United States v. Darrell Digsby , 589 F. App'x 77 ( 2014 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4036
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DARRELL EUGENE DIGSBY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad,
Jr., District Judge. (3:04-cr-00304-RJC-CH-1)
Submitted: December 18, 2014 Decided: December 22, 2014
Before SHEDD, WYNN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Sandra Barrett, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anne
M. Tompkins, United States Attorney, William M. Miller,
Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Darrell Eugene Digsby was convicted by a jury in 2005
of being a felon in possession of a firearm and sentenced to the
statutory maximum sentence of 120 months’ imprisonment, followed
by three years of supervised release. Digsby began his term of
supervised release on August 13, 2013. In November 2013,
Digsby’s probation officer filed a petition to revoke his
supervised release, alleging two violations, including one for
possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell or
deliver.
At Digsby’s revocation hearing, one of the arresting
officers testified that, during execution of a search warrant at
Digsby’s residence, a bag containing fifteen rocks of crack
cocaine was found beneath a rug under the seat where Digsby had
been sitting. In addition, officers found a bag containing 86
prescription pills, including oxycodone, hydrocodone, and
OxyContin, near Digsby’s right foot. According to the officer,
Digsby admitted that he was selling cocaine to support his own
habit. Also, incriminating text messages were found in Digsby’s
cell phone. Based on this evidence, the district court revoked
Digsby’s supervised release.
With a criminal history category of VI, Digsby’s
Policy Statement range was 33-41 months’ imprisonment. See U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual (USSG.) § 7B1.4(a) (2012). The
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court imposed a 24-month term, the statutory maximum. See 18
U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2012). Digsby timely appealed.
This court reviews a district court’s judgment
revoking supervised release and imposing a term of imprisonment
for abuse of discretion. United States v. Copley, 978 F.2d 829,
831 (4th Cir. 1992). To revoke supervised release, a district
court need only find a violation of a condition of supervised
release by a preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(e)(3). This standard “simply requires the trier of fact
to believe that the existence of a fact is more probable than
its nonexistence.” United States v. Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 631
(4th Cir. 2010) (citation and internal quotations omitted). We
find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
concluding that Digsby violated the terms of his supervised
release by possessing with intent to distribute crack cocaine
and prescription pills.
This court will affirm a sentence imposed after
revocation of supervised release if it is within the statutory
maximum and not plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup,
461 F.3d 433, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). A sentence upon
revocation is procedurally reasonable if the district court has
considered the policy statements contained in Chapter 7 of the
Sentencing Guidelines and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2012) factors, Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440, and has adequately
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explained the sentence chosen, though it need not explain the
sentence in as much detail as when imposing the original
sentence. United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th
Cir. 2010). We presume that a sentence within the Chapter Seven
range is reasonable. United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 642
(4th Cir. 2013). Applying these standards, we find that
Digsby’s sentence is not unreasonable.
Therefore, we affirm the revocation of Digsby’s
supervised release and the sentence imposed. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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