United States v. Alvin Hall ( 2014 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 14-4190
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    ALVIN DEWAYNE HALL,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
    District of Virginia, at Richmond.  Henry E. Hudson, District
    Judge. (3:13-cr-00125-HEH-1)
    Submitted:   November 21, 2014            Decided:   December 17, 2014
    Before MOTZ and FLOYD, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit
    Judge.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Jeremy Gordon, Mansfield, Texas, for Appellant. Dana J. Boente,
    United States Attorney, Olivia L. Norman, Assistant United
    States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
    PER CURIAM:
    Alvin       Dewayne       Hall     pled      guilty          to    conspiracy     to
    distribute         and    possess       with    intent         to     distribute         marijuana
    (Count 2) and bribery of a public official (Count 5), for his
    role    in    supplying      contraband         while      a    federal         inmate    and   was
    sentenced to 96 months of imprisonment.                             On appeal, Hall raises
    one issue: whether the district court abused its discretion by
    denying, without proper inquiry, his request for a continuance
    in order to obtain substitute counsel.                               For the reasons that
    follow, we affirm.
    At    his    sentencing          hearing,        Hall    was      represented      by
    appointed counsel but sought a continuance so that he could hire
    another attorney to advise him regarding questions he had about
    sentencing.         Hall specifically told the court that he was not
    seeking to withdraw his plea and made no statements regarding
    unhappiness        with    his    appointed          counsel.          The      district     court
    denied       the    motion       for     a     continuance           finding       that    Hall’s
    appointed counsel was very experienced, had done “superb job,”
    there    were      no    complicated         issues     involved        in      the   sentencing
    which would require additional research, no serious issues that
    that     were      objected       to,     and       that       the    advisory        Sentencing
    Guidelines were clearly and properly computed.                              (J.A. 54-55).
    The        determination          of     whether         a        continuance      is
    justified is left to the sound discretion of the trial court,
    2
    Morris v. Slappy, 
    461 U.S. 1
    , 11-12 (1983), which we review for
    an abuse of discretion.            United States v. Lorick, 
    753 F.2d 1295
    ,
    1297 (4th Cir. 1985).             We have held that a district court need
    not grant a continuance for purposes of securing new counsel
    where the request for it plausibly can be viewed as simply a
    delaying tactic or as otherwise unreasonable.                        See, e.g., United
    States    v.    Gallop,      
    838 F.2d 105
    ,      107-09       (4th   Cir.     1988);
    Sampley v. Attorney Gen. N.C., 
    786 F.2d 610
    , 613–14 (4th Cir.
    1986).    In particular, a defendant’s right to choose his own
    counsel is limited so as not to deprive a court of its “inherent
    power to control the administration of justice.”                             Gallop, 
    838 F.2d at 108
     (citation omitted); see United States v. Gonzalez–
    Lopez, 
    548 U.S. 140
    , 152 (2006) (finding that a trial court has
    wide   latitude       in   balancing       the   right       to   counsel     of    choice
    against   the     needs     of     fairness      and    against       demands      of   its
    calendar).      Thus, we find no abuse of discretion.
    Accordingly, we affirm Hall’s conviction and sentence.
    We   dispense    with      oral    argument      because      the    facts    and   legal
    contentions     are    adequately      presented        in    the    materials      before
    this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
    3