Daniel Sullivan v. City of Frederick, Maryland ( 2018 )


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  •                                     UNPUBLISHED
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
    No. 18-1061
    DANIEL SULLIVAN, Frederick Police Officer,
    Plaintiff - Appellant,
    v.
    CITY OF FREDERICK, MARYLAND; EDWARD HARGIS, Frederick Police
    Department Chief of Police, in his personal and professional capacity; PATRICK
    GROSSMAN, Captain, in his personal and professional capacity; THOMAS
    TOKARZ, Lieutenant, in his personal and professional capacity; JOHN DOE
    FREDERICK POLICE DEPARTMENT, in their personal and professional
    capacities; JANE DOE FREDERICK POLICE DEPARTMENT, in their personal
    and professional capacities,
    Defendants - Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
    James K. Bredar, Chief District Judge. (1:17-cv-01881-JKB)
    Submitted: August 31, 2018                                Decided: September 19, 2018
    Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, AGEE, Circuit Judge, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit
    Judge.
    Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
    Daniel L. Cox, THE COX LAW CENTER, LLC, Emmitsburg, Maryland; John Garza,
    GARZA LAW FIRM, P.A., Rockville, Maryland, for Appellant. Clifford B. Geiger,
    Darrell R. VanDeusen, J. Garrett Wozniak, KOLLMAN & SAUCIER, P.A., Timonium,
    Maryland, for Appellees.
    Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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    PER CURIAM:
    Daniel Sullivan appeals from the district court’s order granting Defendants’
    Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss his initial eight-count complaint and motion to
    strike his amended eight-count complaint. * The district court determined the counts
    alleged in the initial complaint failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted and
    that the amendments in the amended complaint were futile. We affirm.
    We review a district court’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo, accepting as
    true all the factual allegations contained in the complaint and drawing all reasonable
    inferences from those facts in favor of the plaintiff. Hall v. DIRECTV, LLC, 
    846 F.3d 757
    , 765 (4th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 
    138 S. Ct. 635
    (2018). “To survive a Rule
    12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must allege facts sufficient to raise a right to relief above
    the speculative level, thereby nudging the claims across the line from conceivable to
    plausible.” Burnette v. Fahey, 
    687 F.3d 171
    , 180 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation
    marks and alterations omitted). “[A]lthough we must accept the truthfulness of all factual
    allegations” in a complaint, 
    id., statements of
    bare legal conclusions “are not entitled to
    the assumption of truth.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 
    556 U.S. 662
    , 679 (2009). We will accept
    the conclusions the plaintiff draws from the facts “only to the extent they are plausible
    based on the factual allegations.” 
    Burnette, 687 F.3d at 180
    . Additionally, under Rule
    12(b)(6), documents explicitly incorporated into the complaint by reference, documents
    *
    Although the district court’s order dismissed count VIII in both complaints
    without prejudice, we have determined that the order is appealable. See Goode v. Cent.
    Va. Legal Aid Soc’y, Inc., 
    807 F.3d 619
    , 623-24 (4th Cir. 2015).
    3
    attached as exhibits, and documents submitted by a movant that were not attached to or
    expressly incorporated into a complaint that are integral to the complaint and authentic
    are considered. Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 
    822 F.3d 159
    , 164-66 (4th Cir. 2016).
    “[T]he grant or denial of an opportunity to amend is within the discretion of the
    district court.” Drager v. PLIVA USA, Inc., 
    741 F.3d 470
    , 474 (4th Cir. 2014) (internal
    quotation marks omitted). We thus review the district court’s denial of leave to amend
    for abuse of discretion. 
    Id. “A district
    court’s denial of leave to amend is appropriate
    when (1) the amendment would be prejudicial to the opposing party; (2) there has been
    bad faith on the part of the moving party; or (3) the amendment would have been futile.”
    
    Id. (internal quotation
    marks omitted).      Amendments are futile when “the proposed
    amendments could not withstand a motion to dismiss.” Perkins v. United States, 
    55 F.3d 910
    , 914 (4th Cir. 1995).
    We further may affirm the district court’s rulings on any ground supported by the
    record, regardless of the ground on which the district court relied. 
    Drager, 741 F.3d at 474
    .
    With these standards in mind, we have reviewed the record and the parties’ briefs
    and find no reversible error in the district court’s judgment. Counts I and III of the initial
    and amended complaints and count VI of the initial complaint failed to state plausible
    claims for relief for the reasons stated by the district court. Sullivan v. City of Frederick,
    Md., No. 1:17-cv-01881-JKB. (D. Md. Jan. 9, 2018). Count II in both complaints fails to
    state a plausible claim for relief based on Sullivan’s failure to allege he was intentionally
    treated differently from others similarly situated. See Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric.,
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    553 U.S. 591
    , 603-04 (2008); Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 
    528 U.S. 562
    , 563-64 (2000)
    (per curiam); Morrison v. Garraghty, 
    239 F.3d 648
    , 654 (4th Cir. 2001). Count IV in
    both complaints fails to state a plausible claim for relief based on Sullivan’s failure to
    allege discrimination on the basis of membership in any particular class and his bare
    assertions of a conspiracy. See 
    Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
    ; A Soc’y Without A Name v.
    Virginia, 
    655 F.3d 342
    , 346-47 (4th Cir. 2011); Simmons v. Poe, 
    47 F.3d 1370
    , 1377
    (4th Cir. 1995). Count V in both complaints and count VI in the amended complaint fail
    to state plausible claims for relief because those counts offered only “labels and
    conclusions” and “naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.”           
    Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
    (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Count VII in both
    complaints fails to state a plausible claim for relief because the statements at issue were
    not defamatory for the reasons noted by the district court. Sullivan, No. 1:17-cv-01881-
    JKB (D. Md. Jan. 9, 2018). We also discern no reversible error in the district court’s
    dismissal of count VIII in both complaints without prejudice to allow Sullivan to refile
    his claim in state court. See Md. Code Ann., General Provisions § 4-362(a).
    Sullivan’s arguments on appeal do not establish to the contrary, and we reject
    them as without merit. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order. We dispense
    with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in
    the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
    AFFIRMED
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