United States v. Eric Bruton , 589 F. App'x 91 ( 2014 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4369
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ERIC LAMAR BRUTON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley,
Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:13-cr-00299-NCT-1)
Submitted: October 21, 2014 Decided: December 23, 2014
Before SHEDD, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, Greg Davis, Assistant
Federal Public Defender, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Andrew Charles Cochran, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Eric Lamar Bruton pled guilty, pursuant to a plea
agreement, to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012). The district court
deemed Bruton an armed career criminal, see 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)
(2012), and sentenced him to 188 months’ imprisonment—the bottom
of Bruton’s advisory Guidelines range. Counsel has filed a
brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
stating that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but
questioning whether the district court properly classified
Bruton as an armed career criminal. Bruton was informed of his
right to file a pro se supplemental brief, but he has not done
so. We affirm.
When considering whether the district court properly
sentenced a defendant as an armed career criminal, we review the
court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for
clear error. United States v. McDowell, 745 F.3d 115, 120 (4th
Cir. 2014), petition for cert. filed, ___ U.S.L.W. ___ (U.S.
June 16, 2014) (No. 13-10640). Under the Armed Career Criminal
Act (“ACCA”), if a defendant is convicted of being a felon in
possession of a firearm and has sustained at least three prior
convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses
committed on occasions different from one another, the defendant
is subject to an enhanced sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1).
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Bruton contends that his three North Carolina
convictions for burning certain buildings should be counted as
only one predicate offense for the purpose of the ACCA because
they were consolidated for judgment. Although we held in United
States v. Davis, 720 F.3d 215 (4th Cir. 2013), that a
consolidated sentence for multiple North Carolina convictions is
to be treated as a single sentence for purposes of the career
offender enhancement, id. at 219, Davis does not apply in the
context of the ACCA. We reiterate that “[n]othing in § 924(e)
or the Guidelines suggests that offenses must be tried or
sentenced separately in order to be counted as separate
predicate offenses,” and that “[t]he only requirement [for
applying the ACCA] is that the predicate offenses be committed
on occasions different from one another.” United States v.
Samuels, 970 F.2d 1312, 1315 (4th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation
marks omitted). Accordingly, we conclude that the district
court correctly sentenced Bruton as an armed career criminal.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious grounds for appeal.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform Bruton, in writing, of his right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Bruton requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
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counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Bruton. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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