Joseph Miles, III v. William Moore, III ( 2011 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-6466
JOSEPH A. MILES, III,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
WILLIAM MOORE, III, Chaplain, Sussex II State Prison;
DAVID B. EVERETT, Warden, Sussex II State Prison; DAVID
ROBINSON, Regional Director, Eastern Regional Office,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. James R. Spencer, Chief
District Judge. (3:10-cv-00162-JRS)
Submitted: October 4, 2011 Decided: October 19, 2011
Before WILKINSON and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished
per curiam opinion.
Joseph A. Miles, III, Appellant Pro Se. Richard Carson Vorhis,
Senior Assistant Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Joseph A. Miles, III, an inmate at Sussex II State
Prison (“Sussex II”), appeals the district court’s order denying
relief on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint. On appeal, Miles
argues that (1) the district court erred in dismissing his
claims brought pursuant to the First Amendment and the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub. L. No. 106-274,
114 Stat. 803, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a) (“RLUIPA”); (2) he was
deprived of an opportunity to file a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 59(e) motion; (3) the district court erred in denying
his motion to strike Appellee William Moore’s motion for summary
judgment; and (4) the district court erred in allowing the
Virginia Attorney General to represent Moore. Finding no
reversible error, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of
Miles’s First Amendment claim for the reasons stated by the
district court. Miles v. Moore, No. 3:10-cv-00162-JRS (E.D. Va.
Mar. 3, 2011). Further, we hold that Miles had an adequate
opportunity to file a Rule 59(e) motion and the district court
did not err in finding that Miles’s motion to strike did not
comply with the Eastern District of Virginia’s Local Rules and
allowing the Attorney General to represent Moore. However, we
conclude that the district court erred in dismissing Miles’s
RLUIPA claim and, accordingly, vacate in part and remand.
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Miles argues that, as implemented by Appellees, Sussex
II’s policy permitting additions to the Master Pass List only
during designated quarterly open enrollment periods placed a
substantial burden on his religious exercise. Miles, a regular
attendant of Christian religious services, was removed from the
Master Pass List when he was penalized with twenty days in
isolation for being in an unauthorized area; when he was
released from isolation, Miles’s request to be placed back on
the Master Pass List to attend Christian services was denied
because it was not made during an open enrollment period.
We review a district court's order granting summary
judgment de novo, drawing all reasonable inferences in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Robinson v. Clipse,
602 F.3d 605, 607 (4th Cir. 2010). Summary judgment may be
granted only when “there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and . . . the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(2). A district court should grant
summary judgment unless a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party on the evidence presented. See
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
RLUIPA prohibits prisons from imposing a substantial
burden on an inmate’s religious exercise unless prison officials
can demonstrate that the burden furthers a compelling
governmental interest by the least restrictive means. 42 U.S.C.
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§ 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2); see Smith v. Ozmint, 578 F.3d 246, 250
(4th Cir. 2009). A substantial burden “is one that put[s]
substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and
to violate his beliefs, or one that forces a person to choose
between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting
[governmental] benefits on the one hand, and abandoning one of
the precepts of her religion . . . on the other hand.”
Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 187 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). The plaintiff bears the
initial burden of showing that he seeks to engage in an exercise
of religion and that the challenged practice substantially
burdens that exercise. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b); Smith, 578 F.3d
at 250. Once a plaintiff carries his burden, the defendants
must prove that the religious burden is the least restrictive
means of furthering a compelling governmental interest. Id.
In dismissing Miles’s RLUIPA claim, the district court
held that, although Miles showed that the open enrollment policy
substantially pressured Miles to change his behavior, he did not
demonstrate that the burdened religious activity--congregational
worship--was an important belief. The record, however, shows
that Miles submitted an affidavit to the court wherein he noted
that “I believe [church attendance] is vital for Christian
growth and development.” E.R. 148. Moreover, in determining
whether there has been a substantial burden “courts must not
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judge the significance of the particular belief or practice.”
Lovelace, 472 F.3d at 187 n.2. Rather, courts should inquire
into the sincerity of the professed religiosity. Id. The
district court conceded that Miles showed that he faithfully
attended Christian services, baptisms, and communion services
and that he was deprived of the ability to participate in these
activities when he was removed from the Master Pass List. Such
a showing is sufficient to satisfy RLUIPA’s substantial burden
requirement.
Because the district court concluded that Miles had
not shown that the open enrollment policy substantially burdened
his religious exercise, it did not proceed to the next step of
determining whether Appellees could demonstrate that the burden
furthers a compelling governmental interest by the least
restrictive means. On this record, we cannot conclude that the
open enrollment policy is the least restrictive means of
achieving a compelling interest. Accordingly, we vacate the
district court’s dismissal of Miles’s RLUIPA claim and remand
with instructions for the district court to evaluate whether the
open enrollment policy is the least restrictive means to further
a compelling governmental interest.
In sum, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of
Miles’s First Amendment claim, deny relief on his additional
claims on appeal, and vacate the district court’s dismissal of
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his RLUIPA claim and remand for proceedings consistent with this
opinion. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED
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