United States v. John Boyles ( 2015 )

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 14-4888
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JOHN A. BOYLES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Elkins. John Preston Bailey,
Chief District Judge. (2:14-cr-00006-JPB-JSK-1)
Submitted: March 17, 2015 Decided: March 23, 2015
Before KEENAN, WYNN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Katy J. Cimino, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Kristen M.
Leddy, Research and Writing Specialist, Clarksburg, West
Virginia, for Appellant. William J. Ihlenfeld, II, United
States Attorney, Stephen D. Warner, Assistant United States
Attorney, Elkins, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
John A. Boyles pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea
agreement, to aiding and abetting the distribution of crack
cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) (2012)
and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). At sentencing, the district court
varied downward from Boyles’ advisory Sentencing Guidelines
range of 108-135 months and imposed a 97-month sentence, to be
followed by a 3-year term of supervised release. On appeal,
Boyles contends that the district court erred in applying a two-
level enhancement pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§ 2D1.1(b)(1) (2014). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
This court reviews a sentence for reasonableness, applying
an abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552
U.S. 38, 46, 51 (2007); United States v. Dowell, 771 F.3d 162,
169 (4th Cir. 2014). In conducting procedural reasonableness
review, we examine the sentence for “significant procedural
error,” including “failing to calculate (or improperly
calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as
mandatory, failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a)
[(2012)] factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly
erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen
sentence[.]” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. We presume on appeal that a
sentence that is below the defendant’s properly calculated
advisory Guidelines range is substantively reasonable. United
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States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
135 S. Ct. 421 (2014); United States v. Susi, 674 F.3d 278, 289
(4th Cir. 2012).
The lone issue for our consideration is Boyles’ claim that
the district court erred in enhancing his offense level under
USSG § 2D1.1(b)(1). We review the application of this
Guidelines enhancement for clear error. United States v.
Manigan, 592 F.3d 621, 630-31 (4th Cir. 2010).
The Guidelines provide for a two-level increase in the
defendant’s base offense level for a drug offense “[i]f a
dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was possessed[.]” USSG
§ 2D1.1(b)(1). The § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement is proper when the
weapon at issue “was possessed in connection with drug activity
that was part of the same course of conduct or common scheme as
the offense of conviction[,]” Manigan, 592 F.3d at 628–29
(internal quotation marks omitted), even in the absence of
“proof of precisely concurrent acts, for example, gun in hand
while in the act of storing drugs, drugs in hand while in the
act of retrieving a gun.” United States v. Harris, 128 F.3d
850, 852 (4th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“Rather, proof of constructive possession of the [firearm] is
sufficient, and the Government is entitled to rely on
circumstantial evidence to carry its burden.” Manigan, 592 F.3d
at 629. The defendant bears the burden of showing that a
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connection between his possession of a firearm and his narcotics
offense is “clearly improbable.” Harris, 128 F.3d at 853.
We conclude that Boyles failed to satisfy his burden. The
two-level enhancement is well supported by the facts set forth
in the presentence report, which Boyles did not contest.
Particularly, upon execution of a search warrant for Boyles’
property, the police discovered a loaded shotgun in the rear
bedroom of Boyles’ trailer. Earlier, Boyles had sold crack
cocaine to a confidential informant in the kitchen of that same
trailer. The search of the trailer also yielded indicia of drug
trafficking, including paraphernalia, cash, and a digital scale,
and individually packaged quantities of cocaine and crack
cocaine were found on the curtilage of the trailer. We thus
discern no clear error in the district court’s application of
the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement.
We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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