United States v. Bryan Huntley , 594 F. App'x 108 ( 2014 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4325
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
BRYAN YARNELL HUNTLEY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Rock Hill. Terry L. Wooten, Chief District
Judge. (0:13-cr-00555-TLW-1)
Submitted: October 31, 2014 Decided: December 2, 2014
Before KING, GREGORY, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Kimberly H. Albro, FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER’S OFFICE, Columbia,
South Carolina, for Appellant. William N. Nettles, United
States Attorney, Jamie Lea Nabors Schoen, Assistant United
States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Bryan Yarnell Huntley pled guilty to failure to
register as a sex offender, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a)
(2012). In addition to a term of imprisonment, the district
court sentenced Huntley to fifteen years of supervised release.
The court also ordered that Huntley comply with certain special
conditions of supervised release, notably including vocational
training, substance abuse treatment, and mental health
treatment, to include sex offender evaluation and polygraph as
deemed necessary by the mental health evaluator. Huntley
appeals, challenging only his supervised release term and
conditions. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying a
deferential abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). We first review for
“significant procedural error,” such as improperly calculating
the Guidelines range, inadequately considering the 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2012) factors, and providing insufficient explanation
for the sentence imposed. United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572,
575 (4th Cir. 2010). If we find no such procedural error, we
consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence under
the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 578. The sentence
must be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply
with the purposes” of sentencing. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
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We generally review conditions of supervised release
for abuse of discretion. United States v. Worley, 685 F.3d 404,
407 (4th Cir. 2012). However, conditions not challenged by the
defendant in the district court are reviewed for plain error.
United States v. Wesley, 81 F.3d 482, 484 (4th Cir. 1996). To
establish plain error, Huntley must demonstrate that the
district court erred, the error was plain, and the error
affected his substantial rights. Henderson v. United States,
133 S. Ct. 1121, 1126 (2013). If these requirements are met, we
will exercise our discretion to correct the error only if it
“seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation
of judicial proceedings.” Id. at 1126-27 (internal quotation
marks and alterations omitted).
“District courts have broad latitude with regard to
special conditions of supervised release . . . .” United
States v. Holman, 532 F.3d 284, 288 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The court may impose any special
condition that is “reasonably related” to the factors set forth
in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1) (2012), including “the nature and
circumstances of the offenses and the history and
characteristics of the defendant; providing adequate deterrence;
protecting the public from further crimes; and providing the
defendant with training, medical care, or treatment.” United
States v. Dotson, 324 F.3d 256, 260 (4th Cir. 2003) (internal
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quotation marks and citations omitted). The condition also must
“‘involve[] no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably
necessary’ to achieve the goals enumerated in § 3553(a).”
United States v. Armel, 585 F.3d 182, 186 (4th Cir. 2009)
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2) (2012)). It also must be
consistent with the Sentencing Commission policy statements
related to supervised release. Dotson, 324 F.3d at 260-61.
The sentencing court must explain its reasons for the
conditions it imposes, supported by factual findings that
justify those conditions. Armel, 585 F.3d at 186. The court’s
explanation must at least be adequate “to allow for meaningful
appellate review and to promote the perception of fair
sentencing.” See Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. Nevertheless, those
reasons need not establish “an offense-specific nexus,” as long
as the court’s rationale is adequate to support the condition
imposed in light of the applicable § 3553(a) factors. Worley,
685 F.3d at 407 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
On appeal, Huntley first asserts that the district
court failed to provide adequate reasons to enable appellate
review or to justify the special conditions of supervised
release it imposed. He focuses particularly on the conditions
of substance abuse treatment and mental health treatment with
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sex offender evaluation. 1 The Guidelines recommend a substance
abuse treatment condition where “the court has reason to believe
that the defendant is an abuser of narcotics, other controlled
substances or alcohol.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
(“USSG”) § 5D1.3(d)(4) (2013) (p.s.). It recommends a mental
health treatment condition where “the court has reason to
believe that the defendant is in need of psychological or
psychiatric treatment.” USSG § 5D1.3(d)(5) (p.s.).
Our review of the record reveals no plain error in the
special conditions of supervised release. First, although
little of the court’s explanation was applicable only to the
supervised release conditions, we find the court’s explanation
of the sentence as a whole was adequate to support appellate
review of all special conditions of supervised release. We also
conclude that these conditions are reasonably related to the
applicable sentencing factors and involve no greater deprivation
of liberty than reasonably necessary.
Huntley analogizes his case to United States v.
Springston, 650 F.3d 1153 (8th Cir. 2011), vacated on other
1
For the first time in reply, Huntley argues that the court
improperly delegated to the probation office the final decision
about whether sex offender treatment was appropriate, thereby
violating the separation of powers principle. (Reply at 5-6).
This argument is not properly before us. See United States v.
Brooks, 524 F.3d 549, 556 & n.11 (4th Cir. 2008) (deeming claim
raised for first time in reply brief abandoned).
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grounds, 132 S. Ct. 1905 (2012) (non delegation challenge to
offense), reissued in relevant part, 534 F. App’x 576 (8th Cir.
2013) (No. 13-1624), in which the court vacated a supervised
release condition requiring the defendant to submit to mental
health counseling, after concluding that the condition was not
sufficiently related to the specific facts of the defendant’s
criminal history or particular offense. 650 F.3d at 1156-57.
