy thereof was served on Trull.                     We dispense with
    oral   argument      because      the    facts     and    legal    contentions      are
    adequately      presented    in    the    materials       before    the    court    and
    argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED IN PART;
    DISMISSED IN PART
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 10-4986

Citation Numbers: 450 F. App'x 281

Judges: Gregory, Shedd, Davis

Filed Date: 10/17/2011

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024