The court recognized that a sentencing court is authorized to
impose a special condition related to a defendant’s prior
offense, but “may not impose a special condition on all those
found guilty of a particular offense,” as it must “make a
particularized showing of the need for the condition in each
case.” Id. at 1156 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus,
while special conditions requiring mental health testing and
treatment—including sex offender treatment as necessary—could be
warranted in certain failure-to-register cases, “such as when
there is reason to believe that the failure to register
evidences recalcitrance and an ongoing proclivity to commit
sexual crimes,” no such conditions warranted such conditions in
Springston’s case. Id. at 1157.
Contrary to Huntley’s assertions, such additional
factors were present in his case. The sentencing court
specifically referred to Huntley’s numerous prior convictions
and violations of his release terms, his multiple failures to
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comply with sex offender registration, and his noncompliance
with sex offender treatment mandated by the state court.
Additionally, Huntley had a history of substance abuse and
multiple convictions of offenses related to the distribution and
possession of controlled substances. Based on these facts, we
find the substance abuse and mental health conditions adequately
supported by both the court’s analysis and the record. See,
e.g., United States v. Morales-Cruz, 712 F.3d 71, 72-75 (1st
Cir. 2013); United States v. Moran, 573 F.3d 1132, 1139 (11th
Cir. 2009); United States v. Kreitinger, 576 F.3d 500, 505-06
(8th Cir. 2009).
Huntley also asserts that the supervised release term
imposed by the court was procedurally unreasonable because the
court did not calculate the Guidelines range, and thus did not
have an appropriate starting point from which to calculate its
variance sentence. In sentencing a defendant, the court is
first required to calculate the applicable Guidelines range, as
this range is to be used as “the starting point and the initial
benchmark” in selecting a sentence. United States v. Hernandez,
603 F.3d 267, 270 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks
omitted). The parties agree that the appropriate term of
supervised release is five years. See United States v. Segura,
747 F.3d 323, 329-31 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Goodwin,
717 F.3d 511 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 334 (2013).
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Because we are satisfied, despite any ambiguity in the court’s
explanation and written statement of reasons, that the court
adopted a Guidelines range of five years, we discern no error
based on the court’s failure to calculate this range before
determining the extent of its variance.
Huntley further asserts that the district court
considered an improper factor under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A),
and reasons not particular to Huntley, when imposing the
sentence, and thus failed to provide an explanation adequate to
justify the extent of the upward variance he received. In
considering the § 3553(a) factors, the sentencing court is
required to “make an individualized assessment based on the
facts presented.” United States v. Evans, 526 F.3d 155, 161
(4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A sentence
may be substantively unreasonable if the court relies on an
improper factor or rejects policies articulated by Congress or
the Sentencing Commission.” United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445
F.3d 375, 378 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Additionally, “a talismanic recitation of the
§ 3553(a) factors without application to the defendant being
sentenced” is inadequate to support a sentence because it “does
not demonstrate reasoned decisionmaking or provide an adequate
basis for appellate review.” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d
325, 329 (4th Cir. 2009).
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“The court, in determining whether to include a term
of supervised release, and . . . the length of the term . . . ,
shall consider the factors set forth in section 3553(a)(1),
(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and
(a)(7).” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(c) (2012). Not among these
enumerated factors is § 3553(a)(2)(A), which includes “the need
for the sentence . . . to reflect the seriousness of the
offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just
punishment for the offense.” However, as we recently concluded
in the context of supervised release revocation sentences
imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 3583, “mere reference to [the
§ 3553(a)(2)(A)] considerations does not render a revocation
sentence procedurally unreasonable when those factors are
relevant to, and considered in conjunction with, the enumerated
§ 3553(a) factors,” as long as the sentence is not based
“predominately on the § 3553(a)(2)(A) factors.” United States
v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 642 (4th Cir. 2013). 2
2
Although Huntley claims that Webb is not persuasive
authority because it conflicts with United States v. Crudup, 461
F.3d 433 (4th Cir. 2006), we find any conflicting language in
Crudup to be dictum and thus not binding on subsequent panels of
this court. See Webb, 738 F.3d at 641 (“[I]n Crudup, we stated,
without analysis or explanation, that a district court is not
permitted to impose a revocation sentence based upon these
omitted conditions.”).
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Here, although the court relied in part on the
§ 3553(a)(2)(A) factors in justifying Huntley’s sentence, it did
not primarily rely on these factors, but instead explicitly
considered Huntley’s history and characteristics, the need for
deterrence and protection of the public, and the need for
treatment, when selecting the length of his supervised release
term. Thus, we discern no procedural error in Huntley’s
sentence.
Turning to substantive reasonableness, we conclude
that the court’s explanation adequately supported the extent of
its variance. The court specifically cited Huntley’s lengthy
and serious criminal history, his repeated violations of
supervision, his failure to comply with court-mandated sex
offender treatment, his repeated noncompliance with sex offender
registration requirements, his age, and the circumstances of his
underlying sex offense. The court described at length Huntley’s
criminal history and the seriousness of that conduct. We
conclude this explanation was more than sufficient to justify
the court’s decision to impose a fifteen-year term of supervised
release, and was sufficiently grounded in Huntley’s personal
circumstances to support the court’s sentence.
Because we discern no abuse of discretion, plain or
otherwise, in Huntley’s supervised release term and conditions,
we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral
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argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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